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SCHOOLS AS REFORM CHANGERS: 






This dissertation examines how teachers and their allies utilize agency and draw on social 
capital to ignore, modify and altogether undo reforms. Focusing on 10 schools in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, this study investigates the mechanisms employed by teachers, principals, and school 
administrators across the city to counter a single teacher salary reform and maintain the status 
quo.  
This topic is explored in a study combining a mixed methods research methodology that 
includes analysis of interviews, teacher salary data, policy documents, and observation.  The 
analysis is framed in theories of social capital, power, and human agency as well as in the 
application of literature on transnational policy borrowing and lending. Through these theoretical 
lenses, this research contributes to scholarship on the nature of human agency, the impact of 
professional vitality and resiliency of conviction on resistance to change, and role that 
stratification and inequality play in shaping the lives of teachers. 
The study illustrates the endurance of longstanding norms and social hierarchies within 
the teaching workforce in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan; it shows how salary reforms can challenge 
longstanding views around teacher compensation norms; and finally, it further advances the 
argument that the transfer of global teacher policies from one context to another will necessarily 
result in a process of local adaptation, and one that may yield unintended consequences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation examines how an education reform aimed to improve education quality 
and attract new teachers to the profession instead led to a concerted effort on the part of teachers 
and schools to do away with the reform in order to maintain the status quo. In exploring how 
teachers and administrators employ agency and leverage social capital within and outside of 
school, this study aims to understand the dynamic interplay between policy aspirations, policy 
implementation, and reaction and modification of reforms in practice. 
This study investigates how experienced teachers and school administrators in Bishkek, 
the capital city of Kyrgyzstan1 used their authority, leveraged power, and utilized social capital 
to modify the 2011 reform2 that they deemed would diminish senior teachers’ earning potential 
and undermine their status and social standing within the school and society. The study 
endeavors to understand the mechanisms employed by senior teachers3 (and their allies) to 
modify and undo reforms. As explored in this dissertation, these mechanisms are both simple and 
complex: educators utilize loopholes to ignore policies not aligned with established norms and 
they undermine reform components when ignoring them is not possible.  
When policies are implemented based on models that do not fit local cultural norms and 
established social hierarchies within schools, reforms are met with resistance. This is what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz Republic are two standard names for the country and are used interchangeably. The word 
“Kyrgyz” can refer either to the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic (regardless of their ethnic background) or 
specifically to the Kyrgyz people, representing an ethnic group. Unless otherwise specified, I use the term Kyrgyz to 
refer to all people in the Kyrgyz Republic (e.g. “Kyrgyz teachers” refers to teachers in the Kyrgyz Republic, and not 
to teachers of Kyrgyz ethnic origin).  
2  The 2011 teacher salary reform that is examined in this dissertation is referred to interchangeably as the “2011 
reform,” “salary reform,” “remuneration reform,” and “the reform.” Unless otherwise specified, this all refers to the 
same policy that was introduced by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2011. 
3 Teachers with 20 or more years of teaching experience.  
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happened in the case of the 2011 teacher salary reform in the Kyrgyz Republic, which aggrieved 
veteran4 teachers and disrupted collegial homeostasis across schools in the country.  
This chapter begins with some background about the Kyrgyz Republic, including the 
socioeconomic context of the country today and a brief historic overview of the impact that 
sweeping political changes have had on the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991.  The chapter then introduced the 2011 teacher salary reform 
and discusses why veteran teachers in the capital city of the Kyrgyz Republic objected to its 
implementation. The chapter concludes with the guiding research questions of the study, and 
positions its significance in contributing to scholarship in the discipline of sociology and the 
sociology of education, the field of policy studies, as well as the study of Central Asia and the 
post-Soviet region.  
 
Context: Transition and the Rise of Inequality in Kyrgyzstan 
The last quarter century bore witness to swift political and economic change in the post-
Soviet space that resulted in the formation of 15 independent countries. Each country, including 
the Kyrgyz Republic, forged a new pathway for its economic development and sustainability.  
Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country of six million people located in Central Asia. In its 25 years 
of independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Kyrgyzstan has 
maintained a democratic system of government closely resembling a liberal welfare state model 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Because this study examines the motivations of different groups of teachers to accept, modify, or undermine the 
2011 reform, teachers are frequently referenced based on their generational standing: teachers who have been in the 
profession for over two decades are referred to as “veteran teachers,” “senior teachers,” “older teachers,” or 
“experienced teachers.” Unless otherwise specified, these terms are used interchangeably. The terms “of retirement 
age” or “teachers at or near retirement” are used when referring specifically to teachers who are approaching or are 
above the age of 55, which is the voluntary retirement age for teachers in Kyrgyzstan. Likewise, also 
interchangeable are terms referring to “young teachers,” “beginning teachers,” “new teachers,” and “inexperienced 
teachers” when referring to teachers who are new to the profession, with less than five years of teaching experience.  
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that relegates the functions of employment largely to the labor market sector (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
Democracy has not come without the cost of human lives to the Kyrgyz Republic. In 
2005, President Askar Akayev was ousted from office in the so-called Tulip Revolution, owing 
largely to the discontent of the Kyrgyz people with the level of corruption in the country (Juraev, 
2008; Lewis, 2008). In 2010, his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was also ousted for similar 
reasons. A spillover effect of the 2010 revolution was the rise of ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan’s 
southern region, which includes a sizable population of ethnic Uzbeks who are citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan. Two months following the fall of Bakiyev, violence erupted in Osh and other 
southern parts in the country and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, mostly ethnic 
Uzbeks (Bond & Koch, 2010; Hanks, 2011). 
In the economic sphere, since 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic has undergone significant 
structural reform, including swift liberalization and privatization of the labor market. While 
neighboring Central Asian republics have many natural resources, Kyrgyzstan does not, and it 
has far less capacity to financially support its citizens in periods of economic crisis. Neither the 
private sector nor the Kyrgyz government have been able to shield a large portion of the 
population from plunging into poverty following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The dramatic 
economic changes in the country have led to economic hardships and the rise of inequality as 
people have been forced to compete for limited employment opportunities and can no longer rely 
on the government either for work placement or a safety net. In 1999, less than a decade after the 
transition, nearly two-thirds of the population lived in poverty, and 23 percent of the population 
lived in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2001). While these percentages have rebounded, the 
number of people in Kyrgyzstan living in poverty as of 2015 still amounts to 32 percent, a 
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decrease from 38 percent in 2012, at the height of the economic recession in the region (World 
Bank, 2015). In the 2000s, more than 70 percent of people living in poverty were employed but 
with incomes not high enough to live above the national threshold of poverty (World Bank, 
2015).  
After Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991, the public sector’s role in providing gainful 
employment was greatly diminished.  Transition of the economic sector from a communist to a 
capitalist model resulted in socioeconomic stratification of Kyrgyz society, which increased 
income inequality in the country (World Bank, 2001). Thousands of people found themselves 
unemployed or underemployed, while others were newly employed in the private sector or 
became first time entrepreneurs and business owners.  
For most people, this also meant employment in the vast informal or semi-formal 
economy in the country.  The informal economy in Kyrgyzstan encompasses upwards of 50 
percent of the total revenue production in the country and includes as much as 70 percent of the 
workforce (Nasritdinov, Rayapova, Kholmatova, Damirbek, & Igoshina, 2010; OECD, 2010). 
The span of the informal economy has dire implications on tax revenue, posing serious 
challenges in filling government coffers to pay for public services. As such, a cycle is deeply 
entrenched: the informal economy precludes tax collection, the government is limited in the 
resources it is able to allocate for government spending, including on salaries, and in turn public 
sector employees turn to the informal economy to supplement their meager earnings (Vlachaki, 
2015).  As this dissertation shows, this has significant repercussions in the teaching profession.   
The most prevalent class-based division of Kyrgyz society today is that of the poor and 
non-poor. This largely results from the division by employment status and employment sector. 
The majority of the population now works in the private sector, which accounts for 75 percent of 
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GDP and 80 percent of employment (World Bank, 2012). Public service jobs that were 
prestigious during the Soviet era, such as civil service and the teaching profession have since lost 
status and declined in earning potential. 
Additionally, Kyrgyz society has become stratified geographically (with the rural 
population poorer than the urban population), as well as by household size (with larger families 
being on average poorer than families with fewer children), level of education (with those who 
are illiterate four times more likely to be impoverished than those who have higher education), 
and by gender (women increasingly have lower earnings than men in the country) (World Bank, 
2011). As the salary of public sector workers decreased, teachers have also become a population 
vulnerable to poverty.  
Despite the prevalence of stratification along economic class lines in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz society has also largely retained traditional values and social norms based 
on age hierarchies (Gleason, 2003; Hann, 2002). In professional settings, particularly in the 
public sector, rank, experience, and age continue to be associated with power, privilege, and 
position. Those who fall into those categories expect that this order will be maintained. As seen 
in this study, bucking these norms, even inadvertently, has proven to have significant 
repercussions for the implementation of reforms. 
 
The Root of Reform 
Due to its descent into poverty in the early 1990’s, Kyrgyzstan is today classified as a 
lower-middle income developing country by international donor organizations and relies on 
international aid for many human development projects. Yet the country shares a history of 
human development in the 20th century with the “second” world, a now historical classification 
of former socialist republics that included all former Soviet Republics and sphere of influence 
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countries (Steiner-Khamsi & Strolpe, 2004). In the education sector, Soviet education policies 
have left a legacy of universal literacy, multilingualism, and educational equity. Despite the 
education successes of the Soviet era, including near-universal literacy and educational access in 
remote and mountainous regions, over the last 25 years Kyrgyzstan has slipped in indicators of 
education sector success (Silova, Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007). The generation that was born 
and educated in Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union had less access and means to 
complete basic and tertiary education than their parents. In 2006 and 2009, Kyrgyzstan 
participated in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), an internationally 
administered test of student knowledge of reading, mathematics, and science. Both years, the 
country scored at the very bottom. These factors all contributed to the development of crisis 
scenario rhetoric about the decline of education quality in the country that was emerging within 
the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES), among the international donor community, as 
well as in the public sphere. Concern about a looming crisis of the pedagogical cadre became 
prevalent as well at this time (Shamatov & Sainazarov, 2010).  
 
Discontent of the Pedagogical Cadre 
The situation of teacher salaries in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space 
deteriorated in the course of two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Silova, 
Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007). In 2010, teachers were earning the lowest salaries of all 
professionals in the country, at 55 percent of the average national salary (National Statistical 
Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014). At this time, teachers were leaving the profession in 
droves and new teachers were either not entering the profession altogether or leaving after a 
short tenure.   
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The abysmally low teacher salaries, futile recruitment and retention practices, and 
embarrassment and concern regarding Kyrgyzstan’s bottom-rank performance on the PISA test 
were all factors that contributed to the crisis scenario within the teaching profession that 
unfolded in 2010. That year, teachers organized public protests in the capital city of Bishkek, 
pressuring the government to raise the salary of teachers and reconsider practices for attracting 
and retaining teachers.  
With internal pressure as well as pressure from international organizations promoting 
“best practice” solutions, MoES set forth to reform the Soviet compensation system (called the 
stavka system). This resulted in the implementation of a teacher salary reform in the spring of 
2011. The reform had several objectives: make the profession more attractive to recent university 
graduates; solve the problem of teachers taking on overburdening teaching loads by limiting the 
number of teaching hours assigned per teacher; and raise student learning outcomes by 
incentivizing teachers to improve in their work. However, what the reform did not account for is 
the extent to which each of these goals contradicts the age-stratified norms deeply rooted in 
Bishkek’s school environment.   
 
Implementing the 2011 Teacher Salary Reform 
  The reform, which came at the height of teacher discontent due to historically low wages, 
raised the overall salaries of teachers around the country and set out to restructured the 
cumbersome Soviet salary schema. The reform aligned the remuneration of teachers based on 
their level of education in addition to years of work experience rather than on work experience 
alone. A weekly workload and teaching load ceiling were set to ensure that teachers were not 
taking on an egregious number of teaching hours. Finally, the reform also introduced the 
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Stimulus Fund5, a performance-based incentive pay component of the salary aimed to attract new 
teachers to the profession and to motivate all teachers to improve the quality of their work. 
What the reform also set out to do was eliminate the Soviet era compensation schema and 
organization of teachers’ work that was inculcated over decades on age-stratified norms and 
social hierarchies, and which senior teachers held in high regard and deemed equitable.  
The Soviet structure of teachers’ work and the accompanying remuneration system is 
known as the stavka system. The stavka system is organized to compensate teachers per assigned 
teaching load (typically 18-22 teaching hours per week in the post-Soviet era) and other tasks 
such as grading and homeroom duties. In the stavka system, teachers’ designated hours of 
teaching and other tasks comprise the bulk of their salary. Additional factors that increase 
teacher salaries include the geographic location of the school (teachers working in rural or 
mountainous areas received extra salary allowances); the rank (“category”) that teachers obtain 
through an attestation process6; honorary titles earned by teachers throughout their career; and 
years of teaching experience. Since the teaching load can change from year to year and often 
fluctuates even within a single school year, the stavka system does not guarantee a fixed salary 
for teachers.  While in the Soviet Union, the stavka system provided optimal flexibility for 
teachers and schools to customize work schedules and school programming, in the post-Soviet 
era, the stavka system left teachers financially vulnerable due to year-to-year (or even within-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Stimulus Fund is the official term given by the Ministry of Education and Science for a new component of 
salary under the 2011 reform. Throughout this work, the Stimulus Fund is also referred to as “incentive pay,” “bonus 
pay,” “stimulus pay,” and “performance pay.” In this study, these terms are used interchangeably without specific 
reference to any definitional differences of these concepts that exist in education literature.    
6 Before it was eliminated, the attestation process involved teachers attending professional development workshops, 
demoing their lessons to colleagues and compiling lesson plan portfolios that were shared with school administrators 
and district education offices. For the most part, attaining a next-level category was a semi-automatic process with 
teachers moving through the ranks every couple of years or sooner if they received achievement awards or worked 
with students who won prizes in Olympiads, or academic competitions. Teacher categories were thus largely based 
on seniority.  
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year) salary fluctuations. The stavka system, which has remained in many post-Soviet republics, 
also mandates strict adherence to documentation protocols and meticulous record keeping of 
work tasks including time spent on teaching, grading, and extracurricular work.  
This salary schema maintained a highly age-stratified professional life course for 
teachers, in which teachers saw benefits over time and accumulated steady, periodic increases in 
salary for tenure on the job. This Soviet remuneration system for teachers was retained in 
Kyrgyzstan for two decades following independence. During this time, Kyrgyz society also 
maintained age-stratified norms within the teaching profession (Niyozov & Shamatov, 2006; 
Niyozov, 2004), compensating teachers at higher rates as they accrued more tenure on the job 
(with a final salary bump for experience at 20 years). Although post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan has 
become highly stratified along class lines, age-stratified norms are what persisted as the most 
salient classification of individuals into groups within the teaching profession. The decline of the 
prestige of the profession notwithstanding, reverence for senior teachers is woven into the 
narrative of schooling in Kyrgyzstan. Senior teachers continue to have the privilege to teach long 
after reaching retirement age, which allows them to collect a salary in addition to retirement 
benefits. In many schools, the most revered senior teachers also get to pick which classes they 
wish to teach and set preferences for their schedules. Senior teachers are also the institutional 
memory and the lifeline of schools, given that the turnover of new teachers is high. As this study 
shows, senior teachers benefit the most from strong alliances with colleagues, as well as with 
school principals and other administrators. They draw on these social capital resources to ensure 
that the structure of compensation remains favorable to them.  
 The stavka system of the Soviet and post-Soviet epochs can be contrasted with the 
teacher remuneration structure found in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
	  10	  
Development) countries, which functions as a fixed-salary system. In the fixed-salary system, 
teachers are compensated based on a contractual compensation package and work on either a 
full-time or part-time schedule. This guarantees a stable and predictable income for teachers and 
eliminates the competition between teachers for more work hours. The 2011 reform attempted to 
reorient the stavka system toward the OECD model.  
 
Impact of the Reform at the School Level 
In effect, however, the new salary structure did not attain the goals it set out to achieve. 
As discussed in detail in the findings chapters, while the new teacher remuneration policy did 
raise the overall salaries of all teachers, it also left a deep impression on senior teachers that the 
reform would benefit new teachers at the expense of the senior teachers. Senior teachers 
concluded that the new salary structure diminished the professional status of experienced 
teachers and amounted to a salary decrease for senior teachers and a salary increase for 
beginning teachers. Senior teachers were distraught over the elimination of the longstanding 
teacher categories of pay, which were replaced by compensation based on education level. They 
expressed feeling undermined for being compensated less per teaching hour than new entrants to 
the profession who had completed advanced degrees. Furthermore, senior teachers who had 
dedicated their professional lives to their work and anticipated attaining the highest earnings by 
the end of their careers saw competing for merit-based pay (the Stimulus Fund) with beginning 
teachers as an insult to their expertise as veteran teachers.  
The reform went through numerous legislative revisions since it was implemented in 
2011. In the span of three years, a number of amendments were introduced and major provisions 
of the reform were changed. The total number of teaching hours that teachers may now take on is 
higher than it was before the reform was implemented and many teachers now work more than 
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this maximum permissible number of hours. While it is known that the reform was significantly 
modified after 2011 (UNICEF, 2014), what has not been studied is how the reform was 
transformed at the school and teacher levels. This is what this dissertation endeavors to do: 
examine the ways in which this reform was modified and ultimately reverted back to the old 
stavka system.  
My hypothesis going into this research was that this was done largely by teachers at or 
near retirement age who saw the reform as threatening to their livelihoods and undermining their 
status in the age-stratified hierarchy of schools in the Kyrgyz Republic. As the study reveals, 
teachers and their allies (i.e. school administrators) employ all available options to ensure that 
new policies do not have detrimental effects on experienced teachers. The mechanisms of 
modifying the reform take on various forms including some universally applied techniques that 
are ubiquitous across schools as well as highly individualized school-level tactics developed to 
fit the context of a given school.  
 
Statement of the Research Questions 
In this study, it is my goal to flip the research question that underlies most policy studies: 
what impact did a given reform have on schools. Instead, I ask what impact did schools have on 
the reform? As such, it is my aim to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the interplay 
between reforms and the individuals they affect.  
This dissertation is guided by the following overarching research question and sub 
questions: 
In what ways do teachers and schools undo reforms? 
Sub questions: 
• What resources and tools do teachers and administrators utilize to undo reforms? 
• How do teachers and administrators employ agency and leverage social capital within and 
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outside of school? 
• Who are the main allies of teachers and administrators within and outside of school? 
• How do policymakers respond to the efforts of schools to undo reforms? 
 
Significance of the Study 
 In this study, it is my goal to understand how teachers and administrators who saw the 
2011 reform as a threat employed agency and leveraged social capital to maintain the status quo.  
This dissertation tracks the history of teacher policy through the Soviet and post-Soviet eras to 
understand the logic of the Soviet remuneration structure and why it continues to be seen locally 
as a model of equitable compensation. The study examines salary discrepancies across teachers 
of different age cohorts to discern the embeddedness of age-stratification in teacher 
compensation structures to answer the question of who “loses” and who “wins” when salary 
reforms are implemented. Finally, a close analysis of the implementation of the Stimulus Fund, 
or bonus pay, yields a deeper understanding of how bonus compensation can be utilized not only 
to reward teachers but also to undermine reforms.  
This study contributes to scholarship in seeking to understand how teachers and their 
allies maintain traditional, age-stratified norms and resist external norms including those 
associated with neo-liberalism and free market economics. While Kyrgyz society is changing 
along economic class lines, school have largely maintained age-stratified work environments and 
teachers have inherited salary structures that reflect those values. It is at this intersection of 
examining how teachers manage to hold steadfastly to age-stratified work structures and resist 
the pull to change offered by the 2011 salary reform that I seek to understand tensions between 
the old and the new, the global and the local.  
Although the Kyrgyz Republic is a small landlocked country in the Eurasian steppe, it is 
a model of a democracy in a region that is largely autocratic in rule. Like its neighbors, 
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Kyrgyzstan shares a similar legacy of Soviet education and a trajectory of post-Soviet 
educational development that overlaps in many aspects with other Central Asian republics and 
other countries in the region. A number of countries, such as Russia and Belarus, continue to use 
the stavka system for compensation of teachers, rendering this research applicable across 
countries and contexts.  
Kyrgyzstan is selected as the research site for this study because it offers a compelling 
example of a country that has witnessed a decline in teacher compensation and waning prestige 
of public sector work.  The attractiveness of the teaching profession has steadily declined, 
leading policymakers to consider policy action to once again attract qualified professionals and 
recent college graduates. Kyrgyzstan has also seen significant socioeconomic changes, including 
the rise of inequality and socioeconomic stratification and yet the country continues to retain 
highly age-stratified and hierarchical workforce norms within the public sector. The tension 
between the new market-driven workforce and enduring traditional values creates a context of 
competing norms and values. Investigating the interplay of these norms and age hierarchies in a 
changing socioeconomic reality can shed light on how individuals and institutions adapt to 
change.  
This research aims to contribute to the study of policy implementation, the field of 
comparative and international education, and to sociology and the sociology of education.  In 
examining how reforms that are antithetical to the local environment are undermined, modified, 
or altogether rejected, it is possible to learn more about the nature of human agency, the impact 
of professional vitality and resiliency of conviction on resistance to change, and role that 





This chapter has introduced the purpose of this study, offered a contextual background, 
and presented the research questions and significance of this work. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of relevant literature that informs this dissertation’s inquiry of how teachers undo education 
reforms that challenge the social hierarchies within their schools and undermine their status. 
Chapter 2 also presents a conceptual framework for the study. Chapter 3 covers the methodology 
and design of the present study. Chapters 4 through 7 examine the findings of the study and 











The purpose of this literature review is to arrive at an overview of empirical studies and 
theoretical scholarship that informs research on how teachers and schools utilize available 
resources to mitigate changes that undermine the professional status and the status quo of 
schools. Embedded both within literature on the teaching profession universally and as applies to 
the context of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the goal of this chapter is also to develop a conceptual 
framework to understand how individuals who work in environments that are hierarchical and 
age-stratified mobilize resources to topple education reforms.  
The literature review in this chapter is presented in two parts: first is an introduction of 
social stratification theories and a discussion of the impact of economic and political transition in 
traditional, age-stratified societies with a focus on Kyrgyzstan. It is observed that there is a 
dearth of scholarship on age-stratification as it applies to non-Western societies. This section also 
looks at literature on policy studies as is relevant to understanding the implementation process of 
the 2011 reform. The second part of the literature review presents theories of social capital with a 
view of how they have been applied to educational contexts and how they are useful to this 
research study.  
 
Age and Socioeconomic Stratification 
Stratification in a Transitioning Society: Age-stratification and Conflicting Norms in Post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan 
When swift political changes occur, countries experience a reorganization of their 
economic and social structures. The transition from Soviet socialism to a free market economy in 
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Kyrgyzstan resulted in rapid changes within Kyrgyz society, including the formation of new 
social and economic classes (Gleason, 2003; Hann, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 1, the country 
also experienced a significant rise in inequality as the economy shifted to encompass a public 
sector and a private sector, with the private sector quickly emerging as the sector garnering 
bigger economic gains for individuals and the public sector seeing declines in remuneration and 
associated professional prestige. This labor division ushered in a class of the unemployed or 
underemployed and income inequality in the country grew swiftly. While new economic classes 
have emerged in Kyrgyzstan, traditional hierarchical social norms based on age continue to 
persist, creating a tension in policy making between old values and new ideas. This first section 
of this chapter examines literature on class formation and social stratification and contextualizes 
it to Kyrgyzstan.  
According to Davis and Moore (1945) in their seminal article on the “functional necessity 
of stratification (Davis & Moore, 1945, p. 242), each society is organized based on some form of 
class structure and there are no “classless” societies (Ibid, p. 242). Yet the strive for eliminating 
class-based society was a core ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. This nominal 
goal was far from accomplished. As examined later in this study, the concept of equity in a 
socialist workplace actually necessitated the stratification of laborers (see Chapter 4).  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, government-assured employment caved and the 
labor market became fully exposed to free market forces, undermining any Soviet-era efforts to 
minimize class divisions. Class creation in Kyrgyzstan resulted in class inequality. However, as 
economic class formation was taking root, the traditional values of Kyrgyz society around age-
reverence in public and private life as well as the deeply inculcated Soviet-era values of earning 
rank and seniority in the workplace also remained powerful and enduring influences (Niyozov & 
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Shamatov, 2006; Niyozov, 2004). These are the values that I will refer to in this study as age-
stratified norms and age-based hierarchies. 
 The tension between the nascent capitalist ethos and durable age hierarchies came to the 
forefront in the public sector in Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet era. This dissertation examines 
how this played out in the teaching profession with the introduction of a reform that was deemed 
counter-normative by senior teachers.  
Scholarship on social stratification is ample for examining class, gender, and race. 
However, there is a dearth of research on stratification in transitioning societies in which a 
stratum based on age is formed. It is this gap in research and literature that my study aims to fill: 
understanding how groups of people classified by age and years of work experience (i.e. senior 
teachers) fight for survival, resources, and status when they are threated by competing norms (i.e. 
salary reform aimed to unwind age-based norms of compensation). 
 
Class Formation in Kyrgyz Society  
In his writings on class and status, Max Weber (1978 [1922]) stipulates that an 
individual’s class situation is ultimately determined by the market situation (Weber, 1978). Class 
is defined as “any group of people that is found in the same situation” (Ibid, p. 927) and classes 
are linked by common chances for mobility. The control of the labor market by the government 
during the Soviet era created a single public sector of employment and allowed for a strict 
organization of salary schedules to limit the differentiation of salaries across occupations while 
differentiating salaries within occupations based on factors that included, among others, 
experience, tenure, and rank. This facilitated the age-stratification of Soviet society, since 
experience, tenure, and rank are acquired in the course of one’s career. Once the Soviet Union 
was no more, the monolith organizing structure of a single government-controlled labor market 
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caved and the organization of the job market was fully exposed to free market forces. This was a 
profound shock to Kyrgyz society, particularly to the older generation. The bifurcation of the 
labor market created a new highly stratified economic class-based society with competition for 
the privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises and a decline in compensation within the 
public sector. In the transition to capitalism, labor market forces privileged individuals with 
business acumen over those with advanced education degrees, and employment in many 
professions that requires high levels of education saw a loss of earnings and prestige. This was 
the case for many highly educated public servants in Kyrgyzstan, including teachers, who 
experienced dramatic declines in salary relative to peers in other sectors. 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1993) offers a classification schema of how different countries 
rationalize the role of their public sector in supporting citizens throughout the life course, 
including the allocation of benefits to public sector employees and to individuals in adverse life 
circumstances. His classification of welfare state models includes the liberal welfare model, the 
social democratic model, and the communitarian model. These models, while predominantly 
applied to European and North American countries, can also inform the transition that took place 
in Kyrgyzstan, wherein the role of the government changed swiftly from offering a strong safety 
net to individuals to virtually no guarantees of state support for people’s well being.  
The social welfare regime of the Soviet Union provided comprehensive benefits to people 
in Kyrgyzstan, including housing, equitable access to education, and guaranteed employment. 
This closely resembles the social democratic model (although notably the political regime was 
not democratic) in which the state had a powerful role in income distribution policies, including 
setting salary standards and redistributing funding in a manner that was deemed equitable by the 
regime. Owing to the structural reforms that took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
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welfare regime changed from a socialist model to a liberal welfare state model, in which the state 
relegates responsibility of work attainment to individuals, emphasizes the role of the free market, 
and takes limited responsibility in providing support for people in poverty and does so only for 
the most destitute within the population.  
A complementary framework of analysis is to compare social welfare protections on a 
spectrum of individualistic to collectivist, with individualistic societies (such as the United 
States) historically having minimal state interventions and collectivist societies (such as 
Kyrgyzstan) having more protections for individuals.  According to DiPrete, De Graaf, Luijkx, 
Tahlin, and Blossfeld (1997), “an adequate conceptual scheme for distinguishing stratification 
outcomes must make use of both labor market and welfare state dimensions while recognizing 
that these two institutional axes are fundamentally linked “ (DiPrete et. al., 1997, p. 321). The 
post-Soviet Kyrgyz model of a free market economy and limited social welfare protections is 
contradictory to the expected social norms within that society, which has historically relied on 
strong government protections and traditional, collectivist norms. Additionally, capitalist markets 
are immune to norms around age and experience, rewarding only those who the market forces 
deem as most profitable. This is counter-normative for Kyrgyz society, particularly for people of 
advanced years who have come to rely on social welfare protections from the state. As Kathleen 
Kuehnast (1998) observed in her study of how people in Kyrgyzstan experienced the transition to 
a free market economy: there was for many a sense of being “‘cut loose’…and realizing that not 
even the new government or…extended family, could…assist…” (Kuehnast, 1998, p. 653) in 
supporting people in their everyday life, let alone ensuring the long-term wellbeing of the 
population.  
	  20	  
Structural change is a macroeconomic shift within the labor market where the 
organization of the workforce takes on a new and different trajectory and the distribution of jobs 
sees shifts between the public and private sectors (Gerber, 2002; DiPrete et. al., 1997). This shift 
results in the formation of new social classes as human capital and individual potential is 
weighted by labor market forces.  Yet the structuration processes of a new society result not only 
from economic reconfiguration.  Societies also have values-based norm setting mechanisms that 
produce and reproduce social structures (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). How a given society 
calibrates the re-stratification processes in a post-transition environment depends on its national 
context and inherited legacies of social stratification, power structures, and the utilization and 
transferability by various groups possessing different types of capital, including economic, 
political, and social (Gerber, 2002; Giddens, 1984).  
How society becomes restructured after a political and economic transition can be 
analyzed through a framework of categories of worth, which reflect institutional and societal 
norm setting processes that rank classes of people and professional groups. Brian Steensland 
(2006) builds on research before him on cultural categories of worth to develop a schema of how 
societies arrive at categories of deservingness, which includes moralizing the virtues of the 
private sector when that becomes the dominant and most gainful employment sector in the labor 
market. Categories of worth, he writes, “exert institutional influence when they interlock with 
patterned practices in ways that channel routinized action and allocate symbolic meanings” 
(Steensland, 2006, p. 1285). In Kyrgyzstan, the private sector quickly became a symbol of hard 
work and success in the post-transition era, while public sector work retreated to become a job 
sector of second (or last) resort, with lower economic outcomes. Additionally, the quality of jobs 
and the status associated with public sector work decreased in the post-transition labor market 
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(Gerber, 2002, p. 630). Meritocracy became a virtue of the new private sector workforce, a 
contrast to the public sector’s reliance on bureaucratic compliance. Public sector employees, 
including teachers, became bureaucrats rather than meritocratic contributors to society, and as 
such, the decline of prestige of the teaching profession in a post-transition environment was 
imminent. Age, experience, and job tenure became far less important in the labor market than 
they had been in all occupations in the Soviet era. 
Again, what is largely missing in Western scholarship on stratification is the study of 
stratification that spans beyond economic categories. While Kyrgyz society in the post-Soviet era 
did become stratified along economic class lines, what persisted alongside these new economic 
divides is the longstanding hierarchy of age and status. It is in this intersection of enduring age-
stratification and nascent economic stratification that I ground my study and it is in this space 
that I hope to make my contribution.  
 
The Role of New Spheres of Influence in the Education Sector 
Following Kyrgyz independence, the education sector in Kyrgyzstan was heavily 
impacted by global influences. Based on the country’s economic indicators (see Appendix A), 
the international community reclassified the country as “developing.” This was a shock to the 
Kyrgyz public (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006) because it positioned the country as a poor 
nation in need of aid. This categorization was far different than the Soviet approach to the 
financial tutelage of Central Asian republics, which were considered “brothers” in the pursuit of 
socialism with monetary transfers from Moscow to Frunze (now Bishkek) not characterized as 
aid but rather part of domestic budgetary distribution to the region. Despite this shock of 
reclassification, Kyrgyzstan was forced to confront the new reality of its finances and to accept 
foreign aid from international donors.  
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Just as Soviet financial support for Kyrgyzstan came with an ideological agenda, so too 
does international aid come laden with the values and policy influences from the funding 
countries or institutions.  As the economy of post-socialist republics began an onerous transition 
to capitalism, global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
imported structural adjustment policies and offered technical assistance in reconfiguring 
budgetary allocations to human development projects, including within the education sector 
(Steiner-Khamsi, 2012; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006). Various education projects 
were introduced in Kyrgyzstan in the years following the Soviet collapse, such as per capita 
financing for schools, community based early-childhood development, and voucher programs for 
teacher trainings (Silova  & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). These “borrowed” ideas were accepted 
largely because of the aid component rather than the project ideas that these policy packages 
offered (Ibid). The practice of soliciting aid became so ubiquitous that a culture of aid 
competition for grants emerged among government officials, whose roles now included gaining 
access to international donors and possessing requisite skills to secure grants and loans from 
international organizations. These grants and loans are commonly accepted regardless of the 
projects specifics and time demands that this imposes on educational institutions.  
The culture of “blind” aid acceptance at the policy level gets absorbed or refracted at the 
institutional and individual levels. In the context of the education sector, policies affect schools 
and the individuals that are part of the school community, including students, teachers, 
administrators, and parents.  It is at the school level and at the individual level that policies are 
ultimately implemented. Larry Cuban (1998) proposes that the standards policymakers have of 
reform implementation differ substantially from the standards that institutions and individuals 
have. At the policy level, reforms are tested against standards of fidelity and effectiveness 
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(Cuban, 1998). At the institutional and individual levels, reforms are examined based on “moral 
and service values inherent to teaching that differ from the technical and scientific values that 
policy elites possess (Cuban, 1998, p. 459). In the context of Kyrgyzstan, assessment of new 
polices at the school and individual levels is an especially sensitive and sensitized endeavor. It 
involves both an assessment of values imposed by policy elites as well as the foreign values that 
come with reforms that are adopted blindly by policymakers who accept foreign aid without 
regard for the impacts it may have on schools and communities. If new policies are judged to be 
incongruent within school contexts, the affected individuals are likely to mobilize to undermine 
that policy. 
 
The Impact of Political and Economic Transformations on the Teaching Profession: 
Change in Status and Prestige  
 
In his seminal book on teachers, Dan Lortie (1975) positions teaching within a 
sociological conceptualization of professional work, defining “an occupation… as a profession in 
part because people believe that its members jointly possess arcane knowledge on matters of 
vital public concern” (Lortie, 1975, p. 80). While teachers amass knowledge of their subject and 
acquire pedagogical expertise, the extent to which teachers are perceived to possess unique 
expertise over their knowledge domain varies across societies. A consequence of this is the 
commonly held public perception that anyone can teach (Ibid, p. 62). Eric Hoyle defines 
occupational prestige (2001) as “the public perception of the relative position of an occupation in 
a hierarchy of occupations” (Hoyle, 2001, p. 139). This conceptualization is useful because it is 
porous enough to account for the change in the prestige of a profession that results from 
socioeconomic transformation in society. In Kyrgyzstan, teacher salary declines and the 
decreased prestige associated with public sector employment renders the teaching profession low 
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in a hierarchy of occupations. Additionally, the feminization of the teaching profession and the 
perception that teaching is a “caring role” job with a high level of administrative control further 
positions teaching as a low-status profession (Drudy, 2008).  
When social and economic forces result in a decline of teacher status and prestige of the 
profession, identity and self-perception changes also take place. A study by Beijaard, Verloop, 
and Vermunt (2000) reveals that professional identity can have a strong impact on how teachers 
cope with change and the extent to which they are amenable to reforms that may contradict their 
sense of professional identity and threaten the stability of their work lives (Beijaard et al., 2000, 
p. 750).  Scholars have also pointed out that identity of teachers is dependent on both the 
pedagogical and technical knowledge they bring to their work as well as the larger social context 
that frames the course of their careers (Day & Gu, 2010; Van den Berg, 2002). Day, Kington, 
Stobart, and Sammons (2006) also look at teacher identity and theorize that the profession does 
not offer a stable self-conceptualization, particularly when socioeconomic transitions and 
education reforms impact stability within the profession. The researchers posit that the structure 
of the work in a given school and the agency that teachers are able to employ impacts identity 
formation of teachers. Teacher identity is also shaped by “the personal experiences of teachers 
and the social, cultural, and institutional environment in which they function on a daily basis” 
(Day et. al., 2006, p. 603). This speaks both to the class position that teachers occupy as 
members of society and professionals as well as the immediate environment of their schools and 
interactions with colleagues.  
The threat to identity is a potent factor in why teachers are averse to changes that threaten 
the status quo and may explain teachers’ reactions to policies that erode teacher status. Teachers’ 
commitment to the preservation of identity and the status quo is highly characteristic within the 
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profession (Kelchtermans, 1996; Day et al., 2006). Two functions that are paramount to teachers 
are the need to maintain professional stability and to mitigate vulnerability to the judgment of 
colleagues, administrators, and the outside community (Kelchtermans, 1996). Teachers are 
averse to change and are highly vested in identity preservation and status maintenance of the 
profession.  
Because reforms can threaten the status quo and challenge teacher status preservation 
goals (Donaldson et al., 2008), teachers generate in-school and out-of-school support for their 
work in order to maintain or elevate the esteem of the teaching profession. According to Hoyle 
(2001), esteem is “the regard in which an occupation is held by the general public by virtue of 
the personal qualities which members are perceived as bringing to their core task…[and it is] 
generated more by interpersonal than by technical skills in occupations such as teaching” (Hoyle, 
2001, p. 147). In contrast to Lortie’s view that perception of professionalization is rooted in a 
skill-based knowledge domain, Hoyle purports that esteem for the teaching profession is not 
based on the perceived skills possessed by teachers but rather based on their display of 
interpersonal skills both among colleagues and in non-school communities, which affirms the 
worthiness of their work and their professional status. This research suggests that teachers must 
maintain their status and build social capital through engagement with communities in and 
outside of school. 
How then do teachers cope with macro-level changes in society and reforms that threaten 
their social standing and professional lives? In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the introduction of a 
competitive free market system created new classes and repositioned individuals as agents in 
their own life course. The government now abstains from allocating social and professional roles 
for citizens. Social and professional stratification processes are largely dependent upon the labor 
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market rather than public policy set by the government. Individual agency is the force that 
determines individual gains, shapes social and economic development, and impacts social and 
professional status in the post-transition environment. An individual with agency can deploy 
power of decision making to meaningfully shape her own life and affect others (Archer, 1996, 
2000). According to Day et al. (2006), the process of mobilizing for change takes place in the 
space between the structure of society, including power relations across groups and the agency of 
individuals to coalesce for action (Day et al., 2006, p. 613).  What exactly these processes are for 
teachers in a post-transition environment is the subject of my research study.  
A notable body of work investigates questions as pertains to Kyrgyzstan and other 
Central Asian republics. Scholars of the post-Soviet space have a longstanding tradition of 
investigating the local adaptation of global reforms (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008; Steiner-
Khamsi, 2004; Chapmam et. al., 2005). It is my goal to also contribute to this line of scholarship 
by undertaking this present study to understand of how individuals in the Kyrgyz education 
system deploy agency to affect change.  
 
Agency: Action Within the Social Structures of School and Society 
Scholars who study human agency have made significant theoretical contributions to 
understanding the relationship between individual agency, social group dynamics, and collective 
resistance to change (Granovetter, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). Granovetter’s (1985) scholarship 
suggests that agency is not simply an individual’s rational action but rather action structured in 
contexts of resources, capital, status, and privileges that arise from norms established within 
society. Individual actors are strongly influenced by the social relationships that unfold in their 
immediate environment. They are deeply committed to sense making (Weick, 1976), both 
independently and with colleagues before taking action in response to threats. Factors such as 
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cohesion between individuals and groups impact environments and the social relations therein 
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 482).  
Whether or not individuals or groups employ agency to pursue desired goals such as 
undermining unfavorable reforms depends upon how willing they are to engage in risk taking 
behavior to achieve their goals. A large body of scholarship focuses specifically on teachers’ use 
of agency to achieve their pedagogical and professional goals. Lauren Anderson (2010) defines 
teacher agency as “teachers’ capacity to make choices, take principled action, and enact change” 
(Anderson, 2010, p. 541). In a study on teachers and risk taking behavior, Judith Ponticell (2003) 
identifies a relationship between risk, emotion, and teacher identity as it pertains to reforms. She 
suggests that reforms can have an impact on risk-taking behaviors of teachers and that “social 
interactions, organizational processes, and group or organizational values…influence collective 
risk-taking behavior” (Ponticell, 2003, p. 5). Ponticell also discusses prospect theory, which 
posits that when people fear loss they are generally risk averse, whereas situations of likely gain 
yield more risk-inclined behaviors (Ibid, p. 7). In the context of Kyrgyzstan, teachers who saw 
the introduction of 2011 teacher salary reform as a threat that would diminish their salary and 
status as expert teachers may have anticipated more potential for gain from taking the risk to 
undermine the reform.  
Teachers are the brokers and boundary spanners in schools and are ultimately the 
implementers of educational goals and reform agendas (Penuel, Riel, Krause, & Frank, 2009; 
Daly, Moolenaar, Bolivar, and Burke, 2010). The will and incentives to implement reforms lie 
within the bounds of cohesion and collaboration among colleagues. Likewise, the process of 
reform modification and subversion happens through the activation of teacher agency and the 
coalescence of strong ties among fellow teachers, administrators, and in some cases, 
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communities outside of schools. Teachers who are part of strong social networks are better able 
to harness resources to implement reforms in a manner most beneficial to them. By leveraging 
social networks and amassing social capital, teachers are able to employ agency and become 
highly influential in how reforms are implemented at the school level. Teacher agency can also 
yield negative gains for individual teachers, particularly for those beginning teachers who find 
themselves in work settings with mechanized routine structures and social or managerial 
expectations that either do not allow for individual agency or are heavily impacted by the 
monopolization of resources by senior teachers.  
 
Power and Social Capital 
The social standing and professional status that teachers occupy determines their position 
in society, including access to various social networks within and outside of their realm of work. 
How teachers access those networks and utilize them to attain their goals can be further 
understood by examining scholarship on social capital.  
The concept of social capital has become ubiquitous across the social sciences. While the 
concept was employed by the forefathers of modern sociology, including Max Weber and Emile 
Durkheim (Woolcock, 1998), it was the scholarship of late 20th century sociologists that 
catapulted social capital to the forefront of both theoretical and empirical research. Building on 
the ascent of economics research around human capital, Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman 
each independently defined and expanded the concept of social capital. Briefly, Bourdieu’s 
social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition,” in other words, one’s social network (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 248). For Coleman, social 
capital has a structural and contextual basis, which includes the “obligations and expectations, 
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which depend on trustworthiness of the social environment, information-flow capability of the 
social structure, and norms accompanied by sanction” (Coleman, 1988, p. S119). Others scholars 
have expanded these definitions of social capital to include additional dimensions beyond the 
structural and relational, to encompass, for example, cognitive and intellectual dimensions of 
social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
There is no scholarly consensus on a single definition of social capital (Woolcock, 1998). 
Rather, the concept has been applied broadly to examine how people utilize social network ties 
across social spheres; impacts of social capital on beliefs and social norms; and, the role of 
relational dimensions on the acquisition of valuable social and economic resources. The concept 
of social capital has also been widely applied to understand the relationship between schools and 
society and to examine school impacts on life outcomes. Mirroring Coleman’s definition of 
social capital that is premised on trust and the threat of social sanctions, Gamoran, Secada, and 
Marrett (2005) define social capital in the education sphere as the “trust, expectations, shared 
understandings, and a sense of obligations that may characterize networks of relationships 
among educators” (Gamoran et al., 2000, p. 51). Scholars have also shown that collaboration and 
collegiality among teachers allows for building social ties and social capital in schools (Gamoran 
et al., 2000; Smylie, 1992). Kip Tellez (1992) adds that within the teaching sphere, informal 
social ties among teachers are crucial for decision making, as are teachers’ ties with communities 
outside of schools. Both vertical and horizontal social capital formation (Coleman, 1990; Forrest 
& Kearns, 2001) is valuable to teachers.  
The acquisition of social capital is a process that is difficult to track and to measure, not 
least because social capital is fundamentally a theoretical and not a methodological construct. 
Nevertheless, many scholars have endeavored to study how the acquisition of social networks 
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can yield gains for individuals and groups by examining cases in which social capital has played 
a role in benefiting some groups of people over others (Kalogrides et al., 2011; Seidel et al., 
2000).  
Within the realm of research on the teaching profession, studies have shown that schools 
can be highly age-stratified, with older teachers benefiting from in-school social capital garnered 
over a long period of time through relationships built with colleagues and school administrators 
(Kalogrides et al., 2011). Because senior teachers have more social capital within schools, they 
are able to attain more privileges such as desirable classes and schedules than their junior 
colleagues, who are typically assigned to teach the least desirable classes (Ibid). In the case of 
Kyrgyzstan, where a larger teaching load results in higher compensation,7 senior teachers may 
receive a higher teaching load while junior teachers are relegated to a de-facto part-time work 
schedule. Kalogrides et al., also find that the more cohesion there is among older teachers in a 
school, the more likely it is that young teachers get the most undesirable class load. Researchers 
hypothesize that this occurs because principals aim to retain their experienced teachers to 
preserve continuity of experienced cadres and because they are often under significant social 
pressure to do so both within the school and from the community (Grissom, 2011). Parents 
advocate for experienced, older teachers to teach more classes than junior teachers. Particularly 
at prestigious schools, parents intervene as needed to support veteran teachers so that they are 
retained and to ensure that the ‘best’ teachers teach their children (Kalogrides et al., 2011, p. 6).  
While senior teachers benefit from social capital amassed in the course of their careers, 
beginning teachers and mid-career teachers may also acquire good standing and build strong 
relationships with their peers, school administrators, and networks beyond school. In one study, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Teachers in Kyrgyzstan are paid per teaching hour; see Chapter 4, Figure 4.1.  
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Donaldson, Susan, Kirkpatrick, Marinell, Steel, and Szczesiul (2008) investigate young teachers 
taking on additional roles in their schools that may garner them more access to school 
administrators. The study shows that while access of beginning teachers to administrators is not 
perceived as a threat by senior teachers, what is deemed unfavorable by senior teachers is when 
beginning teachers aim to directly challenge existing organizational or pedagogical practices 
within the school. Additionally, if young teachers take on “reform” roles – that is when they 
advocate for change – senior teachers may leverage their own power, agency, and social capital 
to subvert such action.       
Social capital can be used to achieve individual goals or common goals. Using social 
capital to achieve individual goals has been likened to a manifestation of Hobbesian behavior of 
individuals acting in self-interest as a result of challenging life circumstances or threats of further 
instability (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004; Portes & Landolt, 2000). When individuals use their 
social capital to undermine reforms for their own benefit, they are inadvertently working “to 
undermine collective social capital,” which leads to gains for some at the cost of others and 
diminishes the “civic spirit” of the entire community (Portes & Landolt, 2000, p. 535). 
Undermining reforms can diminish trust, collaboration, and cohesion of the school community.  
What are the plausible scenarios in which the utilization of social capital by some 
teachers undermines other teachers or the entire community of teachers in a school? Penuel, 
Krause, and Frank’s (2009) research on social networks formed in schools shows that teachers 
tend to form social ties with others who share similar backgrounds or professional experiences. 
For example, experienced teachers tend to form close social ties with peers of the same age 
group, beginning teachers tend to socialize with other new teachers, and teachers new to the 
school but not new to the teaching profession tend to forge social ties together. What this 
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suggests is that there are age-stratified group formations within schools, through which teachers 
build their professional knowledge and in-school social capital. Because some groups will be 
larger than others and will have closer proximity to school administrators, those groups may 
have more access to school administrators, which will enable them to exert more influence over 
administrative decision making processes, including reform implementation. In an age-stratified 
society like Kyrgyzstan, to the detriment of beginning teachers, age-stratified group cohesion 
within schools means that beginning teachers do not gain the same access to school resources as 
veteran teachers.  
An alternative assessment of school environment is proposed by Donaldson et al. (2008) 
who suggest that the teaching profession is in fact better equipped to resist hierarchies that exist 
within society because to a great extent the profession is “rooted [on the] professional norm of 
egalitarianism” (Donaldson et al., 2008, p. 1090). The extent to which this may be the case in 
traditional societies such as Kyrgyzstan that are deeply age-stratified and rooted in norms around 
social hierarchy and seniority is further investigated and explored in Chapter 6 of this study as 
part of the analysis of bonus pay distribution patterns across schools in Bishkek. 
Coburn and Russell’s (2008) research shows how teachers’ professional community 
networks can help implement reforms. Investigating curricular reforms in eight elementary 
schools in two school districts, they identify four factors of cohesion that impact the 
effectiveness of uniform implementation of new curriculum: structure of ties, access to expertise, 
trust, and the content of interaction (Coburn & Russell, 2008, p. 204). These factors in turn 
impact the strength of the professional community and the reception of the reform. This study 
shows how new policies influence social environments in the workplace, particularly if the 
policies affect different groups of teachers in different ways. However, strong professional 
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communities will often react in tandem to reforms, even if the reform may affect different groups 
of teachers in different ways. This could mean joint favorable action towards change or uniform 
rejection of a given reform. Indeed, cohesive communities can just as well have adverse impacts 
on policy implementation as positive impacts, depending on the convictions of the teachers, how 
teachers galvanize to deal with the reform, as well as how the policy implementation process 
unfolds at the school level (Spillane, 1999). Disjointed communities, especially when teacher 
turnover is prevalent, are not effective at implementing reforms that benefit the most members of 
the community of teachers or the school overall (Holme & Rangel, 2012). Rather, such school 
settings are environments of individualized actions to attain individual goals. This dissertation 
touches on the topic of what happens when high concentration of power lies with small groups of 
teachers or school administrators who negotiate reforms to the benefit of just a few people (See 
Chapter 6).  
A compelling schema of tracking cohesion and social capital flows within a school 
includes connection within, between, and beyond given communities (Pretty, 2003; Woolcock, 
2001,1998). Pretty (2003) calls the formation of these dimensions of connection, “bonding” 
(within group), “bridging” (across group), and “linking” (beyond group) (Pretty, 2003, p. 1913). 
In an analysis of how senior teachers build and leverage social capital, this can be extrapolated as 
individuals forming horizontals bonds with their immediate colleagues, likely in their own peer 
group or subject area; bridging is the work of moving vertically to connect either with other peer 
groups (below group) or to build rapport with school administrators or policymakers (above 
group). Moving beyond a given community in the context of schools is the relationship that 
teachers build with outside communities such as the parents of the children they teach, 
colleagues in other professional disciplines, businesses or not-for-profit organizations that have 
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some relationship with the school, or other entities (beyond group).  
Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) add to this discussion in their writings about the role that 
individuals must play in mobilizing groups to implement ideas. In addition to resources and 
favors as currency for bartering, actors also have the capacity to utilize ideological control 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, p. 30) to influence allies and to suppress the ideological views of 
adversaries. An ideological appeal for repealing reform can also be leveraged externally to 
petition to communities that have a stake in the outcomes of reforms. The notion that teachers 
are “street level bureaucrats” who must appeal to a broad constituency of peers and community 
members can be borrowed from the conceptualization of Michael Lipsky (1979), who explored 
the space of policy implementation as negotiated within and beyond the confines of brick-and-
mortar institutions through sustained engagement with communities. When street-level 
bureaucrats, teachers included, interact with communities, they gain agency to become the 
policymakers within their domains (Lipsky, 1979). 
How is it that teachers who have amassed social capital and are ready to employ agency 
to foster change (or to hinder change, as the case may be) are able to do so?  Czarniawska and 
Sevón (1996) offer a concise overview of organizational behavior as actions taken once the logic 
of consequentiality has been assessed. As examined in Chapters 6 of this dissertation, teachers 
and school administrators consider the pros and cons and risks of their actions and decide on the 
course that is deemed most beneficial, even if that means undermining reforms intended for 
progress.  Thus the “logic of consequentiality, or of rational choice, is used to legitimize the 
actions undertaken” (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, p. 3). This conceptualization is relevant in 
examining the actions of teachers and school administrators in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan who 
endeavored to ignore, undermine, and ultimately undo the 2011 salary reform. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Drawing on the body of literature in the field of policy studies and the study of social 
stratification and social capital theories, the conceptualization of this research study is derived 
from an assembly of landmark theoretical works and research studies that have informed my 
inquiry of how teachers deal with change and come to reject reforms that pose a threat to their 
professional status and the status quo. 
The following conceptual framework allows me to frame the hypothesis that teachers and 
schools administrators were the key actors who undid the 2011 teacher salary reform.  
Within a classic pathway of reform implementation that is anticipated by policymakers, it 
is presupposed that when a policy is introduced to schools it will be implemented by school 
administrators who will ensure compliance from teachers. However, there is often a gap between 
external expectations of reform implementation (to be a streamlined process) and internal 
pressures (to modify the reform so that it is minimally disruptive to the status quo). As Larry 
Cuban’s (1998) work suggests, schools and not policymakers are the entities that implement 
reforms. Additionally, teachers and administrators are the agents within schools that act to 
change reforms that are seen as incongruent with established values and norms.  
The 2011 teacher salary reform in Kyrgyzstan did not follow a linear trajectory of reform 
implementation. The policy proved porous in a manner that enabled teachers to employ agency 
in how the salary reform was implemented. Teachers were able to impact the reform 
implementation process at the school level and to modify the reform at the policy level. Building 
on the theory that it is not only reforms that change schools but also schools that change reforms, 
my research explores how this is accomplished. This study identifies the mechanisms through 
which teachers and administrators chip away at reforms that are antithetical to the core values of 
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their schools. This begins with assessing whether the risk of incompliance is more or less 
consequential than acquiescing to reform goals and utilizing social capital to forge alliances to 
identify loopholes in the reform.




The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research design of the study, including 
methods and sample selection. Additionally, the chapter addresses the validity, feasibility, and 
limitations of the study and discusses the ethical considerations in carrying out this research.  
As stated in Chapter 1, the overarching research question and sub questions that guide the 
inquiry of this dissertation are: 
In what ways do teachers and schools undo reforms? 
Sub questions: 
• What resources and tools do teachers and administrators utilize to undo reforms? 
• How do teachers and administrators employ agency and leverage social capital within and 
outside of school? 
• Who are the main allies of teachers and administrators within and outside of school? 
• How do policymakers respond to the efforts of schools to undo reforms? 
 
The goal of this study is to understand how teachers deal with undesirable change and to 
investigate how they negotiate power, use authority, and leverage social capital to modify or 
undo reforms that challenge the structure of their work lives and threaten to undermine their 
status in school and society. Against the backdrop of changes in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, 
including socioeconomic stratification following the collapse of the Soviet Union, senior 
teachers have the most to lose from reforms that challenge the status quo.  This study examines 
the complex processes that take place when individual teachers, cohorts of teachers and school 
administrators, and ultimately entire schools employ mechanisms to undo reforms.  
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Research Design 
The study utilizes a mixed method approach, which includes inferential statistical 
treatment of school level (n=10) and individual level data (n=712) from schools selected from a 
total of 96 schools in Bishkek. A Pearson correlation analysis and a linear multivariate regression 
analysis answer the question of whether senior teachers’ insistence that they are the “losers” in 
the 2011 reform is correct or merely perceived.  
The qualitative data collection component includes transcripts of 95 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with teachers and administrators at 10 schools in Bishkek and interviews 
with six policymakers. Each of these interviews was transcribed from Kyrgyz or Russian into 
Russian, coded and translated selectively by me into English for the purposes of inclusion in this 
dissertation.  Policy documents, salary and bonus pay criteria documents, and staff development 
materials were also collected during site visits and contributed to the formulation of the 
contextual understanding of each school and the overall analysis of reform implementation and 
resistance at the school level.  
This study employed the following data collection methods: 1) individual and group 
interviews with teachers, school administrators, and policymakers; 2) observations and 
researcher notes of school meetings; 3) review of school documents and artifacts and analysis of 
policy documents relevant to the implementation and legislative changes of the 2011 reform; 4) 
collection and quantitative treatment of salary tables comprising 712 overall entries and 549 
entries on teachers for 10 schools in the sample.  
Data collection was conducted at three levels: macro (city and national level for policy 
document collection and policy interviews), meso (school level for salary data and school-level 
Stimulus Fund documents), and micro (individual and small group level for interviews with 
informants). Document collection included: 1) school-level salary schedule documents for 96 
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schools; 2) district and city level statistics on teacher demographics for Bishkek; 3) data on 
teacher vacancies, student composition, and educational attainment figures; 4) bonus pay criteria 
and teacher accountability documents for 10 schools in the sample.  This scope of data collection 
provides the needed primary and secondary sources to attain a comprehensive understanding of 
the situation of the teaching profession in the Kyrgyz Republic. It also allows for triangulation of 
data and increasing the validity of the study’s findings.  
 
Research Site Selection  
Country. Single country studies in the field of comparative studies are useful for 
“hypothesis generation and ‘plausibility probes’, theory informing and theory-confirming, the 
analysis of so-called ‘deviant’ and ‘outlier’ cases and process tracing and elaboration of causal 
mechanisms” (Landman, 2003, p. 87). This research study aims to attain each of these goals, 
including hypothesis testing, theory generation, and an examination of processes. While the 
study is not specifically seeking deviant or outlier cases, the sampling approach (discussed in the 
following section) includes selecting schools that are both average schools and outliers, to allow 
for maximum variation and diverse representation by school type. 
Kyrgyzstan is selected as the country case for this study because it offers a compelling 
example of a country that has seen a decline in remuneration and associated prestige of public 
sector work.  The attractiveness of the teaching profession has also steadily declined, leading 
policymakers to consider policy action to once again attract qualified professionals and recent 
college graduates. Kyrgyzstan has also seen significant socioeconomic changes, including the 
rise of inequality yet continues to retain highly age-stratified and hierarchical workforce norms 
within the public sector. The tension between the new market-driven workforce and enduring 
traditional values creates a context of competing norms and values. This explains in part why the 
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introduction of the 2011 teacher salary reform in the country was seen by policymakers as a 
viable solution for growing the shrinking and aging workforce but proved ultimately to be 
incongruent within the school context. The norms and age hierarchies within schools sheds light 
on why in the period of three years the reform was largely undone. What is not clear however is 
how this was accomplished, who the key actors were in undoing the reform, and how they 
succeeded in this feat. This makes the Kyrgyz Republic a relevant research environment for 
examining how people deal with change and specifically how teachers who are threatened by 
reforms galvanize agency to modify them.  Kyrgyzstan shares similar challenges around teacher 
recruitment and retention with other countries in the post-Soviet region and other global 
education contexts and it is the aim of this research to shed light on the challenges that emerge 
for societies undergoing transformation in Central Asia and beyond.      
Region in country. Urban areas in Kyrgyzstan experience higher rates of economic 
inequality than rural areas (World Bank, 2013). This makes teachers in cities more likely than 
their rural counterparts to have a lower standard of living compared to other professionals. In the 
last 20 years, the adverse effect of this has been on the status of the teaching profession in urban 
areas, making the job of teaching an undesirable career choice, particularly for prospective 
pedagogues who are completing their post-secondary degrees in the field of education studies. 
Although Bishkek has the highest concentration in the country of higher education institutions 
that graduate students with teaching credentials, Bishkek schools see the highest rates of teacher 
vacancies. Table 3.1 shows the seven oblasts (regions) and two largest cities in the country by 
total number of reported teacher vacancies for the last two years that data is available.8  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This represents only the officially reported number of teacher vacancies; the actual number of vacancies is likely 
higher since schools do not necessarily report all vacancies to MoES. 
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Table 3.1. Reported teacher vacancies in Kyrgyzstan, by region, 2012/2013 – 2013/2014 
 
Teacher vacancies, 2012/2013 Teacher vacancies, 2013/2014 
Bishkek 170 155 
Osh (City) 100 98 
Jalal-Abad 109 89 
Batken 51 45 
Chuy 25 30 
Issyk-kul 18 20 
Talas 18 12 
Osh (Oblast) 11 12 
Narin 0 0 
Source: MoES 
Notably, Bishkek has the highest number of reported teacher vacancies. While many 
countries have gaps between teacher vacancies in rural and urban areas, the fact that in 
Kyrgyzstan the vacancies are higher in urban areas than rural areas is exceptional and makes 
Bishkek an interesting locale to study. 
Additionally, according to MoES, the number of teachers who are retired and still 
working in Bishkek schools nearly tripled in number and doubled in percentage between 2009/10 
and 2013/14 from 360 (seven percent) to 913 (14 percent). All the while, the number of 
beginning teachers remained approximately the same at 1,128 in 2009/10 and 1,488 in 2013/14 
(see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7). This makes Bishkek a compelling site for this research because it 
suggests that the capital city may have experienced the least bottom-line impact on eliminating 
teacher vacancies and recruiting new teachers into the workforce as a result of the 2011 reform. 
As this study and other studies on teachers in Kyrgyzstan reveal (Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2014), 
veteran teachers in urban areas perceived the reform as benefitting rural teachers and young 
teachers at the expense of senior teachers. When the reform was phased in, senior teachers in 
Bishkek were the most vehemently discontent cohort of teachers. As examined in detail in 
Chapter 6, they became the most active in their quest to return to the old model of compensation. 
Bishkek teachers also have the most proximal access to policymakers given that they are located 
	   42 
in the capital city and near the central offices of MoES and local district education offices. This 
too contributes to Bishkek being a compelling research site to understand whether and how 
access to power impacts action.  Because senior teachers in Bishkek perceived themselves to be 
the most negatively affected by the reform, had the most access to policymakers, and because the 
reform appears to have had the least impact on filling teaching vacancies in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz 
capital city is selected as the data collection site for this study. 
Schools.  Once Bishkek was selected as the site for research, data on public schools in the 
city was obtained from the Ministry of Education and Science for the purposes of school 
selection. The sampling frame includes 96 public education schools in Bishkek based on the 
obtained list of all public schools in the city for the academic year 2015/16. These schools serve 
over 127,000 students and employ over 7,000 teachers (MoES). 
Ten public schools in the city of Bishkek are selected as sites for school observation, 
interviews, and quantitative data collection. This number is selected because it allows for 
sufficient coverage of a range of school types and is also manageable for the purposes of analysis 
given the timeframe and scope of this dissertation. A stratified random sampling technique was 
used in the study to ensure diverse representation of schools. First, the categories used by MoES 
for classifying schools in Bishkek were identified. Records of descriptive data on schools 
collected from MoES show that the Ministry tracks schools based on the following categories: 
1. School type by specialization (general education, gymnasium, lyceum, special needs, 
night school, orphanage) 
2. Language of instruction (Russian, Kyrgyz, mixed) 
3. School by ownership (government, private, mixed) 
4. School capacity for enrollment  
5. Student enrollment (below or above capacity) 
6. Change in student enrollment from previous year 
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Based on these categories, I chose to use school type by specialization, language of instruction, 
school by ownership, and school enrollment (below or above capacity) as the selection criteria 
for the 10 sample schools in my study.  Additionally, although this category is not reported by 
MoES, my selection criteria also included the location of the school in the city: city center or 
outskirts of the city. This information was collected by conferring with the local UNICEF 
education experts in Bishkek. The location of the school is important because central Bishkek 
schools largely attract children of higher socioeconomic means from families where parents have 
the social and economic capital to gain admission to the most prestigious schools in the capital 
city. They also have the capacity to pay informal school fees to keep their child in the school. 
Schools located outside the city center serve a lot of children from families with lower economic 
means, including children of migrant families who have moved to Bishkek in pursuit of 
employment.  In the schools selected for this study, four schools in the sample are located in city 
center and six schools are on the outskirts of the city.  Table 3.2 shows the composition of 
schools in Bishkek based on data provided by MoES and the 10 schools selected for this study. 







School type by specialization   
Specialized schools   
Gymnasium or lyceum 25 2 
Lyceum 8 1 
Other (special needs schools, night 
schools, orphanages) 6 1 
Non-specialized schools   
General education school 57 6 
School type by language of instruction 
Russian schools 	   	  Russian as primary language of instruction 39 5 
Kyrgyz schools 	   	  
Kyrgyz as primary language of instruction 17 2 
Mixed language of instruction 40 3 
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School type by student enrollment (below or above capacity) 
Above capacity 93 9 
Below capacity 3 1 
 Source: MoES 
 For school type by specialization, it was my goal to get a cross-section of each school 
type in the city of Bishkek in order to get a view onto the unique challenges faced by each type 
of school as it confronted the 2011 reform. It was also my aim to gather demographic 
information and salary data on the composition of teachers at each type of school to determine if 
employment at different types of schools impacts the overall salary of teachers and whether 
specialized schools reacted to the 2011 reform any differently than non-specialized schools.  
The language of instruction of schools in Bishkek is another classification of type of 
school and is also a proxy indicator of demographics and resources. Russian-language schools 
are more prevalent in Bishkek than Kyrgyz language schools, though Table 3.2 does show that 
mixed language schools have now surpassed the number of Russian-language schools in the 
capital. Russian-language or Kyrgyz-Russian schools in Bishkek typically represent local rather 
than migrant student demographics. Many Kyrgyz-only language schools in Bishkek are new 
schools located in the outskirts of the city and have large student populations from migrant 
families who have come to the capital from the countryside. These schools usually have a high 
number of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds and their families are less likely to 
contribute funds to schools informally or pay teachers for supplemental educational services such 
as tutoring.  
The criterion of school by ownership was identified before the start of the data collection 
phase. Because this study examines the impact of a reform that affected only public school 
teachers, only data on public schools in Bishkek was collected. 
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And finally, the last criterion for school selection in the sample was whether schools are 
below or above enrollment capacity. Out of 96 public schools in Bishkek, only three schools are 
below enrollment capacity. All the other schools operate in two or more shifts to accommodate 
all the enrolled students. The average number of students enrolled in Bishkek schools in 2015/16 
was 1,293, whereas the average capacity of schools in Bishkek was 784 with an average growth 
of 96 students per school from the previous year (MoES). This gap between capacity and 
enrollment demonstrates the need for more teachers (and more schools) in the capital city.   
Table 3.3 shows the characteristics of each school selected for the study. The number of 
the school is randomly assigned from 1-10.9  
Table 3.3. Schools selected for study     
School         School Type Language of Instruction Location 
1 General education school Russian City outskirts 
2 Specialized: gymnasia Russian City center 
3 General education school* Russian City outskirts 
4 Specialized: lyceum Russian City center 
5 Specialized: special needs Russian City center 
6 General education school Mixed City outskirts 
7 General education school Mixed City outskirts 
8 General education school Kyrgyz City outskirts 
9 General education school Kyrgyz City outskirts 
10 Specialized: gymnasia Mixed City outskirts 
*Denotes school in the sample below enrollment capacity. 
As a way of introduction to the schools, the following descriptions offer a basic overview of each 
school that participated in the study.  
 
School 1. School 1 is located outside of the city center, in a residential neighborhood that 
encompasses many working class families. The school is a Russian language school and has a 
diverse student body that includes Kyrgyz, Russian, as well as many ethnic minority children, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 These school numbers are referenced in subsequent chapters. 
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such as Afghans and Kazaks. Most of the children enrolled at the school are children who live in 
the neighborhood, as are a lot of the teachers. A number of students at the school are recent 
arrivals to Bishkek; they are the children of migrants who have come to Bishkek for 
employment. Many migrant children do not speak Russian at home, resulting in a challenging 
language emersion environment at school.  
 There are 45 teachers employed at the school. Fifteen are teachers who are in the teaching 
profession for less than five years. The school is a regular, non-specialized school, and while it 
does face difficulties in recruiting teachers, the school also enjoys a longstanding work 
commitment from many veteran teachers who have spent the entirety of their careers in the 
education sector at this school in the neighborhood where they live and work. According to 
interviews with administrators and teachers at School 1, a number of teachers at the school have 
second jobs, including private tutoring and employment in private schools. The principal has not 
secured permission from the district education office to hold extracurricular classes, and so the 
school has no extra classes for which the parents pay. This means that a lot of teachers seek 
secondary income sources. 
 
School 2. This school is a Russian-language gymnasium school located in the center of 
Bishkek. The school has gymnasium status for approximately 10 years; before this, it was a 
regular school. According to interviews with school administrators, the school became a 
gymnasium after the current principal was appointed and advocated for specialized school status 
with the district education office and the Ministry of Education and Science. Subsequently, the 
school has grown significantly over the last decade and now has 1,700 students, 66 teachers who 
teach subject courses, and approximately 40 part-time teachers who mostly do extracurricular 
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work with students. There are many extracurricular opportunities at the school, owing to the 
financial support of parents who are willing to pay for extra classes for their children. 
 
School 3. Located outside of the city center but not in the largely migrant-populated areas 
of Bishkek, this neighborhood Russian-language school draws students from the vicinity as well 
as students who for any number of reasons could not remain in other schools in which they were 
previously enrolled.  The school is working to overcome its longstanding reputation as the 
“catch-all” school for students who get expelled from other schools. With only 425 students, this 
is one of just three schools in the city that is below enrollment capacity. There are 17 teachers at 
the school, with three who are of retirement age and nine who are new to the school and have 
less than five years of teaching experience. The school has a challenge of retaining new teachers 
because as a regular non-specialized school, there are no government supplements for teachers 
and because the school is located in a working class neighborhood parents contribute only 
modest informal fees to the school and the demand for supplemental classes is limited.  
 
School 4. This is a prestigious school specializing in science education, located in the 
center of the city. The principal has led the school since 1992.  At that time, the school had seven 
bio-chemistry classes; now it only has one, owing to decreasing demand for math and science 
specializations as compared to demand in the Soviet era. Nevertheless, the principal takes great 
pride in the continued prestige of the school and the support the school enjoys from parents, 
many of whom are graduates of the school as well. The school has 60 teachers and 1,200 
students and like other specialized schools in Bishkek, it exceeds its enrollment capacity. The 
school is known to attract families who aim for their children to become doctors, pharmacists, 
and lawyers. According to the principal, many of the parents who are alumni are themselves 
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doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. Parents regularly help the school with various 
expenses, including capital projects. Most recently, parents contributed to repairing the 
playground on school grounds. 
The school is also mandated to enroll students who are zoned to attend it based on their 
home address. For these students, the school establishes less advanced classes than for the 
students accepted into the more rigorous academic track.  
The majority of teachers at the school (62 percent) have been with the school for at least 
10 years. Twenty-six teachers are veteran teachers who have been with the school for at least 20 
years, amounting to most if not all of their work lives. Young teachers do join the teaching ranks 
every year, but most do not stay for the long term. In the 2015/16 academic year only one teacher 
with less than one year of work experience was assigned to teach 14 hours. The seven other 
young teachers who joined the school in the last five years have been assigned to work as 
extracurricular coordinators, which yields salaries far lower than regular teachers (see Chapter 
7). 
 
School 5. School 5 is one of three special needs schools in the city of Bishkek, catering to 
students with learning disabilities and mental illness. As a specialized school, it receives students 
from all over the city. The school’s official language of instruction is Russian and in the 2014/15 
academic year the school was just slightly over capacity. Because the school serves special needs 
students, the students come from different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
 There are 28 teachers at this school and given the school’s specialization, each teacher 
receives an additional 25 percent toward her salary for each teaching hour. Nevertheless, the 
school’s younger teachers are hard to retain because the nature of the work with students is 
challenging and according to the principal and vice principal, the school does not accept any 
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informal fees from parents, which means that the school has no discretionary funds to allocate 
for special projects or additional classes. There is high turnover of teachers at this school and in 
the 2015/16 school year, almost a third of the teachers (nine teachers in total) were comprised of 
beginner teachers with less than five years of work experience. School administrators emphasize 
that they do not have strong ties to the Ministry of Education and Science or to the Bishkek 
Department of Education and instead feel slighted by the authorities. Many informants at the 
school reported that they feel forgotten and neglected by education officials because they are a 
school catering to the needs of marginalized students.   
 
School 6. School 6 is a regular, non-specialized school located outside of the city center, 
not far from one of the city’s major outdoor markets. Many migrant workers who have come to 
work in Bishkek seek employment at this bazaar and a large portion of students enrolled at the 
school are children of migrants as well as children born into Bishkek working class families. The 
school has both Kyrgyz-language classes and Russian-language classes, which are referred to as 
“the Kyrgyz school” and “the Russian school” by teachers and administrators.  
The principal of the school was dismissed at the end of 2015 because of an alleged 
confrontation between the principal and a teacher. Additionally, according to an interview with a 
school administrator, the principal was repeatedly reported to authorities for soliciting money 
from parents. This has created tensions and concerns among colleagues at the school. A new 
acting principal is in place and she is determined to restore order and trust at the school. 
 Because the school is a regular, non-specialized school located outside of city center, 
among its challenges is attracting and retaining teachers. The school teacher salary list reports 
that 53 teachers are employed at the school of which 30 percent (16 teachers in total) are teachers 
with less than five years of experience. School interviews reveal that the school has a lot of 
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young teachers because many of the more senior teachers have left. While not exceptional, it is 
unusual for schools in Bishkek to rely on staffing the school with novice rather than experienced 
teachers.  As the school’s social worker observed, “Yes, as of late, the school has hired a lot of 
young teachers.” When asked why the school does not hire experienced teachers, she responded, 
“It must be that there aren’t many. The teachers we have a problem hiring are teachers for 
Russian classes, as well as mathematics, physics and chemistry teachers” (Administrator 
Interview 6, December 2015). 
 
School 7. This school is located on the outskirts of the city and largely serves students 
from the neighborhood, which includes children of longtime Bishkek residents in the vicinity of 
the school as well as children of migrants to the capital from other regions of the country. This is 
a regular school with classes both in Kyrgyz and in Russian. While the school is over capacity 
with over 1,000 students, it is not as crowded as the specialized schools in the center of the city.  
According to the principal, when she came to lead the school nine years ago, the school 
was dilapidated and she has worked diligently to improve its conditions (Principal Interview 8, 
October 2015). When she came on board, most staff were very experienced and many of them 
continue to work at the school today. Of the 40 teachers at the school, eight have less than five 
years of teaching experience and the majority of teachers (24 in total) are veteran teachers with 
20 or more years of work experience.  
 
School 8. This is a new school that opened within the last 10 years to meet the growing 
population demands in Bishkek, which sees significant continuous migration from other 
provinces of the country. The school is located in the outskirts of the city where many migrants 
live and work. The school’s language of instruction is Kyrgyz and since its opening the school 
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has reached enrollment over its capacity. School 8 employs 63 teachers, of whom more than half 
(33 teachers in total) have less than 10 years of teaching experience, with 23 having less than 
five years of work experience. In an interview, the principal has stated that she makes a 
concerted effort to attract young professionals to the school and to retain them (Administrator 
Interview 16, November 2015). 
 
School 9. This school was built in the last 20 years to meet the demands of a growing 
Bishkek, including in the outskirt regions of the city, which have become increasingly inhabited 
by migrant workers. The school is Kyrgyz-language only and is located near one of the large 
open markets in the city. The same principal has been head of school since the school opened. 
The school is now over capacity by more than twofold and has 72 teachers on staff. A number of 
teachers and administrators have been with the school since its founding. Yet 48 percent of the 
teachers at the school are beginning teachers with less than five years of work experience. 
Teachers turnover is high among new teachers.  
 
School 10. This is one of the most prestigious gymnasium schools in Bishkek. Located in 
the center of the city, this school has classes in Russian as well as Kyrgyz and works in three 
shifts to accommodate the more than 2,700 enrolled students. The school employs 165 teachers 
of whom 28 (16 percent) are beginner teachers. Another 28 staff members run the many 
extracurricular classes for students whose families are willing to pay for them.  
 Initially, the principal at this school did not want to participate in this study, stating that 
the teachers are too preoccupied with their work to take time out for interviews. On the second 
round of following up with the school and after a final invitation for participation, the principal 
did agree to have the school be in the study, though she did not make herself available for an 
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interview, diverting the task to one of her deputies. As with other gymnasium and specialized 
schools, this school is resourceful in retaining its top teachers by offering them opportunities to 
teach extracurricular classes and allowing teachers to have the proximity to parents that enables 
them to collect additional funds. This school relies heavily on senior teachers, including teachers 
of retirement age, to carry the teaching load.  
 
Interviews. The study includes three levels of informants: teachers, school 
administrators, and policymakers. This scope of informants allows for a comprehensive and 
multifaceted examination of how the teacher salary reform impacted the 10 schools selected for 
this study and the mechanisms each school and the individuals therein employed to modify the 
reform. Table 3.4 below includes a count of the informants at each school. 
Table 3.4. Overview of interviews conducted at schools   
School Teachers Principal Vice Principal(s) Other administrator(s)10 Total school interviews 
1 10 1 3 - 14 
2 8 1 2 1 12 
3 4 1 1 - 6 
4 9 1 1 - 11 
5 5 1 1 - 7 
6 7 1 0 1 9 
7 6 1 1 - 8 
8 5 1 0 1 7 
9 7 1 2 2 12 
10 7 0 2 - 9 
Total 68 9 13 5 95 
 
 
The three levels of informants as well as the data from salary documents and other policy 
artifacts collected from schools allow for the validation and corroboration of the data. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Other administrators include school librarian, social worker, extracurricular organizers, and head of school 
operations. 	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School administrators. Administrators, including principals, vice principals, and other 
school staff (e.g. librarian, social worker) were selected for interviews to attain the goal of 
speaking with at least two administrators per school. The interview with the principal or the vice 
principal was the first interview conducted at each school. In some instances, the first meeting 
with the principal is an introductory and informal meeting after which a follow up meeting is 
arranged for the full interview. Introductory meetings lasted approximately 15 minutes and full 
interviews were between 45 minutes and an hour.  
School administrators were asked about their experience of working at the school, the 
school environment as a workplace, dynamics among teachers and between teachers and 
administrators (see Appendix A).  Administrators were also asked how they overcame the 
teacher grievances and ensuing challenges following the introduction of the 2011 salary reform. 
Finally, the administrators also shared with me information on how the Stimulus Fund is tracked 
and allocated at their school and were asked (if they were willing to share) how much they rely 
on the financial support of parents to ensure the successful operations and extra programming for 
the school. Additionally, because schools in Bishkek are hierarchical, the principal and other 
administrators at the school were the focal points for establishing a rapport with teachers and 
arranging for interviews with teachers.  
Teachers. Teachers comprise the largest group of informants in this study. Because the 
study focuses on the salary reform components that were perceived to have negative 
repercussions on senior teachers, at least one teacher with 20 or more years of teaching 
experience is interviewed at each school. If a selected school did not have teachers with 20 or 
more years of experience available or willing to sit for an interview, the most senior teacher 
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cohort was interviewed.11 Aside from ensuring that at least one teacher interviewed is an 
experienced teacher, other teachers were sought to reflect a cross-section of teachers at the 
school, including teachers of varying subject areas and years of teaching experience.  
Because many teachers at Bishkek schools work long hours and take on large teaching 
loads, I made the decision to allow the principal or the vice principal who was assisting me with 
interview arrangements at the school to help with the selection of teachers based on teachers 
availability for interviews. It was important to enlist the help of administrators because they are 
most familiar with teacher work schedules and their availability for a 30-45 minute conversation 
to ensure the least disruption to the school schedule. For this reason, teachers were selected 
through a convenience sample design based on which teachers were available to sit for an 
interview in the designated day(s) that I spent at the given school. I indicated to the administrator 
assisting me with selecting teachers for interviews my two criteria for selecting teachers: that at 
least one teacher should be an experienced teacher and teachers should be diverse in reflecting 
the teacher demographics at the school, including in subject area and years of teaching 
experience. Relying on school administrators to select teachers for interviews may have skewed 
the sample of informants to those teachers who the administrators trust the most. This is the very 
demographic of teachers that I sought: teachers who have the strongest ties to the administrators 
and who (as the research quickly came to reveal) aligned with the school administrators to 
ignore, undermine, and exploit the reform. It must also be noted that not all teachers selected for 
interviews spoke positively about the school, the school’s administrators, or expressed a sense of 
inclusion or alignment with the school’s leadership. 
All individual and group interviews with teachers started with an introduction of my 
research and background and an overview of the confidentiality protocols of the research and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This proved not to be the case at any school. 
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teachers’ ability to withdraw from participating in the study at any time, as per the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) protocol. Teachers were then invited to introduce themselves by first name 
only, indicate what subject they teach, how long they have been teaching overall and in the 
current school.  The conversation was then directed to their experience of working at the school, 
with questions prompting them to discuss the school environment, including how dynamics 
between teachers of different peer groups have changed over time. Teachers were also asked to 
reflect on the school’s implementation of the 2011 reform, including their own reactions to the 
reform, how the reform was implemented at their school, and their understanding of how the 
reform was adapted to fit the school context. Finally, teachers were asked about the role that the 
community of parents plays in the school, including how they support the school and the extent 
to which this has changed over the course of the country’s independence from the Soviet Union. 
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. 
Education officials and policymakers. At the start of the research endeavor, preliminary 
meetings were held in October 2015 with the Deputy Minister of Education of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the head of the Bishkek Education Department within the Bishkek Mayor’s Office, as 
well as with the heads of Bishkek’s four district education offices. These introductory meetings 
were held to inform each entity of the study and receive approval for the research. While the 
national Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for all schools in the country, the 
Bishkek Education Department within the Bishkek Mayor’s Office is responsible for overseeing 
all schools in Bishkek. The Bishkek Education Department is further subdivided into four district 
education offices that oversee schools located within their district of the city. 
 Interviews were conducted with the head of one district education office in Bishkek, the 
chief economist at the Ministry of Education and Science, and a lead researcher at the Academy 
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of Education of Kyrgyzstan (KAO), a policy research arm of MoES.  Each interview lasted 45 
minutes to an hour and a half. The goal of these meetings was to share information about my 
study and to gain the insights and perspective of policymakers about the goals and outcomes of 
the 2011 reform. At the time of document collection, three additional informal interviews were 
held with accountants at three of Bishkek’s district education offices to clarify questions 
regarding the teacher salary tables and the allocation of Stimulus Fund resources.  
School observation. In addition to interviews with school administrators, teachers, and 
policymakers, I was also granted permission by principals at four schools to attend a range of 
school activities, including weekly staff meetings of teachers and administrators, open lessons 
led by teachers, holiday teacher gatherings, and a myriad of school performances including 
school plays, drug-prevention campaign days, and festivals commemorating veterans and people 
with disabilities. The purpose of observations are twofold: to build rapport and trust with the 
school administrators and teachers and to observe the dynamics of staff within the school to 
more fully understand the school hierarchies and intergenerational interactions between teachers 
as well as between teachers and administrators. These observations were instrumental for 
understanding the contexts that shape staff dynamics at each school as well as the background 
information about each school.   Table 3.5 enumerates the events and meetings attended at the 
schools where I was invited to partake as a participant or an observer. 
 
Table 3.5. School meetings and events attended by researcher, 2015/16   
 
Researcher role Duration of event (hours) 
School 3     
End of term student awards ceremony and song 
and dance performance for teachers and parents  
observer 1.5 
Student performance in honor of veterans of the 
Afghanistan conflict (USSR era) 
observer and introduced 
to all attendees 2 
Teacher gathering on the occasion of 
International Women's Day 
participant 3 
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Open lesson by teacher of Russian observer 45 minutes 
School 4     
Open lesson by teacher of English observer 45 minutes 
Presentation and competition for advanced 
English language students on American culture 
facilitator 2 
Weekly meeting of teachers and administrators 
observer and introduced 
to all attendees 1 
Presentation by local bank branch on electronic 
transfers of funds 
observer 30 minutes 
School 5     
Student performances in celebration of day of 
disabilities awareness 
observer and asked to 
introduce myself and 
make some remarks 
2.5 
Lunch gathering with teachers and local police 
officers in celebration of day of disabilities 
awareness 
participant 1.5 
School fair featuring arts and crafts completed by 
students 
attendee 1.5 
School 9   
Open lesson by teacher of English 
attendee and asked to 
give feedback 45 minutes 
Open lesson by teacher of geography 
attendee and asked to 
give feedback 45 minutes 
Open lesson by teacher of Kyrgyz 
attendee and asked to 
give feedback 45 minutes 
School play and student poetry reading observer 2.5 
Anti-drug awareness day festivities observer 3 
Weekly meeting of teachers and administrators observer 1 
Class observation and meeting with government 
officials visiting school 
observer 1.5 
Tea with principal, vice principals, curriculum 
specialist, librarian, and school facilities 
administrator  
participant 1 
Lunch with principal and two vice principals participant 1 
Total   29 hours, 15 minutes 
 
Each opportunity to be an observer or participant in these school activities gave me the 
chance to learn more about the school, including dynamics among teachers within and across age 
groups, between teachers and principals, among administrators as well as between school staff 
and outside visitors (when the occasion included guests from the community or education 
officials). I was fortunate to have been invited to observe these dynamics across different types 
of schools represented in my sample. Both Russian and Kyrgyz language schools were observed. 
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I was invited to two schools located in the center of the city and two schools in the outskirts of 
the city. Two schools were general education schools, one school was a specialized academic 
school and one was a school for students with special needs.  
Among the most valuable occasions for observation were two school meetings that 
included all teachers and administrators. At school 4, this meeting was held in a large classroom 
and was commenced by the principal who promptly gave the floor to her colleagues. Taking 
turns, several administrators and teachers led the meeting and subsequent discussion on the 
business of the work week, including documentation reporting deadlines, planning for upcoming 
Olympiads [academic competitions], and giving feedback to colleagues on tasks accomplished in 
the past week. The room was abuzz throughout the meeting and those who wanted to contribute 
spoke up. There was laughter and a sense of ease among colleagues.  
This is contrasted with a weekly meeting at School 9, a school located in the outskirts of 
the city that has seen a lot of teacher turnover in recent years and relies heavily on staffing of 
beginner teachers to fill the ranks. The meeting was held in a large auditorium where teachers 
filled the first three rows facing the principal who was at the podium in front of them. The topics 
covered at the meeting included a review of protocols for prompt arrival of both students and 
teachers and the importance of keeping students in an orderly procession when moving in the 
hallways during recess. The vice principals also spoke, reminding teachers to be “tidy” and 
“polished” in their dress code and recommending that female teachers who choose to wear pants 
when coming to work should consider bringing a skirt with them to change into upon arrival at 
the school since skirts look more “dressy and clean” (Observation 7, February 2016). The 
teachers were quiet throughout the meeting and following the meeting, one of the younger 
teachers with whom I had established a rapport over the course of several interviews remarked 
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that the meeting was both condescending to teachers and hypocritical, since the principal herself 
does not follow this dress code. 
In addition to observations such as the two anecdotes described above, participating in 
the school activities allowed me to observe the patterns of interactions between staff members of 
different age groups. For example, at the teacher gathering on the occasion of International 
Women's Day at School 3, the young teachers were charged with setting the table, clearing the 
plates, and washing the dishes. Once these duties were completed, it was suggested by the Vice 
Principal that the young (all female) teachers go to another room to dance while the older 
generation teachers socialize together. This occasion and others like it support my hypothesis 
that teachers and administrators in Bishkek schools operate within highly age-stratified norms 
and hierarchies. While young teachers are mentored and supported by their more senior 
colleagues, they are also sidelined from many decision-making occasions at school, which are 
deemed by administrators and senior teachers as appropriate for the involvement of older 
generations of teachers. 
Document collection. The following documents were obtained in this study: statistics on 
all public schools in Bishkek, information about teacher vacancies and the number of new 
teachers hired for the period of five years before, during, and after the reform were collected. At 
the school level, for the city of Bishkek, tarifikatzia [school salary list] documents were 
collected. Additionally, vedomost [salary receipts received by teachers each month] documents 
were collected for select schools in Bishkek. For the sample schools in the study, Stimulus Fund 
information, including school-selected criteria and documentation of Stimulus Fund bonus pay 
coefficients was gathered from six schools that volunteered to share this information.  
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To protect the confidentiality of schools and the privacy of all participants who volunteered 
their time for this study, all documents and identifying information have been stripped of 
identifying markers such as names, school numbers, and exact geographic locations that may 
reveal the identity of schools and staff.  
 
Data and Site Access 
Access to conduct research at the school level was sought formally through the Ministry 
of Education and Science. A letter requesting access to visit schools and collect centralized and 
school-level data was sent to MoES as well as to the Bishkek Education Department within the 
Bishkek Mayor’s Office. Upon receipt of permission granted by the Deputy Minister of 
Education and the head of the Bishkek Education Department, an official letter was signed with 
an official seal by MoES. The letter listed my research goals, duration of research and indicated 
all the schools selected for the study. It also stated that the selected schools are invited to 
participate in the research study and to share at will the documents that are of relevance to this 
research, including salary information, Stimulus Fund criteria, various artifacts of teacher work, 
and anything else that proves relevant in the course of the research. The letter did not mandate 
selected schools to participate in the study and I reiterated to each school and participants that 
their participation is voluntary and they are under no obligation to take part in this research. Two 
out of 10 schools, both specialized academic schools were initially reluctant to participate. In 
both of the schools, the principals insisted that there is no time for teachers to partake in 
interviews. In one of the schools, the principal did not wish to be personally involved in the 
research and directed the matter of my research to a vice principal who was reluctant to 
participate because it may undermine the principal. As a matter of adherence to the research 
design, both of these schools were approached a second time, three months after the initial point 
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of contact with a second offer to participate. Both schools agreed to participate upon the second 
request and so no schools had to be replaced in the original sampling selection.  
Central-level data on Bishkek schools, including student enrollment numbers and 
specialized school status information was obtained from MoES as well as the Bishkek Education 
Department and Bishkek district education offices. Additionally, the UNICEF Bishkek office 
shared access to geospatial software that records the locations of all public schools in the 
country. The assistance from UNICEF was instrumental in finalizing the school selection process 
and in establishing initial contact with each school that required an introductory call and in 
several instances an introductory visit with a local staff member who could vouch for me as a 
researcher. Schools that requested an introductory visit ahead of commencing research were 
honored in their request. The first point of contact with each school was either the principal or 
the principal’s designated deputy in the case of a principal’s absence. 
 
Data Analysis 
The findings presented in this dissertation are based on a mixed methods research 
approach, which combines document review, qualitative coding and analysis of interviews with 
principals, teachers, school administrators and policymakers, and a quantitative treatment of 
teacher demographic data and independent variables that determine teacher salaries. Analysis is 
conducted to understand the ways in which teachers and schools ignore reforms and how the 
Stimulus Fund distribution approaches are used to undermine reform goals rather than to 
embrace them. Analysis of this range and combination of sources serves to achieve triangulation 
and corroboration of collected data.  
All analysis was conducted in an iterative manner, which has allowed for continuous re-
visiting and revising of the conceptual framework and theory generation as well as corroboration 
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of quantitative findings, researcher observations, and participant narratives. All transcripts of 
interviews conducted in Russian were transcribed into Russian. I translated into English selected 
passages that appear as quotes in this dissertation.  Recorded excerpts of meetings held in 
Kyrgyz have been translated into Russian and transcribed. Thematic coding techniques were 
used to first parse and then to organize instances of teacher and administrator actions toward the 
reform into the categories of ignoring or undermining (the reform). Each of these were further 
subdivided into themes of how this was accomplished, and are elaborated on in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Additionally, the coding tracks the three levels of influence that teachers employ to galvanize 
support: micro (individual level), meso (school level), and macro (system level). All coding and 
interview data analysis was done in Microsoft Excel. 
Quantitative data was collected at the Ministry, Bishkek Education Department, Bishkek 
district education offices, and school levels. Data on teacher demographics and the variables that 
comprise salaries were obtained from MoES district education centers in Bishkek. In the 
composite of the 10 schools in the sample, the tarifikatzia documents included 712 total entries, 
of which 540 entries were for teachers. In conducting the quantitative analysis, which was done 
using the STATA software, my aim was to learn which variables have the most impact on the 
earning outcomes of teachers. My first step in the inferential analysis was to determine 
correlation between the independent variables (demographic variables of teachers or school 
variables) and the dependent variable (teacher salary). Once correlation was established, several 
statistical multivariate regression models were run to determine which model has the most 
explanatory power of variables that determine salary. The following independent variables were 
used in the two regression models:  
1. Years of teaching experience 
2. Hours of teaching 
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3. Total hours of work 
4. Subject 
5. School type 
6. Language of instruction at school 
The selection of these variables drew on the qualitative analysis, which catalogued perceptions of 
factors contributing to higher teacher salaries. Variables of collinearity were removed to avoid 
errors and misleading results. Statistical significance for both regression models was determined 
at the 0.01 level. 
 Following the regression analysis, two t-tests were run, also using STATA software, to 
compare the average salaries of teachers at the beginning of their teaching career and at an 
advanced stage of their career. In the first t-test, the salary averages of beginning teachers 
(teachers with less than five years of teaching experience) were compared to the salary averages 
of non-beginner teachers (teachers with five or more years of work experience). In the second t-
test, the salaries of the most senior teachers (those with more than 20 years of teaching 
experience) were compared with salaries of teachers with 20 or less years of teaching experience. 
The cutoff of 20 years or less was selected because 20 years of service marks the final 
percentage increase for experience in the career ladder of teachers in Kyrgyzstan. Both t-tests 
yielded results that are significant at the 0.01 level. 
Subsequently, the qualitative and quantitative findings were compared to determine the 
extent to which teachers’ action to undo the reform are driven by their perceptions or by reality. 
Following the quantitative analysis, the study investigates the allegiances that exist in 
schools and the alliances that are forged to overcome the burdens of the reform. Chapter 6  
analyzes the intricate dynamics between senior teachers and school leaders to understand exactly 
how major components of the 2011 reform came to be ignored and eventually undone. The 
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chapter also looks at the overlapping ways in which different schools in Bishkek came to 
discover and utilize the same loopholes for undermining the reform. 
And finally, the last analysis in this study tracks the implementation of the Stimulus Fund 
at six schools in the sample schools that provided data on how they organize and allocate bonus 
pay. The question explored in analyzing the Stimulus Fund is whether schools in Bishkek use the 
Stimulus Fund as intended to motivate and reward high-performing teachers or if bonus pay is 
largely used to meet other school priorities. Because the exact design and execution of the 
Stimulus Fund is left to the discretion of schools, the Stimulus Fund offers a unique view to 
understand how different schools use discretionary funds to overcome the challenges they face. 
These range from managing teacher discontent with the elimination of pay categories to 
resolving the challenge of retaining the most talented teachers in the workforce. Because the 
Stimulus Fund is organized and allocated using a meticulous and precision-based methodology 
of points and coefficients, my analysis of bonus pay undertakes the investigation of this process 
at the levels of individuals, schools, and departments within schools. A synthesis of this micro-
level analysis then allows for making conclusions about Stimulus Fund goals for different school 
types. This analysis allows me to identify five patterns of how schools distribute bonus pay in a 
manner that reflects the social dynamics, power relations, and hierarchies in Bishkek schools. 
Finally, document collection and preliminary analysis was done concurrently with the 
interviews with the goal of iterative sensemaking of policy documents, participant testimonials, 
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Validity 
In a study that aims to expand existing theory on how individuals and institutions affect 
change, validity of both the research design as well as the data analysis methods is vital. To 
achieve this, it is necessary to take all possible measures to ensure that the methodological 
constructs inform the research questions, that the inquiry is triangulated through the collection of 
different types of data from different informants, and finally, that the analysis of the data is 
comprehensive, unbiased, and elicits results that are evidence based (Maxwell, 2012, p. 121). 
Maxwell (2012) proposes a number of validity tests to rule out validity threats, which include: 
substantial time in the field, collection of rich data, validation of data with respondents, 
awareness of discrepant evidence, triangulation, and comparison (Maxwell, 2012, pp. 125-129). 
My study has incorporated these validity tests throughout the data collection and analysis phase. 
Sufficient time was spent in the field (six months total), including time at schools, which has 
enabled me to become familiar with the school contexts. Data was collected at three different 
levels (individual, institutional, policy) with informants that span across these levels. In instances 
when data validation was necessary, there was outreach and follow up with informants, as was 
the case with clarifying information about the Stimulus Fund at the school and district levels. 
Discrepant evidence was an important part of the findings and was carefully considered in the 
analysis because it helped to uncover instances in which the reports of informants did not match 
the documented evidence shared in the collected salary tables. This necessitated deeper probing, 
revealing the gaps between the formal and informal functions of the school and its constituents. 
The research design encompassed data triangulation vis-à-vis the collection tools, including 
individual and small group interviews, observation, document collection, and data analysis.  
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Comparison across schools and within schools allows for further validation of the research 
approach and the findings.  
The validity of research questions, methods, and proposed analysis is summarized in the 
matrix below.  
 
Table 3.6. Methodological validity matrix: Research questions  
Research 
Question Goals Methods 
Analysis 
Strategy Potential Conclusions 
Validity 
Testing 





























School level variables 
determine teacher agency; 
individual level variables 
determine teacher agency; 
school to community 
cohesion determines 
reform change impacts; 
senior teachers are 
'powerbrokers' at schools; 
power is shared across 








and tools do 
teachers and 
administrators 









outside of schools 

















Fund criteria  
Senior teachers in Bishkek 
appeal directly to policy 
makers; parents are 
utilized to appeal to 
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administrators appeal to 
policymakers; senior 
teachers influence 
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distribution schemes as a 
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Who are the 
























Teachers in Bishkek have 
strong ties within schools; 
or, strong ties within 
communities; teachers 
appeal directly to policy 
makers; teachers feel 
alienated and vulnerable; 
there is variation across 
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administrators are ignored 
or penalized individually 
or as a cohort by 
policymakers for either 
direct or indirect 






Source: Table structure from Maxwell (2012, p. 14). 
 
Role of the Researcher 
I am a native speaker of Russian, which has allowed me to conduct interviews, 
observations and to analyze policy documents and artifacts collected in Bishkek without the aid 
of an interpreter. In school visits to Kyrgyz-language schools in which observations were 
recorded in the Kyrgyz language, the help of a translator was employed.  
My language proximity to the participants in this study as well as my capacity to analyze 
primary source documents firsthand has benefitted this study in allowing me to employ my 
skillset as a researcher directly rather than through a second party (i.e. interpreter). And yet as a 
foreigner my distance from the participants was valuable to assure an appropriate contextual 
separation from the participants. In each individual and group interview, I introduced myself as a 
PhD candidate from the United States and explained that I grew up in the United States and 
speak Russian owing to the legacy instilled by my parents to maintain the language of my 
heritage. This explanation was aimed to create both a comfort and rapport with the participants 
but was also intended to clearly convey that I am neither employed by the government of 
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Kyrgyzstan nor serving the interests of any international or bilateral aid agency that operates in 
the country. Some principals did assume in the introductory meetings12 that I was employed at an 
NGO or aid agency. I explained to each study participant that I am conducting independent 
research as a graduate student at Teachers College, Columbia University. While some study 
participants may have still perceived me as a contributor to the network of international aid 
workers in Kyrgyzstan, I did receive feedback from numerous teachers that they saw me as a 
colleague in the field of education. A number of teachers, particularly senior teachers, 
commended me on my goals and contributions to the field. One principal shared with me her 
own story about working on her dissertation and how difficult it was to be an “insider” in gaining 
trust and honest responses from colleagues. I am confident that many, though certainly not all of 
my informants did share information and their experiences in a forthcoming and candid manner. 
It is owing to their responses that I have been able to assemble and understand the nuanced 
dynamics of how teachers and administrators work together to attain their goals of preserving the 
status quo. 
As for my academic background and preparedness for tackling this research, I started to 
study the post-Soviet region when I began my undergraduate career in political science and 
Eurasian studies at Columbia College. In graduate school at Teachers College, I honed my 
academic interests in international education and sociology. Topically, I became interested in the 
professional lives of teachers and in individual motivations of those who choose to become 
teachers in countries that do not reward teachers with wages comparable to other professions. As 
such, I began to research how public perceptions about the teaching profession impact who 
become a teacher and who stays in the teaching profession.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This was the case in several schools to which an introductory call was placed by staff at UNICEF in order to 
arrange for my meeting with the principal.  
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As a Master’s degree student at Teachers College from 2010-2011, I had the privilege to 
take part in a six-country UNICEF study on teachers in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CEECIS) region, including Kyrgyzstan (UNICEF, 2011). 
This study was important not only because it compared the structure of teachers’ compensation 
practices across the region, but also because it laid the foundation for research investigating the 
impact of teacher policies on the lives of teachers and their professional standing in society.  
I became interested in studying the teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan after learning about 
the efforts of the Ministry of Education and Science to improve its remuneration practices and 
the agency teachers themselves employ to increase their professional standing. The swiftness in 
implementation of the 2011 salary reform also captivated my interest. Between January and June 
2014, I contributed to another UNICEF study, this one commissioned by the Ministry of 
Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic, which included a two-week visit in country to 
collect data. The aim of the study was to assess the post 2011 reform situation of teachers, 
including salary, organization of work, and quality of instruction. The study identified a number 
of challenges in adopting the new reform, including the resistance of senior teachers to the 
reform. The research brought to light a growing rift between beginning and senior teachers’ 
adaptation to changes in schools and in society and a rise of “intergenerational tensions” in the 
wake of the reform (UNICEF, 2014). My preliminary observations in the field led me to a hunch 
that social remapping processes are underway as a consequence of this reform, with teachers of 
all ages renegotiating power and position within the school. I also formed the hypothesis that 
senior teachers employ agency and utilize social capital to undermine, modify, or reject reforms 
altogether if the reforms are deemed as oppositional to the social hierarchies within schools and 
threaten to undermine senior teachers’ status in school and society.  What is not known, 
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however, is how exactly the process of reform modification takes place at the school level. This 
is the focus of my research.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
As with all research, this study is limited in scope owing to finite resources and time 
available to undertake this study. More time in the field would permit the addition of another set 
of stakeholders in the education process: parents and other community members with interests in 
policies that shape school affairs. Understanding how parents and families experience the 
phenomena unfolding in the education sector would inform both scholarship and practice on the 
far-reaching impacts of education reforms.   
The stratified random sampling approach for the selection of schools in this study was 
chosen to allow for maximum variation across schools. However, the 10 schools selected for 
observation as well as the population of interviewees does not allow for extrapolation to a wider 
population. Conducting this research in the capital city further confines the observations to this 
unique setting. However, even as the methodology confines, the findings offer a plethora of 
insights: the study explores how context impacts reform implementation; how alliances and 
allegiances play out in age-stratified education settings; and, the role of human agency – even in 
controlled and regimented environments – to affect change.  
One finding that was made evident but not explored in this study is the increasingly 
ubiquitous practice of soliciting school fees in schools around Bishkek. Many teachers and 
administrators revealed in the course of interviews that money collected from parents is a lifeline 
for the finances of the schools and a key contributing factor for the retention of teachers in the 
profession. And yet, given the extent of poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic, solicitation of fees from 
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parents exacerbates the growing inequalities in education access and quality in the capital city 
and around the country.  
Finally, this study aims to contribute to scholarship in the field of education policy 
studies, comparative and international education as well as sociology. In doing so, it is possible 
to apply many theoretical approaches to the vast and rich data gathered in the course of study. 
Social network analysis, game theory, and principal agent theory are just some of the myriad of 
frameworks that could have also been applied in this study to contribute further to expanding 
theory on how individuals employ agency and utilize social capital to achieve their goals. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
As with all research involving human subjects, the protection of participants was a crucial 
ethical consideration for this study. To ensure confidentiality of participants, the names of all 
who volunteered their time to be part of the study as well as the selected research sites have been 
held confidential to ensure the safety and anonymity of all participants. This research adhered to 
the guidelines and protocols that have been set by the IRB, including sharing informed consent 
forms with the participants. In transcription of data, each school and each informant has been 
assigned a coded ID or pseudonym. All data files are kept on a password-protected computer 
accessible only to the researcher.  
Although the research included topics that pertain to sensitive issues including salary 
information and personal views on national policy that have direct effects on teachers’ work and 
livelihoods, all informants invited to take part in the study were willing to participate in the study 
and to speak about the issues involved. In several instances, teachers and school administrators 
declined to participate in the interviews or to respond to specific questions.  A number of 
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informants gave feedback that they appreciated the opportunity to reflect on their profession and 
work lives.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE HISTORY OF TEACHER POLICY AND REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN 




This chapter presents the historical overview of the teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan, 
including the trajectory of the formulation of the stavka system in the Soviet era as well as the 
ensuing changes in compensation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In examining 
Kyrgyzstan’s challenge in eliminating the stavka system, I discuss the salary structure before and 
after the reform, exploring the rationale of why the stavka system endures years after the 
implementation of the 2011 reform, which aimed to depart from it. Evidence of the 
(mis)perceptions of the reform’s goals by experienced teachers and school administrators is also 
presented in this chapter.  
 
The Soviet Education Legacy, Salary Structure, and Change 
The legacy of Soviet education institutions continues to define the education sector in 
Kyrgyzstan today.  The Soviet Union’s commitment to universal and equitable education, the 
school’s role as an institution of learning and a provider of moral education, and the organization 
of teacher pay, have all had lasting effects on the post-Soviet organization of education.  As 
government funds for education became increasingly limited following Bishkek’s independence 
in 1991, providing universal and equitable education across a vastly rural and mountainous 
landscape posed significant challenges for the government of Kyrgyzstan. It became immediately 
and increasingly more difficult to staff remote schools with teachers, particularly after the 
elimination of government subsidies and benefits afforded to teachers. Small schools in rural 
areas were unable to have expertise coverage in each subject area and the quality of education of 
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rural and peripheral schools began to become differentiated from more urban and larger regional 
schools. The role of the school and teachers as purveyors of moral education also changed. As 
the government removed benefits for teachers and the relative salary of teachers declined 
compared to peers in other professions, the work of teachers became more transactional, with 
teachers vying to take on additional teaching hours or identifying other job opportunities outside 
of school to supplement their income. In this sense, the efforts of teachers became near solely 
focused on conducting lessons rather than the beyond-teaching responsibilities that encompass 
moral education. Additionally, the concept of moral education became more ambiguous in a time 
of transition from socialism to capitalism.   
While the enduring practice of assuring equity in education and the role of teachers as 
subject experts as well as educators of “morals” gradually declined, the Soviet style of 
remuneration practices did remain and continues to endure today.  The history of teacher policy, 
including the structure of the compensation system is examined in this chapter, with a view to 
understanding the logic of this structure and why it has been so resilient.   
 
Compensation Philosophy in the USSR 
The Soviet compensation system was highly fragmented and complex (Nove, 1993; 
Bergson, 1944).  While the concept of equity was significant to the ethos of socialism, one 
definition of equity in the labor market is that wages are not “simply accounting wages…but 
equal to productivity, if the resources of the community are to be utilized as effectively as 
possible” (Bergson, 1944, p. 15). This historical synthesis of the logic of equitable pay is 
insightful for making sense of the logic of fair wages and compensation in the Soviet Union: it is 
not equal pay that is equitable but rather proportional pay based on the input, ability, and 
dedication of the worker. Based on these principles, the socialist workforce of the Soviet Union 
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was compensated on an individualized salary schedule, resulting in highly differentiated salaries 
across workers responsible for the same work and wages that fluctuated from month to month 
depending on the individual’s contribution of labor.   
The education sector in the Soviet Union followed the same protocols of organizing labor 
and remuneration as other labor sectors (Noah, 1966). Compensation for labor of teachers was 
calculated principally on teacher’s input, ability, and dedication to the profession. Input was 
measured by the number of hours teachers were assigned to the tasks of teaching, grading student 
work, and performing other non-teaching duties. Ability was compensated if teachers worked in 
specialized educational environments, such as academically rigorous gymnasium schools or 
schools for students with special needs. Teachers were also rewarded with higher wages as they 
rose up the ranks via an attestation process, which required teachers to demonstrate pedagogical 
and subject-area expertise. Teachers whose students competed successfully in Olympiads were 
also honored and rewarded either by the school or the district education offices, or both. 
Commitment to the profession was compensated with extra pay and relocation bonuses if 
teachers were willing to relocate to remote schools. To meet the demands of a vast education 
system, university graduates were often assigned to work for several years at remote schools. 
Finally, longevity in the profession was compensated through the institution of progressive pay 
raises throughout the career, topping out at 20 years of service. The attestation process was also 
tied to longevity in the workplace, as teachers were able to rise in their rank every several years.  
This approach to compensation in the Soviet tradition, including in the education sector, 
effectively functions as an hourly wage system, with final gross pay determined by the number 
of hours worked, supplements for teaching at specialized schools or remote schools, and 
seniority.  As Abram Bergson (1944) pointed out in his scholarship on Soviet wage structures 
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published some 70 years ago, it appears to be a striking paradox that the socialist USSR 
determines wages based on the principles of capitalism, with compensation strictly based on the 
value of labor. Yet this is at the crux of understanding the logic of the compensation of Soviet 
workers and the Soviet system of compensation: differentiation of compensation reinforces the 
principles of socialist equity in which an individual’s contribution to the Soviet workforce is 
closely tracked and rewarded accordingly. In the case of the teaching profession, the values 
emphasized and compensated are hours for teaching and performance of other measurable tasks; 
the ability of teachers; and dedication to the profession. As this dissertation shows, it is the 
indoctrination of these values over the course of decades that has made it so difficult for 
Kyrgyzstan to transition to any other type of compensation system in the education sector. 
The 2011 reform, which aimed to assign all teachers to work exactly the same number of 
hours, pivoted away from the practice of work differentiation. The introduction of performance-
based pay wherein senior teachers compete with beginning teachers also contradicts the 
longstanding values of teachers and school administrators on what they deem as an equitable 
compensation structure. The model of compensation generally used by OECD countries in which 
teachers are compensated equally for their work even if some teachers teach more than others 
does not conform to the Soviet compensation logic of equitable pay. Before further examining 
the reaction and the undoing of the 2011 teacher salary reform, it is useful to understand the 
organization of Soviet and post-Soviet schooling and the remuneration structure for teachers’ 
work.  
 
Soviet Schooling and Salaries 
 Schools in the Soviet Union were built on a neighborhood school model. At age six, 
children were enrolled at their local school and would attend the same local school from first 
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grade through grade 11. All schools included all grade levels. For students who needed to be 
enrolled in a specialized school, be it a school for children with special needs or an orphanage, 
transfers could be done at any time. Enrollment into a gymnasium school or subject-specific 
lyceums was possible in the fourth grade for students who exhibited overall academic promise or 
prowess in a specific subject. Gymnasium schools focused on overall academic achievement 
with the goal of preparing students to enroll in universities. Lyceums specialized either in 
subject-specific academics (e.g. accelerated bio-chemistry studies) or technical education to 
prepare students for post-secondary education at specialized colleges or technicums or for direct 
transition to work. Night schools and remedial education institutions were also established in the 
Soviet Union to accommodate everyone in the national strive to achieve universal literacy.   
 Schoolteachers were assigned work hours based on the needs of the school and the 
subject specialty of a given teacher. For example, a chemistry teacher working in a lyceum that 
specializes in the physical sciences would more likely be assigned the maximum number of 
permitted teaching hours than if this teacher were working in a regular school where the teaching 
need for chemistry classes may not be as high. On the other hand, if the lyceum hires more than 
one chemistry teacher to meet its curricular needs, the teacher may find herself having to divide 
and share the teaching hours of chemistry. In this case, both teachers will work fewer teaching 
hours than if they were the only chemistry teacher at a school. As this hypothetical scenario of 
chemistry teachers shows, teacher earnings in the Soviet system are largely tied to how many 
teaching hours (or teaching workloads) they are assigned.  
 
The Stavka System in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras 
The organizing component of salaries in the Soviet Union is based on a stavka system. A 
stavka refers to a set number of teaching hours that comprises one teaching workload. Workloads 
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were set by centralized bodies of power in the government and included different hours in 
different occupations. The defining characteristic of the Soviet (and post-Soviet) stavka system 
for teachers was one teaching load of 16 or 18 hours per week (differentiated by elementary 
versus secondary school teachers). Teachers could take on one stavka but they could also take on 
a half stavka, one and a half stavka, or even two stavkas, if those hours were available for that 
subject at a given school. This flexible arrangement of teaching hour allocations was useful both 
for schools in order to match their staffing needs as well as for teachers, who could elect to work 
less or more hours depending on their professional goals and personal circumstances. If a given 
school had a limited number of work hours for a given subject, a teacher could also elect to work 
additionally at another school. In the scenario of the chemistry teachers, if one teacher found that 
sharing teaching hours with her colleague did not provide enough work hours, she could seek 
another stavka or half-stavka teaching load at another school or transfer to work in another 
school altogether.   
Just how deeply entrenched in history and mindset the stavka system is can be examined 
by turning to additional scholars of earlier generations who have asked similar questions about 
the structure of compensation of teachers in the Soviet Union. George Bereday and Ina 
Schlesinger’s 1963 analysis of what comprises teacher salaries in the Soviet Union reads 
remarkably similar to my own subsequent illustration of the structure of teacher pay 
determinants: “education, length of service, the type of school in which work takes place, age 
level of the class taught, the subject of specialization, the locality of the school” (Bereday & 
Schlesinger, 1963, p. 202). Each of these factors have remained as the determinants of the 
calculation of a teacher’s salary through the Soviet era, the period of post-Soviet transition, and 
remain intact in Kyrgyzstan even after the 2011 teacher salary reform. In the education finance 
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offices throughout the country, one can still find economists tabulating teachers’ pay, “on a 
monthly basis, according to a basic established number of lessons given each week…this applies 
to the number of lessons given in a week, not to the number of hours a teacher must work…if the 
teacher is asked to take a number of lessons in excess of the basic load, he is paid for every such 
lesson according to an hourly rate worked out on the basis of the monthly salary…the geographic 
location of the school is taken into consideration in determining the teacher’s salary…[and] if the 
teacher improves his education and receives a higher qualification or academic degree, his salary 
rate is adjusted accordingly” (Ibid, p. 204). All of these aspects continue to be true today in an 
astounding display of the steadfastness of the stavka approach to teacher compensation.  
No Western scholar has produced a more comprehensive study of the structure and 
financing of Soviet schools than Harold Noah. In his seminal work on Financing Soviet Schools 
(1966), Noah investigates and details the macro-level financing of schools at the national level 
and the micro-level economic planning that that takes place at the level of schools and individual 
teachers. Again, the resonance across a span of 50 years of history is remarkable and I build on 
Harold Noah’s work to begin to show the structure of the stavka system.   
In the 1960’s as in the 2010’s, a key document that the principal is charged with drafting 
and revising each year is the tarifikatzia,13 which is a salary list that enumerates all teachers, 
administrators and auxiliary staff members employed at the school as well as school vacancies. 
The tarifikatzia includes detailed information on the tasks assigned to each teacher and 
administrator. The document also includes other components that contribute to the staff 
member’s salary, including years of work experience, level of education, hourly rate of pay, and 
until it was eliminated in 2011, the teacher category attained by the teacher in going through a 
process of attestation. As Noah explains, there were five factors that determined the salary of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Appendix D for two examples of a tarifikatzia from the 2015/16 academic year. 
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teachers:  the grade level taught, the subject taught, years of work experience, location of the 
school, and type of school (Noah, 1966, pp. 169-171). All of these have remained and continue 
to comprise the total salary of teachers in Kyrgyzstan. As Figure 4.1 (“Salary structure before 
reform”) illustrates, the salary structure in the Soviet Union was a compilation of base pay, 
additional teaching hours and non-pedagogical tasks assigned to teachers, as well as a range of 
supplemental payments and allowances for the five compensatory factors enumerated by Noah.  
One component that existed in Soviet times and re-emerged in the post-2011 reform era 
is bonus pay. In the Soviet Union, bonus pay was called premia [premium payment] and was 
awarded to teachers in the form of an annual 13th salary or on certain occasions such as when a 
given teacher’s student(s) win in Olympiads (see Chapter 6 for more information about bonus 
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Figure 4.1. Composition of the teacher remuneration system before and after 2011 reform 
 
Stavka salary structure 
before reform (2009) 
Bonuses (ad hoc) 
Allowances 
(Less than 1%) 
High mountainous/rural 
location, hazardous work 
conditions, etc.  
Supplements 
(Approx. 3.5%) 
Years of teaching experience, 
homeroom duties, checking 




schema based on an     
attestation process 
Additional Teaching Hours 
(Approx. 37%) 
 Up to 1 additional stavka 
Base Salary 
(Approx. 37%) 
1 Teaching stavka 
(16 hours elementary school; 
18 hours secondary school) 
Salary structure after   
reform (2014) 
Incentive Pay  
(10% in addition to salary) 
Compensatory 
(Approx. 5%) 
Supplements for years of work 
experience; high mountainous/ 
rural location, hazardous work 




Teaching Hours (Allowable) 
(Approx. 28%) 




20 hours teaching  (50%) 
Up to 12 hours additional work 
including preparation for 
lessons, extracurricular work, 
and professional development 
(paid at half the rate of 1 
teaching hour)  (15%) 
   
2011 reform goal model 
Incentive Pay 
(Up to 20% in addition to 
salary) 
Compensatory 
Supplements for years of work 
experience; high mountainous/ 
rural location, hazardous work 
conditions, special school status. 
No Additional Teaching Hours 
Guaranteed 
20 hours teaching  
Up to 12 hours additional work 
including preparation for 
lessons, extracurricular work, 
and professional development 
(paid at half the rate of 1 
teaching hour) 
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 Figure 4.1 (“Salary structure before reform”) illustrates the nuanced and complex composition 
of teacher salaries in the stavka system, which includes five components and numerous sub-
components that factor into the salary formula. The main source of income for teachers is 
generated from how many stavkas and any additional work hours that teachers take on. As the 
approximate percentages of each salary component in Figure 4.1 show, supplemental payments 
and allowances are a small addition to teacher earnings. For the most part, teacher earnings are 
determined by how many hours they teach (see Chapter 7 for a quantitative analysis on the 
variables that determine teacher salaries). With the stavka system, components of the salary 
system, however small, are calculated with precision. Even today as schools complete the 
tarifikatzia documents on the computer using Microsoft Excel, the figures are rounded at two 
decimal points and each component of the salary, however small, is calculated for each teacher 
every single month.  
The calculation of salary is highly formulaic and standardized with little room for 
maneuverability. However, principals and teachers do have some say in determining how many 
stavkas (or today, how many hours of teaching) a teacher is assigned. For the most part, how 
many hours teachers are assigned to teach is largely dependent on the staffing needs of schools 
and in some cases, teachers’ ability to secure a desirable number of teaching hours.  
This teaching workload system, which offered flexibility for schools and teachers, 
worked well in the Soviet Union because the government also provided many subsidies to 
teachers that met basic life needs. Subsidies included plots of land for housing and farming in 
rural areas or apartment allocations for teachers in cities, discounted public transportation, and 
reduced costs on utilities for the home. Teachers were afforded travel opportunities as part of 
their professional development and schools frequently received vacation vouchers from the 
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Communist Party to send teachers and other staff members for vacations during winter and 
summer breaks. Teachers received bonuses from schools when their students earned prizes in 
Olympiads and gifts from parents and the school for holidays and special occasions. Teachers 
also enjoyed relatively high social standing in the Soviet Union (DeYoung, 2006) and benefitted 
from deep community ties built around a system of barter that enabled teachers to get access to 
various commodities and services, ranging from procuring specialized food items to healthcare 
services at facilities of their choosing. With all of these non-pecuniary benefits, the exact number 
of teaching hours was not as consequential as it would become after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
This benefit package for teachers changed swiftly after the breakup of the USSR. The 
transition to capitalism ushered in major economic crises in the 1990s, depleting the State budget 
and virtually emptying the state coffers in Kyrgyzstan. Like other post-Soviet republics, 
Kyrgyzstan struggled with maintaining a large number of civil servants on payroll (DeYoung, 
2006; Luong, 2004; Gleason, 2003; Hann, 2002). In Kyrgyzstan, a poor nation with limited 
budget allocations directed to education and significant challenges in tax collection (Mokhtari & 
Ashtari, 2012), among the first things to be eliminated were the subsidies to teachers. Compared 
to the compensation of professionals in other sectors, the actual salary of teachers was also 
reduced. With these changes in effect, the teaching hours that teachers could take on became 
crucially important because net pay became the key element to survival in a post-socialist 
economy.   
The situation of teacher salaries in Kyrgyzstan deteriorated in the course of two decades 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Compared to other professions, remuneration within 
the teaching profession stagnated for decades. By 2010, the average teacher salary in Kyrgyzstan 
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was at an all time low, at approximately 55 percent of the average salary in the country (National 
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014). No other professionals with comparable 
levels of education earned as little as education professionals. To the contrary, peers with similar 
educational backgrounds received significantly higher wages than teachers (see Table 4.1).   
Table 4.1. Comparison of wages, select industries (% wage earnings of national average) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Financial activity and insurance 271.9 261.1 216 201 205.7 
Professional, scientific, and 
technical activity 159.2 145.6 137.3 138.5 136.3 
All education professionals 
(includes primary, secondary, 
higher and other educational 
activity) 59 55.5 51.3 74.6 68.8 
Primary education 60 54.3 61.3 62.3 66 
Secondary education 49.3 46 67.9 70.5 63.6 
Healthcare and social security 62.6 58.1 78.9 88.3 81.9 
Arts, entertainment and leisure 57.8 52.9 57.3 60.7 72 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 54.4 60.6 51.3 49.5 51.2 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014 
 
In the public sector, only the salaries within the agriculture sector are lower than that of 
teachers (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Teacher salaries remain below the national income average, 
comprising only two-thirds of the average salary of other professionals (see Figure 4.2). Each of 
these factors make teachers vulnerable to poverty. For teachers who are breadwinners for their 
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Figure 4.2. Average salary growth for select sectors in Kyrgyzstan, 2001-2012 
 
 
Source: UNICEF, 2014  
 
 




Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014; UNICEF, 2014. Data 
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Figure 4.4. Relative salary by sector, USSR (in Rubles) 
 
 
Source: Jubilee Statistical Yearbook: The national economy of USSR, http://istmat.info/node/ 
Data compiled by: Farida Ryskulueva and Ji Liu; inspired by the work of Harold Noah (1966). 
 
In the 1990s, as the economic lives of teachers began to change, the structure of the 
stavka system played an important role in reinforcing the hierarchies of pay at schools.  Again, 
the values ascribed to equitable pay in the logic of Soviet socialism are based on input, ability, 
and dedication. Each was transitioned into the new capitalist logic of compensation and each 
took on significance because it translated directly into cash compensation. The stavka system in 
post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan reaffirmed long established norms of equity of pay based on how hard 
one works (input); one’s capabilities and talent (ability); and one’s tenure and commitment to the 
profession (dedication). With net salary more important than ever before, these values were 
translated into norms that calcified an already deeply age-stratified hierarchy of teaching 
assignments and compensation in Kyrgyz schools. In the 1990’s, the compensation practices in 
Kyrgyz schools became centered around allocating the most teaching hours to veteran teachers, 
keeping the most senior and expert teachers in specialized schools even beyond retirement age, 
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with tenure and categories earned through attestation. When the 2011 teacher salary reform was 
introduced and bucked these norms, it is no surprise that it was met with resistance.    
 
The Impetus for Change 
Owing to the low teacher salary and non-existent government subsidies for teachers, the 
post-Soviet stavka system in Kyrgyzstan came to function with teachers competing to take on 
large teaching loads in order to make a living wage. Allowing teachers to take on overburdening 
teaching hours became the primary way for school principals to incentivize teachers to stay in 
the teaching profession. The ability to allocate additional teaching hours meant that principals 
wielded immense power in the earning outcomes of teachers. Principals allocated teaching hours 
in a range of ways, including based on the needs of the school as well as to accommodate the 
established allegiances between teachers and the school administration. The range of assigned 
teaching hours per teacher varied from as little as just several hours per week to an excess of 
over 35 teaching hours (see Chapter 7). In some schools, especially those with significant teacher 
shortages or high student enrollments, teachers were in advantageous positions to take on a large 
number of teaching hours. In other schools, teachers were at the mercy of their principal to 
receive an allocation of enough teaching hours to earn a living wage. This system of teacher 
work allocation meant that those teachers who had strong relationships with the school principal 
or ties to other school administrators would get to pick not only how many classes they wanted 
to teach, but also which classes. Older teachers and teachers with influential ties to the school 
often got the best teaching hours, a reflection of strong age-stratified and collectivist values in 
the country (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004). This left early career teachers in a disadvantageous 
position, receiving the fewest teaching hours and the least desirable class assignments and 
contributed to many young teachers choosing to exit the profession altogether. Those teachers 
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who were not able to secure enough teaching hours at their school but did not leave the 
profession sought additional work in other schools or outside of their teaching roles in order to 
supplement their income, such as private tutoring of students outside of work hours.  
The decline of the status of teachers and prestige of the teaching profession impacts the 
negative selection into the teaching profession. In the post-Soviet era in Kyrgyzstan, the trend 
has been that only those university graduates who fail to secure a more attractive position enter 
the public education sector (Shamatov, 2006).  Merely 17 percent of students who enroll in a 
teacher education program become teachers upon completion of the degree  (Steiner-Khamsi, 
Teleshaliyev, Sheripkanova-MacLeod, & Moldokmatova, 2011). The other 83 percent either 
switch their degree specialization over the course of their studies or find work in other sectors.  
Coming to acknowledge that this posed an existentialist threat to the future of education in the 
country, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic began to consider options for reform of teacher 
compensation.   
In 2009, a pivotal study conducted by UNICEF (UNICEF, 2009) brought to light the 
challenges around recruitment and retention of teachers owing to the organization of teachers’ 
work and the structure of remuneration policies. With the advisement of UNICEF, MoES began 
to consider remunerative restructuring as a means of improving the situation of teachers in the 
country.   
At the same time, in addition to pressure for reform in the education sector, this period 
was marked by politically volatility in the country.  In April 2010, an uprising of discontent 
citizens led to the ousting of the president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Protesters were vehemently 
opposed to the corruption of the regime and the rising costs of living in the country (Bond & 
Koch, 2010). In the summer of 2010 ethnic tensions in southern Kyrgyzstan were elevated and 
	  89	  	  
led to violent clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan, resulting 
in over 400 deaths (Hanks, 2011), mostly of Uzbeks.   
Within the education sector, the impetus for change became the necessity to implement 
reforms to stave off any additional protests. After the tumultuous political events and devastating 
ethnic violence in the country, the Ministry of Education and Science, for its part, was ready to 
act to mitigate any conflicts within the education sector. With encouragement from UNICEF, 
MoES solicited proposals for a salary restructure from various international agencies involved in 
education sector projects in Kyrgyzstan. 
While the move to restructure the teacher remuneration policy was supported by the 
international community, the teacher salary reform itself was not funded by any aid agency, since 
it was largely an initiative of MoES and because of the relative speed of adoption and 
implementation following the events of 2010.14 At a time of heightened tensions in the country, 
both politically as well as in the education sphere, MoES and UNICEF shared the goal of 
utilizing the momentum of the time to introduce a reform that would pivot the compensation 
structure away from the archaic stavka system.  
In early 2011 MoES introduced a new remuneration structure for teachers. Although the 
reform would ultimately prove to be unsuccessful in moving the teacher remuneration structure 
beyond the old stavka system, it was decidedly an historic move to pivot away from a decades-
old system that was functioning in the service of the status quo and upholding longstanding 
norms and hierarchies but not meeting the goals of education in present-day Kyrgyzstan.  This 
chapter’s discussion of the longstanding norms and practices of the stavka system offers a 
perspective to understand why the stavka system is so resilient. Because each component of the 
reform countered established norms and social hierarchies at the school level, it was to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Information provided by a UNICEF consultant who worked on the revised salary scheme project.  
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expected that the reform would be met with resistance. This study is guided by the quest to 
examine the ways in which teachers who experience a loss (or perceive a loss as inevitable) of 
salary and status act to undermine, modify, or entirely reject those reforms.  
 
The Change: Moving Away from the Stavka System 
The implementation of the 2011 reform came at the precipice of teacher discontent, when 
teacher salaries were the lowest among all professionals in the country. To meet the necessity of 
sustaining the talent pool of the pedagogical cadre and to improve the quality of education in 
Kyrgyzstan, MoES sought to change the structure of teacher pay. The Ministry of Education and 
Science outlined its reform goals as follows:  
1. Provide teachers with a decent wage in accordance with the requirements of legislation in 
the field of education and labor. 
2. Attract young and qualified professionals to work in schools. 
3. Motivate and reward teachers for quality and results. 
4. Simplify the wage structure.  
 
To meet these goals, MoES solicited proposals for revamping the stavka system to meet the 
above stated goals. 
Since the period of reform implementation followed a time of civil unrest and ethnic 
tensions in the country and because of strong involvement of the international community in the 
educational sphere in Kyrgyzstan, international organizations, including UNICEF and later 
USAID played advisory roles to the government of Kyrgyzstan in developing a new teacher 
compensation structure. MoES organized discussion forums and invited representatives of the 
Ministry of Finance, schools, and local and international organizations to propose alternatives to 
the existing salary model. Three proposals were ultimately presented to the Ministry of 
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Education and Science.15 One was from UNICEF and promoted a workload system that most 
closely resembles the salary structure in OECD countries. The second was a joint proposal from 
USAID in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance that proposed to transition the stavka 
system into an hourly wage system of compensation, with a minimum number of teaching hours 
and additional non-teaching hours that teachers could also work. The third proposal was 
submitted by a local Kyrgyz consulting firm called Socium Consult, which is heavily funded by 
the World Bank, and advocated for a category-based workload system, emphasizing that 
compensation for teacher categories should be retained in the compensation package.16 The key 
components of each proposal are outlined in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Proposals for revamping the stavka system, 2011 	  	  
  Hourly wage system Workload system 
Category-based workload 
system 
Proposing agency Ministry of Finance & 
USAID UNICEF World Bank 
Proposed 
remuneration system 20 teaching hours  25 teaching hours 18 teaching hours 
Guaranteed work 
component 
6 hours of preparatory 
work; 11 non-teaching hours 14 non-teaching hours 
  
6 hours of non-teaching 
work 
  Compensatory 
component 
30% maximum tenure 
compensation; 
30% maximum tenure 
compensation; 
30% maximum tenure 
compensation; 
  
25% mountainous region 
compensation; 
25% mountainous region 
compensation; 
25% mountainous region 
compensation; 
  10% rural compensation; 30% rural compensation; 10% rural compensation; 
  
15-25% specialized school 
compensation 
15-25% specialized school 
compensation 
15-25% specialized school 
compensation 
Incentive component 20% 
10% in 2011; up to 30% by 
2013 




implementation 2,788 million Kyrgyz som 3,143 million Kyrgyz som 3,126 million Kyrgyz som 
Source: MoES  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This account of events is provided by Education Specialist Consultant for UNICEF who facilitated the 
organization of proposals for salary reform.  
16 It is worth noting that this organization that submitted a reform proposal singled out the need for retaining 
category-based compensation, a component of the salary that the two other proposals recommended be eliminated. 
The decision to eliminate teacher categories as a compensation component would become one of the most contested 
parts of the reform because it was deemed unfair by senior teachers. 
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As Table 4.2 shows, there were a number of similarities across proposals, including 
maintaining the compensatory component at levels that parallel compensation under the stavka 
system. The key differences among each component lie in the overall organization of teacher 
work. Under the hourly wage system, teachers would work 20 hours, have up to 12 additional 
hours of non-teaching duties, and be compensated on a per-hour basis. In the workload system, 
teachers would teach 25 hours, have an additional 11 hours of non-teaching duties, and be paid a 
fixed salary. In the category-based system, teachers would teach 18 hours per week and would be 
compensated based on a rate that accounts for their category standing.  
Ultimately, the model that was adopted for the reform was the hourly wage system, from 
the proposal submitted by USAID and the Ministry of Finance. The hourly wage system reform, 
once initiated, took on the major goals outlined by MoES. This involved simplifying the wage 
structure, introducing a Stimulus Fund to motivate and reward teachers, and increasing the salary 
for all teachers (including beginning teachers) to attract new professionals to the teaching 
workforce. Additionally, the reform also endeavored to eliminate the practice of teachers taking 
on excessive teaching loads and the inequitable distribution of teaching hours, which in many 
cases depended on a teacher’s relationship with the school’s principal and administrators. The 
reform thus limited the total number of teaching hours to 20 and implemented a work week with 
a maximum of 32 work hours. The 32-hour limit became the ‘guaranteed’ salary component, and 
included teaching and non-teaching tasks such as grading student notebooks and homeroom 
duties (see Figure 4.1, “2011 reform goal”). To attain the goal of attracting new qualified 
teachers to the profession, the rate of compensation per teaching hour was now determined by 
qualification based on level of education of teachers, rather than the Soviet-era teacher category 
system, which compensated teachers based on rank. Eliminating the category-based pay 
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component proved to be a source of deep resentment on the part of senior teachers who deemed 
it as subtractive salary component. As one experienced teacher describes,  
This news shocked everyone. For example, I had the highest category, and it was based 
on categories that the full salary was determined, and now that salary part was removed. 
It was said that the salary would be doubled, but it turned out that on the one hand the 
salary was increased, but on the other it was subtracted. The category was removed and 
so the salary decreased. Why was I upset? Because I’ve worked for some 30 odd years, 
and let’s say I work 24 hours and a brand new teacher also works 24 hours. We get 
exactly the same pay. It was upsetting because our salaries became on par. (Teacher 
Interview 14, November 2015). 
 
Further exacerbating this upset, the new salary structure assigned the highest hourly rate 
to teachers with a Master’s degree. Effectively, this made the hourly compensation of select 
younger teachers with Master’s degrees higher than that of the most experienced teachers. This is 
because the Master’s degree was introduced in Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet era, resulting in 
young professionals having more exposure to earn Master’s degrees than their senior colleagues.  
Finally, to motivate teachers and improve their performance, an incentive pay component 
was also introduced as part of the reform.  All teachers, novice and experienced, would now be 
competing in the same pool for an additional salary component.  
Within six months of instituting this new salary schema, it began to be dismantled, 
reframed, and reverted back to the old stavka system. In three years, the new remuneration 
system that was intended to set the teaching profession on the course of a workload system was 
in effect reverted back to the old teaching load (stavka) system, with teachers again vying for 
additional teaching hours to boost their income. In Chapters 6 and 7, I endeavor to understand 
how teachers and schools modified the reform. But before doing so, it is important to understand 
how each component of the new teacher remuneration policy proved to be contentious and 
ultimately unsuccessful.  
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Valuing Education Qualifications Over Seniority or Age 
Under the new reform, the category compensation component was entirely eliminated, 
though additional pay for teachers’ years of work experience (10 percent for 5-10 years of 
service; 20 percent for 10-19 years of service, and 30 percent for 20 or more years of service) 
was retained. The categories were replaced with a scale of per-hour compensation based on 
education level. Teachers with a secondary pedagogical degree are compensated at the lowest 
hourly wage; next level of compensation is awarded to teachers with Soviet higher education 
degrees or the current equivalent of Bachelor’s degrees; and the highest wage is reserved for 
teachers with Master’s degrees (see Table 4.3). 




Hourly rate (Kyrgyz som) 
Current university student 
Secondary pedagogical degree 
50.4 
67.5 
Bachelor’s or specialist diploma 81 
Master’s degree or higher 90 
Source: MoES 
As of 2014, 85 percent of teachers in Kyrgyzstan held higher education degrees (National 
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014). Yet for the vast majority of teachers who 
had attained the highest teaching category, the elimination of categories and introduction of 
education qualifications meant that they were bumped from the rank that offered the highest 
level of compensation to a middle rank in the education qualification criteria. Under the new 
salary schema, the most experienced teachers lost their category but did not qualify for the 
highest per-hour salary because the teachers who were educated in the Soviet era had not earned 
Master’s degrees. Interviews with senior teachers and school administrators show that the move 
to a qualifications-based formula for calculating the largest component of teachers’ salary (i.e. 
their base salary for teaching) was reviled by the older teachers. As one senior teacher stated, 
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“We certainly are offended. Those of us who earned the highest category by working hard all 
those years…only to lose it.” (Teacher Interview 35, November 2015). Another senior teacher 
shared her understanding and perception of the reform and how it disadvantaged and disparaged 
senior teachers, 
There was a lot of hype about raising wages. Well, it turned out that only the young 
teachers received salary increases. The reform cut out compensation for teacher 
categories and the attestation process, and so the teachers with a lot of work experience, 
our veteran teachers, they started to earn salary on the same footing as those teachers who 
just joined the workforce. Of course, it was necessary to [financially] support young 
teachers, no one disputes this, but still, some gradation is necessary. An experienced 
person versus someone who just started working – and like a blind kitten – is just finding 
his way, trying to learn something. (Teacher Interview 47, December 2015). 
Many school administrators agreed with senior teachers’ assessment that this component of the 
reform was unfair to the teachers with work experience. In the words of one principal, 
I do not entirely agree with the removal of the categories. In my opinion, it resulted in 
damaged teacher morale. Why? Because the individual has devoted his whole life to 
teaching. And at sixty, the teacher is a General without epaulets. He gave his life in the 
service of the motherland, through the most difficult of times, but in the end, he has no 
rank. He is a nobody. (Principal Interview 84, March 2016).  
As these testimonials suggest, experienced teachers and their school allies perceived 
senior teachers at the pinnacle of their careers to be the losers of the reform. The elimination of 
the category component of the reform caused great discontent among senior teachers who felt 
slighted by the government.  
 
Imposing a Weekly Work and Teaching Load Ceiling 
As already discussed, in an effort to eliminate the inequitable distribution of teaching 
hours that was commonly determined by teachers’ standing with school administrators, the 2011 
reform limited the total number of teaching hours to a maximum of 20 hours and a work week of 
no more than 32 hours (which included up to 12 hours of non-teaching duties such as grading 
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student notebooks, homeroom responsibilities, and professional development hours). The 32-
hour limit became the base salary component (see Figure 4.1, “Salary structure after reform”). 
Additional salary supplements for teachers’ years of work experience (10 percent for 5-10 years 
of service; 20 percent for 10-19 years of service, and 30 percent for 20 or more years of service) 
and supplements for teachers working in specialized schools that include gymnasia and lyceums 
as well as schools for students with special needs remained intact as a carryover from the Soviet 
remuneration system.  
In practice, however, this reduction of teaching hours meant that there were not enough 
teachers to teach the requisite subject hours and teachers were effectively unable to earn a living 
wage. This situation was dire in urban school districts, most notably in Bishkek, where all but 
three schools out of 96 public schools are significantly over capacity, causing schools to operate 
in two or three shifts in order to accommodate the large student body. Teachers living in Bishkek 
also grapple with a higher cost of living than teachers in rural areas, making the cap on 
permissible work hours a financial strain on teachers who wish to work more hours to earn 
higher wages. And so, the reform began to be reverted at the school level almost immediately, 
once it became clear that there were teaching hour limits. School principals in Bishkek had no 
choice but to ignore the capped teaching hour limits in order to staff their school and ensure 
continuity of the education process. Bishkek teachers and school principals also petitioned 
education officials to have case-by-case exceptions made for their schools to expand work hour 
limits for teachers when qualified new teachers could not be found for hire. According to an 
official in MoES, 
When the reform was introduced in 2011, we received endless complaints from school 
leaders: we do not have so many teachers to cover the curriculum with these work hour 
maximums, there is a teacher shortage, so let us combine the work hours and teachers. 
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The Ministry was forced to give them permission to do so. (Policymaker Interview 78, 
February 2016). 
Just several months after the teaching limit was set, it was amended. Over a period of 
three years, the permissible weekly teaching load was increased from 20 to 25 hours, then to 27, 
and finally to 31 hours. Table 4.4 enumerates the legislative changes that took place following 
the reform that effectively reverted the new salary system back to the stavka system. With a 31-
hour per week teaching limit, teachers are now back to competing for teaching hours and 
negotiating with the principal to be assigned the maximum permissible teaching load and 
additional teaching hours. This once again advantages the experienced teachers who have 
longstanding rapport with the principal at the expense of the new teachers who are assigned 
fewer teaching hours and consequently have lower earnings.  
Source: MoES 
 
Replacing the Semi-automated Promotion System with Performance-based Pay: 
Introducing the Stimulus Fund  
The Soviet education system instilled mechanisms to ensure that teachers received 
training to expand their subject expertise as well as continually updated their knowledge base of 
pedagogical practices. Teachers were incentivized to continue to receive training and improve 
the quality of their teaching. Among the incentives to do so was the teacher rank (category) that 
teachers obtained in the course of their professional life by participating in trainings, 
Table 4.4. Increase of permissible teaching and total work hours, 2011 – 2013  
 Legislation Maximum teaching load         (hours 
per week) 





Decree 270, 31 
(May 2011) 
25 36 
Directive of MoES, 0407/4451, 1 
(September 2011) 
27 41 
Decree 373, 24 
(June 2013) 
31 49 
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demonstrating their lessons, and supporting students who competed in Olympiads. As Soviet 
teachers rose in their category rankings, they would earn a higher title, eventually becoming a 
“teacher of the highest category.” This stepladder in rank and status also impacted their earnings, 
with teachers earning more as they rose in rank. 
In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, government funding for continuing education and training of 
teachers became sparsely available. In effect, this means that there are limited resources to 
ensure that teachers moving up the category ranks are in fact improving their subject expertise 
and pedagogical practices. Nevertheless teachers continued to be moved up in categories. 
Teacher categories thus became a de facto semi-automatic promotion scheme for teachers. By 
the time the 2011 salary reform was implemented, more than 75 percent of teachers in the 
country had attained the highest category (Policymaker Interview 78, February 2016), amounting 
to a significant component of teachers’ salaries (up to 20 percent, see Figure 4.1). This also 
meant that a large component of the education budget allocated for teacher salaries was 
nominally rewarding quality, but in reality was instead largely duplicating compensation for 
tenure. It was as per this reasoning that MoES decided to replace the categories that had become 
a semi-automated promotion component of the salary with performance-based pay, called the 
Stimulus Fund. 
The Stimulus Fund was introduced as an incentive-based bonus component of the 2011 
reform and was intended to give teachers ongoing motivation to perform well and continue to 
maintain and improve the quality of their teaching. The incentive pay schema was recommended 
by the donor agencies that advised MoES on solutions to improve the work quality of teachers. It 
was recommended that the Stimulus Fund be allocated by MoES in the amount of 20 percent of 
the total teacher salary per school. However, MoES implemented incentive pay at a rate of just 
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10 percent of the total of a school’s salary budget, to be disbursed to teachers and administrators 
on a quarterly basis. MoES also provided a list of recommended criteria for schools to use to 
allocate the incentive pay, with the final criteria selection and mode of Stimulus Fund 
distribution left to the discretion of schools. Chapter 6 examines in detail how the Stimulus Fund 
was implemented and undermined across schools in Bishkek.  
While the introduction of incentive pay was intended to facilitate camaraderie, 
knowledge sharing, and friendly competition among teachers to foster better pedagogical 
practices and overall performance (Interviews with policymakers, October 2015 – March 2016), 
instead, this component of the salary reform was heavily criticized by teachers. Experienced 
teachers saw the pay-for-performance measure as undermining their expertise.  In interviews 
with senior teachers around the city of Bishkek, there were expressions of discontent with having 
to compete with young teachers for extra salary (see Chapter 6). Young teachers also expressed 
concern that the Stimulus Fund was disproportionately awarded to older teachers (Interviews 
with teachers, October 2015 – March 2016).  
Because the Stimulus Fund allocation is left to the discretion of school administrators and 
the Stimulus Fund committees formed at each school, the way in which schools disburse this 
component of the salary reveals the dynamics and hierarchies between teachers of different age 
groups as well as dynamics between teachers and administrators. The Stimulus Fund thus 
became a locus of control that enabled schools to modify and revert aspects of the 2011 teacher 
salary reform to the previous salary structure, including using the Stimulus Fund to reward senior 
teachers who lost compensation due to shifting compensation from seniority to qualifications). 
While some aspects of the 2011 reform, such as the cap on teaching hours, were ignored, the 
Stimulus Fund was utilized to undermine the reform by imposing old norms (i.e. senior teachers 
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should be compensated at higher levels because their teaching experience adds value to their 
practice) on new ideas (i.e. allocation of bonus pay will be based on quality of work and not on 
other factors).  
An analysis of the Stimulus Fund distribution practices across Bishkek schools that is 
detailed in Chapter 6 identifies the different distribution patterns across schools. Each 
distribution pattern offers insights into how schools adhere (or do not adhere) to government 
policies and cope with reforms.  While all schools follow the Stimulus Fund protocols on paper, 
a close examination shows that in practice, many schools allocate the Stimulus Fund in a manner 
that reflects the hierarchies and power dynamics at schools with the Stimulus Fund used to 
ameliorate arising challenges.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presented a historical overview of Kyrgyz education in the Soviet and post-
Soviet eras. It examined the enduring logic of the stavka compensation system and tracked the 
composition of the stavka before and after the 2011 reform. The chapter also shared the voices of 
discontent of senior teachers who perceived the 2011 reform as an abandon of longstanding 
norms of compensation in education that reward input, ability, and dedication. In the next 
chapter, I continue to examine the perception formation of senior teachers that they were the 
losers of the 2011 reform and illustrate how teachers and principals set out to undermine the 
2011 reform.   
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CHAPTER 5 
IGNORING THE REFORM 
Introduction 
We have an expression in Kyrgyz: A good leader must be deaf in one ear and blind in one 
eye.  
     (Teacher Interview 3, October 2015) 
 
 The 2011 reform was initiated owing to many pressures, among which were the need to 
raise teacher salaries as well as to make education quality improvements following two 
consecutive low performances on the PISA test. Additionally, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, 
the education environment in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was deeply affected by politically-motivated 
violence and ethnic strife in the country. The pressure to raise teacher salaries was a reactionary 
overture on the part of the government to preclude protests of teachers.   Because a series of 
teacher protests did take place in 2010 in front of the Parliament House in Bishkek, it also had a 
catalyzing effect that triggered the action of policy change around teacher remuneration.  
 Since teachers publically demonstrated their discontent in 2010, it was my hypothesis 
going into fieldwork that teachers took proactive measures to voice discontent with the 2011 
reform. I surmised that the swift changes to legislation that took place within several months 
after the reform was introduced were accomplished through organized activism by teachers who 
voiced their concerns in public forums and via access to education officials. While I was aware 
that there had been no massive demonstrations or any school walkouts in objection of the reform, 
it was my hunch that those teachers who found themselves discontent with the reform voiced 
their views in forums that reached policymakers. I suspected that in the schools that had the 
highest proportions of experienced teachers I would find core “nucleus” groups of teachers who 
are the main reform resistors, or what I termed reform agent teachers. It was my intention to 
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investigate how reform agent teachers leveraged social capital by “bonding” with colleagues in 
their own peer group or subject area, “bridging” to other peer groups such as school 
administrators, and “linking” with groups outside of the school to achieve their goals of 
undermining the reform (Pretty, 2003). 
 Instead, what I found in the course of conducting 95 interviews with teachers, school 
administrators, and policymakers was that a much more nuanced directive of agency is at play in 
shaping the reaction (and redaction) to this reform and the orchestration of its demise. In the 
course of conducting and subsequent analysis of interview data, it became apparent that a 
different phenomenon than mobilization of public protest was leading the charge of change. 
Teachers who expressed disdain for the reform also spoke fervently about their commitment to 
their school and to the teaching profession. Rather than a nucleus of reform agent teachers, 
interviews revealed nuanced dynamics between teachers and school administrators that shape the 
way teachers and schools interpret reforms and act to implement or ignore them.  
 
Reform and its Discontents 
What happens within school environments when homeostasis of social hierarchies is 
dislodged? When teachers perceive a reform to be a threat to their status and salary, they work to 
counter this threat. What are the ways in which teachers coped with the changes ushers in by the 
reform and what actions did they take to counter it? 
There are a myriad of ways in which individual teachers took action to show discontent 
with the reform. These include common modes of objection: voicing discontent and petitioning 
for change directly to policymakers up the bureaucratic power vertical; seeking additional 
sources of income to supplement the (perceived) loss of salary; and, expressing disdain by 
leaving the profession altogether. While each of these actions took place, there was another way 
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in which teachers coped with the reform and began to unwind it: they utilized their social capital 
both within school and outside of school to begin to revert the new salary schema back to the old 
one. 
In Bishkek’s hierarchical work environment that adheres to age-stratified norms, senior 
teachers enjoy the most benefits, which often includes having a say in how many classes and 
which classes they teach. This privilege comes from years of building social capital with parents 
and with principals. Parents trust senior teachers’ reputations as pedagogues and in many 
instances because they have themselves been the students of these teachers. Principals rely on 
senior teachers to maintain the prestige and upkeep the institutional memory of the school, to 
carry large teaching loads, and to step in to take on more teaching hours if and when novice 
teachers leave the school. Teacher loyalty to the profession is manifest by years of service and 
resiliency on the job. In many cases, teachers also display loyalty to the principal, which is 
manifested in the commitment shown to the principal’s approach to navigating the policy 
environment at any given time. 
A relationship based on a mutually agreed social contract between principal and teacher 
is thus fostered: the principal needs to staff the school and ensure that the education process 
unfolds at a level that is acceptable to the primary overseers of her work (i.e. education officials 
and parents). In turn, teachers are looking for job security and opportunities to maximize their 
earnings. Thus the point of intersection of mutual interest for principals and teachers in Bishkek 
schools is around teacher retention and earnings. This relationship is made especially salient in 
times of change that threaten the status quo. 
In the post-2011 reform era, principals were in a position of wielding immense power to 
determine teacher pay by utilizing reform loopholes to allocate work hours beyond the stipulated 
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limits and to afford other income-generating opportunities to teachers, such as assigning them to 
homeroom duties or extracurricular work. Beyond the official government salary, principals also 
decide whether and how much to add to official teacher salaries from informal school fees 
collected from parents. Principals also have the capacity to grant teachers special privileges to 
supplement their income beyond work hours by permitting them to tutor students privately in or 
outside of the school, or aligning teacher schedules to enable them to also work at other schools. 
Reciprocally, teachers who wish to capitalize on their social ties with principals are expected to 
follow the course set by principals to navigate the new policy environment. The allegiance 
between principals and loyal teachers is critical to understanding the course of unraveling the 
2011 salary reform because it was through nuanced collaborations between these parties that the 
reform was unwound.  
 Contrary to my original hypothesis, interviews with teachers revealed no evidence of any 
concerted effort by teachers to stage public protest or reform resistance in the public sphere, that 
is, outside of school.17 I now examine how the relationship based on mutual interests as well as 
competing interests between principals and teachers is useful in explaining the lack of collective 
effort by teachers to publically express their discontent with the 2011 teacher salary reform. I 
then look at how the process of undoing the reform was instead accomplished by ignoring the 
reform inside the school. 
 The reform’s perceived decrease of earnings for experienced teachers, elimination of 
categories, and the leveling of hourly wages as per education level elicited strong discontent 
from senior teachers in Bishkek. However, unlike in 2010, there were no protests, public 
outcries, or publicity campaigns aimed at changing the reform. According to policymakers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As stated earlier, there were also some efforts of voicing discontent and individual complaints filed with the 
Ministry of Education and Science.   
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critical feedback about the reform was received by the Ministry of Education and Science, but 
there were no threats of either mass demonstrations as had taken place in 2010 or of an exodus of 
experienced teachers from the profession (Policymaker Interview 78, February 2016). Why was 
it that senior teachers who were so vehemently opposed to the reform that diminished their status 
and earning potential opted not to champion for change? The allegiances formed with the 
principal and loyalty to the profession are key explanatory factors.  
Teachers across school types, including the most prestigious public schools in Bishkek18 
as well as regular schools, expressed a similar sentiment: it is not that they fear protest or cannot 
get organized; rather, they do not want to foster a public perception that they are “non-
conscientious workers” and “unpatriotic citizens” (Teacher Interview 5, October 2015). 
Additionally, and also in the words of the same teacher, they “simply do not wish to cause 
trouble for principals” (Ibid). Teachers reported that with the commencement of the 2011 reform, 
it was made clear to all educators that principals would be held accountable for any public 
protests or propaganda campaigns launched against the 2011 reform. As one teacher explains, it 
is not that teachers are afraid of the principal, rather, they are afraid for the principal, 
There is no fear of the principals, people get scared of resentment. Principals are called in 
and told, “if you don’t know how to fulfill your duties as principal, then you should write 
a letter of resignation.” No one wants to throw anyone under the bus, and so people stay 
quiet. It’s for this kind of thing that principals are fired. (Teacher Interview 25, 
November 2015). 
  
When pressed on the question of whether teachers utilized any avenues for 
communicating their discontent of the reform with policymakers, teachers replied in the 
affirmative, confirming that channels of formal communication were certainly available and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Prestigious” schools in Bishkek are the gymnasium schools and the lyceums that specialize in academic 
preparedness of students. For the most part, these schools are located in the center of the city and they collect the 
largest informal fees from parents.  
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policymakers did receive feedback. However, teachers quickly found that critiquing the reform 
had potentially severe consequences not directly for them but for school leaders, 
In the very beginning there were some attempts to reach out to the officials. But the 
principals were told - how should I put this - to tape everyone’s mouth shut, so that no 
one would say anything. If there are complaints and calls from schools, the principal will 
be held responsible…they were told that if even one school goes out to protest, it could 
launch a war with us [schools]… And so of course out of respect for our principal, we 
couldn’t and we didn’t file complaints. (Teacher Interview 29, November 2015). 
 
So how then did teachers voice their discontent of the reform? As testimonials from numerous 
teachers showed, they confined their discussions and grievances within the school setting rather 
than escalating it to the level of the education officials, 
If teachers need something, they prefer to speak with someone face to face and that 
would be all, particularly if there is any discontent.  
 
Teachers felt indignant when categories were removed. But no one went out to protest or 
wrote to anyone higher up, we just grumbled amongst ourselves.  
 
We let things boil over and we marinate in our own juices. We make some noise at our 
school meetings, disperse, and forget about it. We meet again, make some noise and 
disperse again. We don’t write to any higher ups, not teachers at this school.  
(Teacher Interviews 12, 46, 53, November – December 2015). 
 
Teachers also explain and justify the collective suppression of their discontent, 
 
Our system is built this way. What is there to speak of, it will only make you more upset. 
What are teachers afraid of? I do not know, maybe the old days, the old teachers. 
 
We post-Soviet people have gotten used to everything…we understand that we’re in a 
time of crisis, the country is poor, and demanding something is impossible. We just need 
to work.  
            (Teacher Interviews 28 and 42, November – December 2015). 
 
Why are teachers willing to forego their organizing power to protect the principal? There 
are several reasons for this. First, in some schools, principals do petition for higher salaries and 
better work conditions for teachers, or at least they impress this perception upon teachers. And 
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second, if teachers feel disempowered in petitioning for change to policymakers, they will align 
with principals to improve their situation at the school level.  
How do principals communicate to senior teachers that it is of mutual interest to enter 
into this alliance? And, how do principals suppress the discontent of teachers who may not have 
the experience and social capital to benefit from an alliance with the principal?  Principals use a 
multifaceted approach that takes a number of forms, including relying on senior teachers to 
ensure compliance of other, more junior teachers and demonstrating examples of what happens 
to non-compliant teachers.  
 
Senior Teachers Ensuring Compliance of Junior Teachers 
In an age-based hierarchical work environment, senior teachers are immensely influential 
among their junior colleagues. Principals utilize the respect given to senior teachers by deploying 
senior teachers to steer their younger counterparts in the direction of the school’s approach for 
handling reforms. Instead of organizing in protest, young teachers are steered by their senior 
colleagues toward an acquiescing view that the situation will be improved through incremental 
changes curated by the administration or merely with the passage of time. This approach allows 
the principal to be only peripherally engaged in the process of suppressing the agency of teachers 
to publically voice their discontent with the reform and to avoid direct confrontation with 
teachers. According to one senior teacher, this process takes place in the following manner, 
The principal does not say anything. It's the teachers. Here, even if we have salary 
questions, they [Bishkek Education Department employees] might say, 'Why did you 
come here? Go back there and ask [at your school]." And so, in order to not compromise 
the principal, we just do not go anywhere. Because they call the principal up right away, 
and give her a stern talking to as if she is were a young school girl who has to go stand in 
the corner.  So in order for things not to turn sour for the principal, we stay quiet. 
(Teacher Interview 37, December 2015). 
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For the most part, senior teachers facilitate the process of letting the junior colleagues know 
about these informal protocols for compliance. This is done through roles such as running 
department meetings, chairing Stimulus Fund committees, and casual discussions with junior 
colleagues about pros and cons of protests versus incremental change.  
While this approach of the diffusion of information by senior teachers is the preferred 
methods for principals to attain compliance, it is not always possible for principals to achieve 
their goals this way. In this instance, principals resort to another method: modeling to teachers 
the repercussions of incompliance. 
 
Modeling Consequences of Incompliant Behavior 
 Principals who need to ensure teacher compliance will find the means necessary to 
achieve their goals. When direct or indirect modes of attaining compliance do not work either 
through acquiescing means or the diffusion of information through senior teachers, principals are 
likely to turn to more coercive tactics: modeling to their staff the consequences of dissent.  
One example of how this was accomplished took place at one of the schools in this study. 
The school is located in the outskirts of Bishkek and the principal employs the technique of 
acquiesce and rallying her senior teacher and administrators to disseminate the message that 
teachers are not to file complaints and to avoid organizing or participating in public rallies to 
contest the 2011 reform. However, at this school, this approach proved to be effective with some 
but not all teachers. To completely contain all teachers, the principal has also taken to bullying 
and threatening some teachers with job loss (Teacher Interview 15, November 2015). Yet even 
these intimidation tactics have not been entirely successful at this school. In the 2014/15 
academic year, an incident took place in which one teacher was modeled as a negative example 
for other teachers, culminating in her dismissal. The teacher was suspected by the principal of 
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writing letters of complaint to the district education office pertaining both to the 2011 reform as 
well as the work conditions at the school, including an environment of harassment and 
intimidation. In turn, this teacher was reportedly subjected to close scrutiny and criticism by the 
school administrators, leading to her dismissal. Both the principal and several vice principals 
attended her classes on a regular basis to determine and document all points of contention with 
her work. Eventually, once the school administration collected enough evidence to make a case 
of unsatisfactory performance, she was fired for poor performance. According to the informant 
who shared this story with me, all teachers at the school were made aware that this is what 
happens to teachers who are disloyal. She described her perception of the principal as follows,  
The principal wins all the battles. She must have lots of friends in power. All the teachers 
are scared of her. (Teacher Interview 15, November 2015). 
 
Other schools also have principals who instill fear in their staff. The combination of fostering 
fear, establishing good will among loyal senior teachers, and propagating an environment of 
quiet acquiescence all help the principal maintain homeostasis and implement the school’s 
agenda within the reform environment.  
 
Understanding the Social Contract Between Principals and Teachers 
Principals use different tactics to pacify teachers who are dissatisfied with reforms and 
may be inclined to take public action to remedy the situation. An important question emerges: 
when teachers comply, what do they attain from principals that they value more than voicing 
their discontent?  
The fulfillment of the social contract of reciprocity answers this question. When teachers 
consent to not publically voice their discontent with the reform the principals too uphold their 
end of the bargain: they ignore the reform, albeit, in a different way than teachers. While the 
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expectation from teachers is to remain publically well tempered, the onus is on the principal to 
alleviate the negative consequences of the reform. As this dissertation aims to elucidate, the 
agency forged through the partnership between senior teachers and principals resulted in the 
undoing of the 2011 salary reform. This was done by ignoring and undermining the reform. The 
rest of this chapter illustrates how principals across schools in Bishkek systematically ignore the 
2011 reform.  
As discussed, reactionary teachers were silenced by none other than school leaders and 
senior teachers by entering into the following social compact: there will be no public voicing of 
objections to the reform on the part of teachers and in turn teacher grievances will be dealt with 
at the school level. This bold undertaking tests the bonds between teachers and principals and 
school administrators.  If broken, it has significant repercussions for all parties: dismissal, 
subjugation to public embarrassment, loss of official and/or informal income. 
While teachers uniformly ignore the reform in the public sphere by not protesting and not 
otherwise voicing discontent with the new salary structure, it is the covert school-level ignoring 
of the reform that has become an engine of the quiet coalescence of revolt against the reform. 
Out of public view and at the level of the school, teachers and school administrators collude to 
exploit loopholes in the reform to revert back to the stavka system. It is through a myriad of 
small ‘rebellions’ of ignoring the reform at the school level that the reform was largely undone, 
school by school. This micro-level undoing of reforms took place by ignoring reform policies 
and undermining the spirit of the reform.  
 
Ignoring the Reform: Schools Utilize All Available Loopholes to Ignore Reforms 
 The 2011 salary reform was introduced in a centralized manner, mandating that all 
schools nationwide adhere to the new teacher remuneration policy. But the implementation of the 
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reform was to be executed at the school level, with support and oversight from district education 
offices to transition from the stavka system to the workload pay system. Although the policy 
prescriptions were universal, schools individualized the practices of transitioning to the new 
remuneration system, utilizing loopholes beyond the purview of policymakers to ignore 
significant components of the reform and chip away slowly to return the system back to what it 
was before the reform. Principals’ varied approaches to ignoring the reform were largely aimed 
at generating beneficial results for teachers. This is how principals fulfill their end of the social 
contract and maintain the loyalty of committed teachers in the workforce. Ignoring the reform 
and exploiting loopholes involves risk for principals such as being reprimanded by supervisors, 
loss of “face” or respect by the education community, and in the worst-case scenario, dismissal. 
Nevertheless, the social contract between principals and teachers outweighs these risks of rule 
breaking. Since the introduction of the 2011 reform, schools have come up with numerous ways 
to ignore it. These include the following strategies, which were manifest in the 10 schools 
examined in this study: 
1. Keeping strategic teaching hour vacancies at the beginning of the school year that are 
distributed to existing teachers rather than hiring new teachers. 
2. Assigning teaching hours and other tasks to teachers beyond permissible workload limits. 
3. Retaining informal teacher attestation practices at the school level. 
 
 
Core Strategies of Rule Breaking: Disregarding the Reform  
In their allegiance to the mutual interests forged between them, teachers and principals 
have a shared determination to overcome the shortcoming of the reform in-house rather than 
tackling an external and politicized approach to policy change. They have adopted a process of 
ignoring the reform as a way of undoing it. One way this can be discerned is by examining the 
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discrepancy between the documentation that is officially submitted to Bishkek district education 
offices and what actually takes place at schools. 
The tarifikatzia is one of the most important record-keeping documents that each school 
is required to compile and submit to their local district education office for review and approval 
on a biannual basis. The tarifikatzia enumerates all the teachers on staff at a given school and 
lists their assigned teaching hours and other work tasks. The document also includes information 
on vacant teaching positions at the beginning of the school year. In comparing the data in 
tarifikatzia tables with interview data, it is possible to corroborate the extent to which the 
tarifikatzia tables reflect what is actually taking place at schools.  
 
 Keeping strategic vacancies for senior teachers instead of hiring new teachers. All 
schools in Kyrgyzstan have to submit the tarifikatzia document for review to their district 
education office well ahead of September 1,19 which is the first official day of the school year. 
Schools work tirelessly to ensure that this documentation is ready for submission in a timely 
manner, with some schools beginning the tarifikatzia planning process as early as spring of the 
prior school year (Interviews with School Principals, September 2015 – March 2016). 
Remarkably, between August 31 when the tarifikatzia from each school must be approved by the 
district education office and September 1, which marks the first day of the school year, there are 
discernible changes that will have taken place at the school level. Most notably, teaching 
vacancies reported by schools are filled so that the educational process can commence. How they 
are filled reveals one way in which schools are able to ignore the reform mandate. I first examine 
the reported vacancies in the schools and then consider vacancy types in more detail. Below is a 
list of teacher vacancies at each of the 10 schools in this study.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The school year in Kyrgyzstan begins on September 1, unless September 1 falls on a weekend.  
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Table 5.1. Teacher vacancies listed in tarifikatzia, 2015/16  














































Physics, Kyrgyz language, Vice Principal, school psychologist, etc. 
 
History, geography, economics, elementary school, Kyrgyz 
language, etc.  
Physical education, shop class (industrial arts), history, art, etc. 
 
English, Russian, physical education, geography, music, school 
psychologist, physics, astronomy, ethics, etc.  
Mathematics, Kyrgyz language, Russian, physics, astronomy, 
chemistry, biology, geography, school psychologist, etc. 
Information technology, librarian 
 
Kyrgyz language, Russian, school psychologist, school activities 
coordinator 
Chemistry, physical education, shop class (industrial arts), ethics, 
school psychologist, etc.  
Source: tarifikatzia documents collected at Bishkek district education offices 
In nearly all schools, teaching vacancies were reported to the district education office. 
Although nine out of 10 schools reported vacancies, all principals are obliged to ensure that as of 
September 1 there is sufficient coverage for all vacancies in all subjects. How is it then that 
principals are able to resolve the challenge of filling teaching vacancies between end of day 
August 31 when the tarifikatzia goes into effect and September 1 when classes begin? 
 To answer this question, it is worth examining the variation of the vacant teaching hours 
across subjects and schools. Table 5.2 lists vacant teaching hours for eight schools in this study, 
for select subjects. The two schools that reported no vacancies or just two vacancies in other 
subjects are omitted.  
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Table 5.2. Teaching vacancies by subject, select schools, listed in tarifikatzia as of September 1, 201520 
Subject School 1 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 School 7  School 9 School 10 
Elementary school - - 9 - - - - - 
Kyrgyz language - 5 3 - - 3 28 - 
Economics - - 8 - - - - - 
Geography - - 4 - 17 2 - - 
‘Shop’ class - - 22 36 4 9 - 21 
History  - - 3 1 - - - - 
Russian - - - - 24 16 27 - 
English - - - - 26 - - - 
Astronomy 2 - - - 1 - - - 
Physics 2 19 - - 6 8 - - 
Mathematics - - - - - 7 - - 
Chemistry - - - - - - - 3 
Physical education - - - 23 12 - - 9 
Source: Tarifikatzia documents collected at Bishkek district education offices 
Table 5.2 yields a number of insights. First, across the schools there are different vacancy 
magnitudes ranging from just several hours in a given subject to teaching vacancies that could be 
a full teaching position for a teacher. The larger number of vacant teaching hours per subject 
indicates the need for one or more additional teachers to join the school, as is the case with 
schools that post vacancies anywhere from 16 to 36 hours. The small vacancy hours, ranging 
from just one to 12 hours per subject, shows a need to hire part-time teachers or find an 
alternative way to distribute those hours to teachers already employed at the school.  Second, 
despite testimonials from teachers and administrators pointing to the largest gaps of teachers 
being in mathematics, science, and Russian language, this cross-section of schools in Bishkek 
reveals that there are vacancies in a wide array of subjects. Finally, there is no discernable 
pattern of vacancies across school types. Schools 4 and 10, which are specialized schools for 
academic enrichment, rank third and fourth respectively in terms of reported vacancies, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 School 2 and School 8 are excluded from this table because they have no vacancies that were reported in any 
subjects listed. Hours designated in bold represent teaching vacancies that could fill at least one full teaching 
position. 	  
	  115	  	  
another specialized school, School 2, is the only one that reported no vacancies at the beginning 
of the school year. Regular schools across the city range in variation of vacancies by magnitude 
and subject. This suggests that regardless of school type, most schools in Bishkek are confronted 
with the challenge of teacher vacancies in the beginning of the school year.  
 Principals tackle the challenge of filling vacant teaching hours in a number of ways. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, one goal of MoES put forth in the reform was to attract and retain 
new teachers. However, given that fewer new teachers join the teaching profession just two years 
after the reform was introduced than immediately following its commencement (see Chapter 7, 
Table 7.1), the goal of attaining a sustainable inflow and retention of new teachers into the 
profession was not accomplished. The low retention rates of new teachers who enter the 
profession gives pause to principals about hiring young teachers to take on the vacant teaching 
slots. One principal expressed her concern that entrusting new teachers to take on large teaching 
hours can easily backfire, 
We have a longstanding problem of filling our mathematics vacancy. The fact is that 
there are simply not enough good math teachers. We’ve worked over the last 10 years to 
permanently fill the vacancy. The issue is that when we hire a young teacher and if we 
train her well, she will leave to go teach at a private school, where she will earn 2-3 times 
as much as she does here.  Then we are back to square one with a vacancy. (Principal 
Interview 63, February 2016). 
 
When new teachers leave, the principal usually opts to redistribute teaching hours to the 
trusted experienced teachers who take on the teaching hours that departing teachers leave behind. 
Over time, this develops into a pattern in which senior teachers expect that they will be given 
those remaining teaching hours, either mid-year if a new teacher leaves abruptly or right from the 
beginning of the school year. This becomes the de facto approach to filling vacancies for which 
teachers were not hired at the start of the school year. For some experienced teachers who seek 
more teaching hours to increase their income, this is welcomed.  For other teachers, it becomes a 
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burdensome experience of having to take on additional work hours on top of an already hefty 
workload. The mathematics teacher at the same school where the principal (quoted above) has no 
choice but to turn to her experienced teacher for support, states, 
I have a heavy workload. Each week, 36 hours, in two shifts. I work a lot because there 
are not enough mathematics teachers. We have many vacancies at our school. We need 
physics teachers, geography teachers, a mathematics teacher and a chemistry teacher. 
Vacancies are now filled by substituting. (Teacher Interview 72, February 2016). 
 
Her colleague who teaches Russian language at the same school expressed a similar concern, 
   
Young teacher don’t come to work at schools. But someone has to teach those classes. So 
we take on those hours. Instead of those 18 hours of teaching in the Soviet times…we 
take on 40 hours each. This is extremely difficult…but it’s owing to this that we earn our 
salary. (Teacher Interview 56, February 2016). 
 
These accounts reveal the schema most commonly employed by principals to resolve the 
challenge of filling vacancies while also enabling senior teachers to increase their income: 
transferring vacant teaching hours to existing teachers, mostly teachers who have the longest 
work experience. This involves ignoring a key component of the 2011 reform: limiting the 
teaching load to 20 hours per teacher per week.  But how is it that principals are able to get away 
with this rule breaking behavior? 
The answer lies in part with the mismatch between the reform goals and the reality of 
staffing at the school level. When the reform took effect in 2011, it became quickly apparent that 
limiting teaching hours to 20 per week per teacher would pose an existential threat to schools. 
First, schools would not have enough teachers to teach the mandated curriculum. Second, 
teachers would in effect become part-time workers, and the challenge of retention would become 
insurmountable. It would be difficult for principals to retain the most experienced and highly 
trained teachers who have become accustomed to the stavka system in which they are able to 
take on additional teaching loads to increase their income. In this reform environment, to retain 
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the best teachers, principals resort to ignoring the new limit of teaching hour assignments and 
continue to assign more work hours to senior teachers. Even as the Ministry of Education and 
Science lifted the teaching hour limit, the practice of principals ignoring the maximum 
permissible teaching load stipulated by MoES persists.  The most ubiquitous way in which 
principals bypass adherence to teaching hour limits is by consistently reporting teaching 
vacancies at the start of the school year and “solving” the teaching vacancy problem by 
redistributing those hours to senior teachers rather than hiring new teachers. Even as the 
maximum permissible teaching load increased from 20 to 31 hours in the course of two years 
(see Chapter 4, Table 4.4), principals continued to give their most valued and indispensible 
teachers as many teaching hours as they wish to take on. In some cases, principals coerced 
teachers into taking on more teaching hours if it was necessary for the school’s fulfillment of the 
academic curriculum. According to one principal, 
Yes it was stipulated that teachers are to teach 20 hours per week and every teacher is to 
have 20 hours, but that is not how it is here. With chemistry for example, I have one 
chemistry teacher, and they want me to have two. But I give 45 hours to my chemistry 
teacher, because she is one of the best chemistry teachers in our country. So of course I 
give her as many hours as she wants, because she knows that for one stavka she will get 
only 5,000 som. So I give her extracurricular hours, because she prepares students so well 
for Olympiads that we get to go to Japan, Copenhagen, and to all the chemistry 
competitions. So I tell her, you take one stavka as per policy, and I’ll give you the second 
one as extracurricular hours. But we still had some chemistry teaching hours left 
over…I’m the one who goes to her and begs her to take on some more classes. (Principal 
Interview 52, December 2015). 
 
Similar scenarios of teachers taking on more hours than permitted play out across schools in 
Bishkek, as evidenced across interviews with different teachers, 
Oh I sure work a lot, I also take on substitute teaching, for a total of 34 hours a week, and 
I am a homeroom teacher for two classes.  
 
You really have to forget about everything in life. And entirely forget about your needs. 
Take me, for example, I work every day, six days a week from 8 to 6. No breaks, no 
weekends.   
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I work a lot. I have to work a lot. It may be best not to showcase this too much, it may 
even be illegal, but I'm working for two salaries. This means, for example, that if I’m 
supposed to work only forty hours - this is my full stavka and I cannot take on more than 
forty hours. If I work any more than forty hours, I would be doing so as a substitute 
teacher, where in general I would be paid only 20 percent…so instead what I do is make 
arrangements with someone: she might be written in the tarifikatzia, but I would teach 
those classes and get the salary…In my case, my daughter is also a mathematics teacher, 
and so I teach her hours for her. (Teacher Interviews 4, 36, 72, October - December 2015; 
February 2016). 
 
Keeping these strategic vacancies in order to redistribute work hours to current teachers 
instead of hiring new teachers was one of the first mechanisms employed by principals to 
assuage the impacts of the 2011 reform. In fact, this practice of redistributing work hours existed 
before the reform was introduced and continuing forth with it became a mechanism to ignore the 
reform both in practice and in spirit. That principals were able to continue this practice speaks to 
both the very real challenge of attracting and retaining new teachers as well as to the relative 
ease of utilizing loopholes in the reform to revert the work structure back to the stavka system.  
 
Assigning teaching hours and other tasks to teachers beyond permissible workload 
limits. As the evidence presented above shows, principals and teachers have found a myriad of 
ways for teachers to take on work beyond what is officially permitted. Principals document 
additional teaching hours as extracurricular work in the tarifikatzia21; they assign teachers to be 
long-term substitute teachers for classes that do not have a permanent teacher and are listed as a 
vacancy in the tarifikatzia; and, in some instances, teachers’ extra work hours are not 
documented and are instead completed informally vis-à-vis arrangements with other teachers and 
the school.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Extracurricular classes in the Kyrgyz Republic are classes held outside of the mandated state curriculum and are 
funded through the financial contributions of parents who wish to have extra classes or in-school tutoring for their 
children. The “prestigious” schools in Bishkek tend to have many extracurricular classes and in some instances even 
hire teachers to teach solely those classes, while regular schools have fewer or no extracurricular classes at all.  
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In addition to schools keeping strategic vacancies and teachers taking on teaching loads 
beyond permissible work hours, the reform is also ignored at the school level in other ways. 
Blind spots in the tarifikatzia allow schools to manipulate not only the allocation of teaching 
hours but also other tasks such as homeroom duty, which is a key role in the school not only 
because teachers are assigned to oversee the development of students but also because 
homeroom teachers help generate revenue for the school and extra income for all teachers.22 
Homeroom duties place tremendous responsibility on teachers in Bishkek due to the significant 
overcrowding of urban schools. But homeroom duties are seen as critical work assignments for 
teachers because it is largely homeroom teachers who are tasked with securing monthly informal 
school fees from parents (Principal Interviews, October 2015 – March 2016). The extent of rule 
breaking around this aspect of teachers’ work is astounding: trusted teachers and even 
administrators can be cajoled or coerced into taking on homeroom duties, including more than 
one and on occasion even more than two homeroom classes, even if they are not officially 
compensated for the extra work. As one Vice Principal who found herself in this situation 
explains,  
This is not a paid role for me. Based on the tarifikatzia, administrators cannot be 
homeroom teachers. I essentially work for free…but the school supplements this of 
course. (Administrator Interview 90, March 2016). 
 
Taking on additional duties that contradict protocol is a testament to the salience of the 
social contract between teachers, principals, and school administrators. Principals strive to meet 
school needs using whatever mechanisms they anticipate will work best, be it following official 
policy or ignoring it. They also understand that if school staff take on roles beyond the scope of 
what is permissible through official channels, there is an expectation of a reciprocity of gains and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Homeroom teachers raise money for the school from parents of students in their homeroom class, a portion of 
which is allocated to supplementing teachers’ official government salary. 
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responsibilities between the parties involved. As one teacher explained, “the administration does 
a good job of helping teachers. For example, they give supplementary pay and different stimulus 
payments.” (Teacher Interview 71, February 2016). When schools deem rule breaking as more 
beneficial than compliance with reform goals and the risks as manageable, then ignoring the 
reform is the course of action that schools will take.  
 
Retaining informal attestation practices at the school level. Attestation was an 
incentive for teachers to complete higher qualifications in their profession. Instituted in the 
Soviet Union, it involved assigning teachers to a professional rank, ranging from the category of 
‘beginning teacher’ to the highest category of ‘master teacher.’ The attestation process was 
available for all teachers who wished to partake in it and the incentive of being placed in a higher 
salary bracket for each category attained was enough to motivate most teachers to pursue it. 
Several interviews revealed that principal and school administrators uniformly encouraged 
teachers to take part in the attestation process because having more teachers with higher 
categories added to the prestige of the school (Principal Interviews 34 and 84, November 2015; 
March 2016). Attestation also afforded teachers the opportunity to have more professional 
development and showcase their work, which was good both for teachers and schools. The 
attestation process became a promotion system that combined both teacher tenure and training. 
Teachers were eligible to pursue the next category of the attestation process every two to five 
years and they had to undergo trainings at either the school or the district education office levels, 
depending on the stage of the attestation process. Teachers attended workshops, gave open 
lessons, and occasionally received a higher category for preparing students for Olympiads in 
which their students won.  
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By the time the salary reform was initiated in 2011, 75 percent of teachers in Kyrgyzstan 
had attained the highest category of ‘master teacher’ (Policymaker Interview 78, February 2016). 
This large percentage of attainment of the highest category of teaching was a reflection of the 
aging of the pedagogical cadre as well the increasing ease of obtaining the highest category, 
owing to the decline of funding allocated to teacher training opportunities that resulted in less 
rigorous criteria for moving through the ranks of the category structure. As discussed in Chapter 
4, attaining a high category as a teacher could result in up to a 20 percent addition to the salary 
(see Figure 4.1, “Salary structure before reform”). While in the Soviet Union categories were 
associated both with prestige as well as salary, in the post-Soviet era teachers were largely 
motivated to attain the highest category because any increase in salary was important at a time 
when teacher salaries were miserly compared to employment in other sectors. The category thus 
became an additional salary component that boosted the income of experienced teachers and 
remained a source of status and pride. However, from the perspective of education finance 
experts at the Ministry of Education and Science, this salary addition to three quarters of the 
workforce was a costly and increasingly unreliable way to reward teachers for improving the 
quality of their work. Categories came to be regarded at MoES as a tremendous burden on the 
education budget with limited returns, given that teachers who had attained the highest category 
were no longer pursuing growth in their professional standing and the government was unable to 
provide adequate continuing education opportunities for all teachers. A major component of the 
2011 teacher salary reform was the elimination of the attestation process and the entire teacher 
category system, including remuneration benefits for teachers who had attained the highest rank 
of ‘master teacher.’ Largely, this affected teachers who had been in the workforce for at least 10 
years or more.  
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With the elimination of categories, teachers lost their category status and category-based 
remuneration from the government. At the school level, however, the story is quite different. 
Experienced teachers were the most aggrieved with the elimination of categories and this aspect 
of the reform became the biggest point of contention among experienced teachers, leading 
principals to take ameliorative action. Across schools, principals found solutions that both 
enabled them to formally comply with the stipulation of eliminating the teacher categories while 
also ignoring this component of the reform at the school level. Formally, teachers were no longer 
receiving category compensation; categories were not listed in the tarifikatzia documents 
submitted to the district education offices and teachers were not compensated as ‘master 
teachers’ through their government salaries. However, principals retained the culture of the 
categories across schools, keeping close records of the category status of each teacher on staff. In 
some instances, principals continued to conduct the attestation process informally at the school 
level. This includes an annual or biannual review process by subject-specific committees. As 
before the 2011 reform, teachers at these schools continued to prepare and present open lessons, 
which were assessed and evaluated by their colleagues. Teachers’ records of attending teacher 
trainings and voluntary workshops were also taken into account for the school-level attestation 
process. And most notably, in the schools that collect sizable informal fees from parents, the 
practice of compensating teachers for their categories was retained through these means. 
Although the 2011 salary reform called for moving away from the category system and 
instituting a new way of organizing teacher pay, some of the most prestigious schools in the 
capital city of the Kyrgyz Republic have continued to have a category compensation system, 
ignoring the 2011 reform agenda.  
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In one school, a teacher spoke about the in-school informal attestation process as one of 
the sole ways in which principals can support teachers, 
Principals don’t have many opportunities to support teachers. One example is if the 
attestation is done within the school, because they know the quality of our work…Within 
the school the administration can support us, but higher up [at MoES] they cannot. 
(Teacher Interview 19, November 2015). 
 
The principal at another school in Bishkek, explains the rationale of maintaining the attestation 
tradition,  
Attestation was eliminated, but we kept it, because it is where the teacher can really 
bloom if the individual is talented and creative…We see the attestation process not as 
some kind of whip, but to the contrary, as an opportunity for teachers to showcase what 
they’ve learned…and we’ve learned that we have some outstanding work taking place 
that colleagues might not otherwise know about. And this gives us the opportunity to get 
acquainted with it and appreciate the person. And the individual feels good, because he is 
evaluated and an assessment is given not only in a material sense but also in moral 
support. This plays an instrumental role. It also allows us to show young teachers what is 
expected. (Principal Interview 63, February 2016). 
 
This testimonial of a principal who works to maintain the tradition of the attestation process 
shows that the practice of teachers working to earn categories is multifunctional: it is a mode 
through which they can innovate and showcase their work; it is an avenue of demonstrating to 
beginning teachers exemplary pedagogical practices; and perhaps most importantly, it serves to 
boost the morale of teachers.  
 
Fee Collection from Families 
In addition to maximizing salary payments from the government salary allocations, 
schools in Bishkek have also established mechanisms of informal fee collection from families. 
This is a practice that has evolved since the early 1990s when teachers collected cash payments 
directly from parents or even students in classrooms to more recent practices of establishing a 
school-wide ‘Social Fund’ into which families deposit money directly via bank transfers. These 
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practices are universal and well known in the public sphere as the modus operandi of Bishkek 
school leaders and teachers. While the practice of fee collection is not condoned by the Ministry 
of Education and Science, education official also do not block the process nor do they intervene 
in the practice. Only on rare occasions when the Ministry of Education and Science receives 
inquiries or complaints about the excesses of fees collected do education officials investigate the 
school and take punitive action against principals and schools. 
Why is it that the practice of fee collection from families has become ubiquitous in 
Bishkek? According to teachers, it is the only way in which schools and teachers can subsist 
(Teacher Interviews, October 2015 – March 2016). In the specialized (and most prestigious) 
schools of the city, it is also the only way that teachers are retained in the profession (Ramas, 
2016).  In the words of one teacher, “schools survive only because of parents…the government 
provides only to the extent that it can and so we and our school leader don’t just sit with our 
hands folded in our laps waiting for the government to give more. It’s the parents who help us 
stay afloat.” (Teacher Interview 3, October 2015).   
Collecting informal fees and the involvement of teachers in private tutoring in and out of 
school are practices that occur within the domain of the informal economy. The informal 
economy spans about half of the total revenue production in the country and employs 
approximately 70 percent of the workforce (Nasritdinov, Rayapova, Kholmatova, Damirbek, & 
Igoshina, 2010; OECD, 2010). The low government salaries of teachers and others employed in 
the education sector are supplemented by the funds raised by schools and teachers (as is the case 
with other public sector professions such as medicine where willing individuals also reap the 
benefits of offering privatized services beyond the duty of public service).  School leaders 
leverage the factor of opportunism of teachers to earn more money as a means of encouraging 
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teachers to raise funds for themselves and the school. Teachers who have the most credibility and 
the strongest reputation in the community are commonly asked to teach extracurricular classes or 
to tutor privately, be it their own students or students from other schools. In the words of one 
vice principal, “If someone wants to earn more, she can always earn more” (Administrator 
Interview, November 2015). 
 
Another Social Contract:  
Policymakers Turn a Blind Eye on School-level Reform Ignoring Practices 
In this chapter, I have presented the three main strategies employed by schools to ignore 
the 2011 teacher salary reform: keeping strategic teaching vacancies at the beginning of the 
school year that are distributed to existing teachers rather than hiring new teachers, assigning 
teaching hours and other tasks to teachers beyond permissible limits, and retaining informal 
attestation practices. Additionally, teachers and principals in Bishkek also collaborate in 
collecting informal fees from parents, including a large lump sum for student admissions to a 
school and subsequent annual and monthly payments (Ramas, 2016). 
 Each of these strategies are largely imperceptible at the policy level, yet the ubiquity and 
efficacy with which schools in Bishkek applied them has made an impact on the reform, which 
was amended continuously to reflect the realities of reform implementation at the school level. 
While the quotidian practices of selectively implementing and largely disregarding the reform 
were out of view of policymakers, evidence suggests that education officials were aware of the 
localization of reforms that were taking place at the school level. As a high level Ministry of 
Education and Science economist confirmed,  
Yes each school adjusted as was fitting to them. Even though we made it clear that they need 
to follow a single formula for making the tarifikatzia. That was the law. (Policymaker 
Interview 79, February 2016). 
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Schools in Bishkek are subject to regular inspections and scrutiny of adherence to 
legislative decrees. One of the schools in this study saw the dismissal of the principal due to her 
abuse of power (see Chapter 3, ‘School 6’), which included assigning teachers excessive school 
duties and soliciting fees from parents. The principal had assigned one teacher to be homeroom 
teacher for three classes. This task is not only impossible to fulfill in practical terms, but it is also 
not permissible based on the official documentation practices, which mandate that all tasks of 
teachers and administrators be recorded in the tarifikatzia. The dismissal of this principal took 
place because of egregious rule breaking in the school’s formal record keeping and because the 
principal engaged in extensive fee solicitation from parents, which was reported by parents to the 
district education office responsible for overseeing this school.  
But why is it (if all schools are engaged in rule breaking to some extent) that some 
schools and certain school leaders are subjected to close scrutiny of practice and are dismissed, 
while others are not? It serves us well here to revisit the ways in which principals operate to 
contain teachers: they collaborate with senior teachers to help facilitate the compliance of others, 
and if needed, they model to their staff the negative consequences of incompliant behavior. 
Likewise, evidence of education officials’ awareness of rule breaking and the undermining of 
reform that takes place at the school level suggests that there is also a social contract of 
reciprocity in the relationship between school principals and education officials.  
It is the task of education officials to ensure that reforms are implemented without any 
disruptions to the education process. To accomplish this, education officials have to compromise 
with school principals who have their school’s goals in mind. In the case of the implementation 
of the 2011 reform, the formation of a strategically mutual relationship between policymakers 
and principals allowed the reform to be administered and prevented teacher protests. Permitting 
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some rule breaking at the school level also serves as a feedback loop for policymakers to refine 
the reform.  
In Kyrgyzstan, reforms are often submitted to the Parliament in draft form, rushed to pass 
in legislature, and later revised and amended. The process of incremental reform change takes 
place both by schools pushing back against reform components and policymakers enabling this 
to take place in order to gain feedback on the reform so that it can be modified accordingly. 
Education officials thus attain their primary goal of keeping the education system functioning 
and forestalling conflict. They also help keep senior teachers in the profession and prevent public 
outcry against the reform. For principals, the win is the implicit permission to pursue their 
individualized agenda of localizing the reform in a manner befitting their school environment. 
However, principals are under constant and significant pressure to maintain the delicate balance 
of adapting the reform to their school and complying with the law.  
As principals do with teachers, education officials also win over strategically beneficial 
principals who they can work with to ensure the compliance of principals across the board. These 
loyal principals are the ones whose schools policymakers herald as showcases of success. In turn, 
loyal principals model behavior to their peers. Policymakers also set examples of non-compliant 
schools and principals to ensure that there is no overstepping of boundaries around the implicitly 
permissible rule breaking that befits the relationship between principals and policymakers.  As 
discussed, negative example setting was the case at one school in which the principal was 
dismissed mid-year. It is likely that she was dismissed not only because she was breaking rules, 
since other schools also solicit informal school fees from parents and assign multiple homeroom 
classes to teachers. Rather, she was dismissed because she overstepped boundaries and failed to 
balance the formal and informal structure of the school – that is, her actions became too visible 
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in the public sphere. In the case of this school, the informal practice of parental fee collection 
was elevated from the district education office to the Bishkek Education Department within the 
Bishkek Mayor’s Office and on to MoES by parents filing formal complaints, at which point the 
Ministry had to apply its formal structure as overseer of school compliance, thus making an 
example of this principal’s bad practices.  
Another explanation for the perpetuity of rule breaking at the school level is that the 
Ministry of Education and Science enables this behavior due to reasons of self- preservation as 
well as limited capacity to affect change. As a government official cynically reflected on why the 
government does not get involved in addressing clearly evident instances of rule breaking, 
People live on their own these days [without the government]. And it is a good thing, because 
they don’t protest and there are no public outrages. As we used to say, at least there is no 
war. (Policymaker Interview 40, December 2015). 
 
This statement suggests that government officials recognize the challenges teachers and 
principals face owing to the limited resources allocated by the education sector. But it is also an 
admission that the government sees benefit in the separation between the government sector and 
the school-level problem solving that must take place in order for schools to function. The 
education policymakers have no alternative to turning a blind eye to the mechanisms employed 
by schools in order to survive. Additionally, since many policies are implemented in draft form 
and rushed manner and with intention of incremental change over time, this explains why 
schools that ignore reform mandates remain mostly without reprimand, the exception being 
schools that either overstep boundaries or have the misfortune of being made an example of.  
 In the next chapter, I examine how schools have appropriated an opportunity to shape a 
new component of the reform to undermine the reform.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE STIMULUS FUND:  
UNDERMINING THE REFORM ONE SCHOOL AT A TIME 
 
Introduction 
The Stimulus Fund pay is what used to be the premium payment, which was also paid out 
quarterly. This is the same old, only renamed as something new.     
  (Teacher Interview 62, February 2016) 
In Chapter 5, I examined the ways in which principals and teachers subvert the 2011 
reform by finding available loopholes to ignore specific policy goals. When it serves the goals of 
the school, there is disregard for the spirit of the reform and an aim to return to the Soviet stavka 
system. In this chapter, I examine the school-level implementation of another component of the 
2011 salary reform to understand its role in undermining it.  
When the Ministry of Education and Science set out to implement a teacher salary reform 
aimed to attract new teachers to the profession and motivate teachers to improve the quality of 
their work, the component introduced to do so was the Stimulus Fund.  The Stimulus Fund is an 
incentive pay component of the salary paid out quarterly based on teacher performance. The 
resources allocated for the Stimulus Fund from the Ministry of Education and Science are 
calculated as a percentage of the total amount of salary funds allotted for a given school. Each 
school is allocated an additional 10 percent of the total salary amount for the Stimulus Fund. Of 
this amount, at least three quarters are to be distributed as bonus pay to teachers and up to one 
quarter as bonus pay to administrators and support staff at the school. Although bonus pay funds 
comprise only 10 percent in addition to a school’s salary budget, the introduction of the Stimulus 
Fund incentive pay schema nevertheless played a significant role in the reform implementation 
process. The aim of this chapter is to examine how schools utilized the authority they were given 
to administer incentive pay to undermine the 2011 reform.  
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In this chapter, I ask the question of whether the Stimulus Fund was successful in 
motivating and rewarding high-performing teachers, as was intended by MoES.  I show that 
contrary to policy goals, the introduction of incentive pay had a deleterious impact on teacher 
motivation and resulted in a number of unintended consequences, including intergenerational 
rifts among teachers, a rejection of other components of the 2011 teacher salary reform, and a 
failure to make progress in overcoming the persisting challenge of attracting and retaining 
qualified teachers.  As early as six months after the reform was announced, it began to be 
dismantled. I argue that the Stimulus Fund was a significant contributing factor to undermining 
and undoing the 2011 salary reform. 
 
Why Incentives Don’t Pay: Introducing Bonus Pay in the Kyrgyz Republic  
With pressure from local and international communities, the Ministry of Education and 
Science of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted a salary schema proposed by the Ministry of Finance 
and USAID (see Chapter 4) to improve teaching quality by introducing incentive pay as a 
component of teacher remuneration. In consultation with these entities and other international 
experts, MoES determined that teachers aught to be financially incentivized to improve their 
work, and that the Soviet system of teacher categories was no longer viable in achieving this. As 
such, a new incentive component of the teacher salary – The Stimulus Fund – was introduced. 
The Stimulus Fund became one of three teacher salary components, the two others being the 
‘guaranteed’ salary component (number of assigned teaching hours, preparatory work, 
homeroom duties, etc.) and the ‘allowances’ portion of the salary (supplements based on criteria 
such as teaching at a specialized school, working in a mountainous region, length of tenure in the 
profession, etc.) (See Chapter 4, Figure 4.1).  The Stimulus Fund is disbursed on a quarterly 
basis, with schools allocating ‘points’ to staff members based on performance and the 
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accountants at the district education offices converting the points to monetary amounts. This 
conversion of points to Kyrgyz som is based on a formula that includes the total number of hours 
worked by an individual over the quarter and a school-wide coefficient23 of additional wages, a 
quotient of the total funds allotted to the school for the Stimulus Fund and total funds allocated 
for compensation of the Guaranteed component (the total work hour wages for all school staff). 
At the district education office, the Stimulus Fund is calculated based on the average of each 
teacher’s salary for three months. The school itself does not allocate the Stimulus Fund payment 
to staff; instead the school is assigned coefficients (or ‘points’) to distribute, based on the number 
of staff employed.24 At the school level, each department (usually organized by subject area) 
forms a Stimulus Fund committee that is comprised of teachers and administrators. Together, 
they set the performance criteria and oversee the process of tracking teacher performance 
throughout the quarter to determine the bonus pay points for each teacher as well as each school 
administrator. On a quarterly basis, each school sends to the education district office a tally of 
points earned by each staff member. The education district office calculates the final amounts 
and transfers the bonus pay money directly to teacher bank accounts.  
Given that the Stimulus Fund is only 10 percent of the school salary allocation and is 
distributed to teachers just once every three months, it is a small amount compared to teachers’ 
monthly salaries and ranges anywhere from just several hundred som (with a conversion rate of 
approximately 69 som per U.S. dollar as of this writing) to several thousand som.  Small bonus 
payouts notwithstanding, the implementation of the Stimulus Fund was a notable and impactful 
pivot away from the static compensation structure that allocated higher pay to teachers based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The term ‘coefficient’ is used in Kyrgyz policy documents and in the vernacular of schools when referring to the 
points allocations of the Stimulus Fund that can range from 0.1 to any whole number. For ease of reference, I also 
refer to bonus pay points allocated by schools as ‘coefficients.’ 
24  See Appendix E for two examples of a Stimulus Fund Coefficients Table. 	  
	  132	  	  
categories as a proxy of quality to an active system of bonus compensation that now demanded 
regular tracking of teacher performance. As this chapter shows, owing to this shift, the Stimulus 
Fund had a significant impact on the reform implementation process.  
The inquiry explored in this chapter is whether schools in Bishkek use the Stimulus Fund 
as intended to motivate and reward high-performing teachers. I also explore the hypothesis that 
the introduction of the Stimulus Fund as an alternative to attestation played a role as a catalyst 
for schools to begin to undermine and undo the reform.  The chapter presents a detailed overview 
of the Stimulus Fund structure in design and in practice, examines five Stimulus Fund 
distribution schemas, and discusses the logic of how and why schools use the Stimulus Fund to 
undermine the 2011 reform.  
While the Guaranteed salary component and the allowances portion of teacher pay 
were centralized and implemented with oversight of MoES, the Stimulus Fund component, 
including the organization, criteria-setting, and distribution of the bonus pay was relegated to the 
discretion of schools. Because schools were given the authority to decide how to allocate and 
distribute Stimulus Funds to teachers and administrators, it is this component of the salary that 
school leaders had the most leverage to adapt to fit the needs of their school environment. An 
analysis of the distribution of incentive pay across schools thus elucidates core power dynamics 
within schools and shows the extent to which schools utilize the Stimulus Fund to attain their 
own objectives, at the expense of the spirit of the reform. In the following section, I show how 
Stimulus Fund criteria are determined at the school level, share a number of examples of how 
bonus pay is calculated, and explore how the introduction of bonus pay in Bishkek became a 
catalyst for undoing the 2011 teacher salary reform. 
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Understanding the Stimulus Fund 
Although the Stimulus Fund was introduced as a new salary component in 2011, the 
concept of additional pay for performance is not a new phenomenon. During the Soviet era, 
teachers in the Kyrgyz Republic and throughout the Soviet Union were incentivized to prepare 
students to participate in Olympiads and other competitions. Teachers whose students won in the 
Olympiads received salary bonuses (then called premiums). The premiums depended on the 
school’s availability of resources, but were often sizable. Additionally, in the Soviet Union, it 
was common for teachers to receive premiums for general good work throughout the year or in 
one lump sum at the end of the year. As one teacher explained,  
The Stimulus Fund pay is what used to be the premium payment, which was also paid out 
quarterly. This is the same old, only renamed as something new. And a long time before 
2011 we used to have the 13th salary.25 (Teacher Interview 62, February 2016) 
 
This teacher is not exceptional in her view that the Stimulus Fund is a different iteration of 
rewards that had existed in the past. Unlike this teacher, however, others believe that the 
Stimulus Fund was disruptive of the status quo even though it mimicked the long forgone 
tradition of bonus pay for teachers. A number of teachers and administrators took contention 
with the introduction of the Stimulus Fund. As one vice principal expressed, 
Teachers used to have an incentive. When you got your category, you got a higher salary. 
And you knew what you would receive each time. Now, the Stimulus Fund is always 
distributed among all colleagues. (Administrator Interview 60, February 2016). 
 
Critical to understanding the discontent with the introduction of this particular bonus pay 
structure is that teachers perceived the Stimulus Fund as a replacement of category supplements. 
As senior teachers put it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In the Soviet era, the 13th salary was a bonus paid to teachers once a year that was equivalent to one month’s 
salary.  
	  134	  	  
I went to the training courses and seminars [for attestation]. They were really something. 
But here there is no incentive… in five years, even three years, we will have to reap what 
they have sowed with education [reforms]…I am now leveled with young teachers. The 
way it works now is how many hours I take on is as much as I earn. You see how many 
years we have worked and all of our experience teaching, and this is not even taken into 
account…and so I just take on as many hours as I can. (Teacher Interview 71, February 
2016). 
 
Competing for merit-based pay with all other teachers was seen as an insult to 
experienced teachers, many of whom had volunteered time throughout their careers to improve 
the quality of work of all teachers – something that senior were now expected to do on a 
competitive basis.  
Although the idea of bonus pay is itself not new, the introduction of the Stimulus Fund as 
incentive pay to motivate teachers to improve their performance was seen by senior teachers as 
contradicting the values and norms of age-stratified compensation. Many teachers believed that 
they were already working at full capacity and saw incentive pay at a rate of just 10 percent of 
the school’s salary budget as patronizing rather than motivating. Because the support from 
teachers and school administrators for the Stimulus Fund was lackluster from the beginning, 
rather than embracing the Stimulus Fund, many schools instead adapted the Stimulus Fund to 
advance various school-specific agendas towards which the funds were directed.  
 
The Stimulus Fund as Intended 
In announcing the salary reform, MoES suggested model criteria for the Stimulus Fund. 
Table 6.1 enumerates these criteria. However, the final selection of criteria was left to the 
discretion of schools. 	  




Dimension (researcher’s classification) 
Complexity and intensity of teaching teaching quality 
Preparation of students for Olympiads student learning 
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Quality of extracurricular activities extracurricular work 
Preparation and organization of conferences, workshops professional growth and development 
Authoring original publications or writing curricular materials professional growth and development 
Curriculum development and lesson preparation professional growth and development 
Condition of classroom professionalism 
Work discipline (not coming late to class, dress code, etc.) professionalism 
No administrative penalties administrative 
Quality maintenance of documents/records administrative 
Source: MoES 
 
Of the 10 criteria recommended by MoES, only one reflects a dimensions of student 
learning: the preparation of students for Olympiads. Yet even the preparation of students for 
these academic competitions concentrates the teacher’s effort on one or several students rather 
than on improving student learning outcomes of all students. The other dimensions 
recommended in the criteria may contribute to student learning but only indirectly. Fulfillment of 
administrative functions, including maintenance of documents and the absence of administrative 
errors and penalties are criteria of teacher compliance rather than quality. While these are 
important responsibilities of teachers, they do not bear a direct impact on improved quality of 
teaching and learning.  
Because allocation of Stimulus Fund criteria and the distribution of bonus pay points was 
relegated to the authority of each school, there is variation across schools in the distribution 
patterns of incentive pay. While MoES provided criteria recommendations and sample protocols 
for bonus points allocation, it did not stipulate that it would hold schools accountable to 
implementing the recommended criteria. For this reason, an analysis of how the Stimulus Fund 
was implemented, including the range of ways that schools adapted the Stimulus Fund to their 
own goals, is illustrative of both the challenges schools face as well as how they seize the 
opportunity to modify reforms. While some schools implement the criteria exactly as 
recommended by MoES, other schools use incentive pay allocation to undermine the reform by, 
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for example, disbursing the funds to compensate senior teachers for the eliminated categories 
component of the salary or distributing bonus pay points equally among teachers.  
 
The Stimulus Fund as Implemented  
Six schools of 10 schools visited in this study provided information about the criteria 
used for determining Stimulus Fund allocations at their school. Table 6.2 enumerates the 
Stimulus Fund criteria of all the schools visited that volunteered to share this information. Each 
of the schools incorporated at least one of the criteria recommended by MoES, with most schools 
using at least several of the recommended criteria. All but one school added at least one criteria 
of their own. 
As Table 6.2 shows, most schools opted to adopt criteria as recommended by MoES. 
However, in doing so, many of the schools adapted the criteria to fit their school environment. 
For example, in one school, ‘complexity and intensity of work’ and ‘quality of disciplinary and 
non-curricular work’ became subsumed into one category, ‘quality of education and 
extracurricular activities, organization of school-wide activities and participation in public 
events’ (not listed in Table 6.2). Another, ‘organization of educational and behavioral work in 
class’ could also be classified under ‘Curricular development’ or ‘condition of classroom’ but for 
this school the newly created category was more deemed more relevant. 
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Table 6.2. Stimulus Fund criteria comparison across six schools in Bishkek, 2015/16 
Stimulus Fund Criteria26 School 1 School 2 School 5 School 6 School 9 School 10 
Complexity and intensity of work  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Quality of disciplinary and non-curricular work  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   Preparation and organization of conferences and 
workshops  ✓     
Preparation of students for Olympiads  ✓ ✓    
Authoring original content or curricular 
materials       ✓ 
Curricular development  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Condition of classroom ✓ ✓  ✓    
Absence of administrative penalties ✓ ✓       
Quality maintenance of documents and school 
records ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    
Work discipline (e.g. promptness, additional 
duties) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Visiting open lessons of other teachers ✓        ✓ 
Portfolio  ✓           
Professional development, active participation in 
department work    ✓   ✓    
Quality of lessons ✓         ✓ 
Level of professional mastery    ✓   ✓   
Organization of educational and behavioral work in 
class       ✓    
Innovation         ✓ ✓ 
Monitoring and evaluation of student achievement        ✓   
Professional competitions           ✓ 
Source: Stimulus Fund data collected during school visits
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Criteria listed in bold text are the recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science; all others are assigned by individual schools.  	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Once a school selects criteria, bonuses are allocated on a points system. One point 
(equivalent to a coefficient of 1.0) is allocated per teacher. A school that has 50 teachers would 
have 50 bonus points to distribute. These 50 points are further segmented into points allocated 
per subject-area department. If there are 10 teachers in the science department at this school, the 
department will have 10 points to distribute among science teachers. In the process of allocating 
the bonus pay points to individual teachers, they are further sub-divided into decimals of the 
coefficient. Each department’s Stimulus Fund committee tracks the distribution of points either 
per task or per overall performance of teachers, implementing either a rewarding (additive) or a 
punitive (subtractive) approach to bonus points allocation. This is illustrated when examining 
bonus pay school by school.  
 
Five Distribution Patterns of the Stimulus Fund in Bishkek Schools 
Each of the schools’ Stimulus Funds that are examined in this study offer compelling 
stand-alone examples of how schools localize reforms. They illustrate the variety of ways in 
which schools in Bishkek adapted bonus pay funds to address the needs of their specific 
environment. Comparing how different schools allocate Stimulus Fund points allows me to 
discuss the similarities and differences in the challenges faced by different types of schools in 
Bishkek.  
This study identified five patterns of how schools distribute the funds from the Stimulus 
Fund to the teachers and administrators of the school. They include: 
• Category replacement distribution, affording senior teachers higher bonus pay. 
• Subject-area retention distribution, allocating bonus pay to retain teachers in hard-to 
recruit subject areas. 
• Teacher micro-management or compliance distribution, aimed at ensuring teacher 
compliance to school policies or assigned tasks; this schema tends to penalize younger 
teachers and reward senior teachers. 
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• Authority-oriented distribution, wherein either school administrators or teachers who 
head up the Stimulus Fund committees receive disproportionately higher bonus pay 
allocations than other colleagues.  
• Non-differentiated distribution, in which bonus pay coefficients are awarded equally 
among teachers, undermining the overall goal of the Stimulus Fund. 
 
Each type of Stimulus Fund schema reflects the social dynamics, power relations, and 
hierarchies in the schools. It also reflects the attitudes and points of objection of schools toward 
the reform. The points of objection can be analyzed by observing how schools diverted the 
MoES-recommended distribution of the Stimulus Fund to meet school-specific goals. In each 
case of the five schools examined, the Stimulus Fund was distributed in a targeted manner aimed 
to compensate certain individuals more than others, reflecting the unique dynamics and staffing 
circumstances of schools. 
In each school, bonus pay point allocations for senior teachers are higher than for beginning 
teachers, which amounts to senior teachers earning higher bonuses. Table 6.3 shows the 
coefficient distribution patterns across schools. Since each teacher in a school receives a 
coefficient of 1.0, parity of point distribution would mean that everyone receives a bonus pay 
coefficient of 1.0. If a teacher receives a bonus pay coefficient of more than 1.0 it means that 
another teacher will receive a coefficient of less than 1.0.  
Table 6.3. Stimulus Fund points distribution to teachers across select schools in Bishkek, 2014/15 
 School 2 School 5 School 6 School 9 School 10 
Total number of coefficients of 
1.0 46 8 24 9 0 
Teachers with more than 10  
years experience with coefficient 
of 1.0 
24 6 16 3 0 
Teachers with 10 or less years of 
experience with coefficient of 1.0 22 2 8 6 0 
Teachers with more than 10  
years experience with coefficient 
of less than 1.0 
2 0 3 9 38 
Teachers with more than 10  
years experience with coefficient 
of more than 1.0 
5 7 11 7 47 
	  	  140	  
Teachers with 10 or less years of 
experience with coefficient less 
than 1.0 
10 4 14 34 16 
Teachers with 10 or less years of 
experience with coefficient more 
than 1.0 
5 5 1 20 0 
Total teachers with 10 or less years 
of experience  37 11 23 60 16 
Total teachers with more than 10 
years of experience  31 13 30 19 85 
Total number of teachers 68 24 53 79 101 
Source: Stimulus Fund data collected during school visits 
 
Table 6.3 shows a range of practices of bonus pay distribution points across schools. In 
some schools, the majority of teachers receive a bonus pay coefficient of 1.0 while some receive 
more or less than 1.0. In one school, no teachers receive a coefficient of exactly 1.0. While in 
most schools, teachers with more than 10 years of experience receive higher coefficients than 
teachers with 10 or less years of experience, there is one exception, a school in which 
experienced teachers are divided between those who receive a higher coefficient than 1.0 and 
those who receive a lower coefficient than 1.0, though in this school, far more younger teachers 
receive a coefficient below 1.0 than above 1.0.   
 Table 6.3 evidences that the Stimulus Fund is disproportionately allocated to reward 
older and more experienced teachers than young teachers. The category replacement distribution 
schema, evident to varying degrees in each school in this study, shows that schools reserve bonus 
funds to compensate more experienced teachers at a higher rate than beginning teachers, in most 
instances regardless of performance. Behind this approach is the factor of the eliminated 
categories structure that existed in the stavka system, the removal of which in 2011 dismayed 
and disgruntled senior teachers. Schools thus adopted the Stimulus Fund to compensate for this 
policy grievance by compensating senior at a higher rate than junior staff members. Although 
this is contradictory to the goals of the MoES, which envisioned that opportunities for bonus pay 
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would make the teaching profession more attractive to young people and recent university 
graduates, the category replacement schema became one mechanism among many for retaining 
senior teachers and for administrators to keep their end of the social contract reached with 
teachers (see Chapter 5). 
Another use of the Stimulus Fund is directed to reward and retain teachers of specific 
subjects that are deemed hard to replace and thus a priority to incentivize via bonus payments. 
This comes at the cost of bonus pay points and payouts for teachers of other subjects. Regardless 
of this inequitable distribution based only on subject taught and not performance, the subject-
area retention distribution schema of the Stimulus Fund is employed to meet the specific 
environment demands of some schools.  
The teacher micro-management or compliance distribution ensures compliance of 
teachers to school protocols and administrative tasks by rewarding the most diligent teachers 
(usually also the senior teachers) at the expense of others (usually the more novice teachers). 
While the teacher micro-management/compliance distribution schema does track teachers based 
on criteria designated by the school for the dispensation of bonus pay coefficients, in this 
approach, the emphasis is more directed toward punitive measures for incompliance to 
administrative duties rather than rewarding teachers for performance that reflects teachers’ work 
in advancing student learning. This schema is applied in schools that have strong administrative 
command and where the principal works assiduously to achieve teacher professionalism goals.  
In the authority-oriented distribution schema, the Stimulus Fund is disproportionately 
directed to reward administrators or teachers who head up their department’s Stimulus Fund 
committees. This type of Stimulus Fund not only undermines the spirit and goals of bonus pay 
but also creates an inequitable distribution of funds that is disproportionately subtractive for 
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young teachers and advantageous to the teachers or administrators who have gained access and 
influence at the school. 
Finally, the bonus pay schema of non-differentiated bonus point distribution manifests 
across different types of schools. Though the approach to equal distribution of bonus pay points 
can be interpreted as an egalitarian approach that signals fairness in distribution, in most 
instances, the case of equal point allocations is instead a method applied when departments (or 
entire schools) do not engage in implementing bonus pay as intended to pay staff per 
performance. This approach, though cloaked in egalitarian symbolism when described by 
schools, in fact represents the most explicit rejection of the Stimulus Fund policy as intended by 
MoES: schools simply distribute bonus pay equally rather than tracking individual performance.  
I now turn to analysis of each Stimulus Fund distribution pattern per model. 
 
Category Replacement Distribution 
Category replacement school is a small, specialized school in the center of the city. It has 
aligned its Stimulus Fund structure based on a coefficient points accumulation system 
recommended by MoES. The school is divided into subject departments and each department 
receives as many points as there are teachers in the department. This school diversifies its bonus 
points approach across departments.  
This school has devised most of its bonus pay performance criteria by combining several 
criteria recommended by MoES into compound indicators (see Table 6.4). Combining a distinct 
criterion into compound criteria is advantageous to senior teachers more than younger teachers. 
For example, combining work discipline, absence of administrative penalties, and no absences 
into one category listed as “work discipline and absence of administrative penalties and no 
absences” proves to be more punitive for younger teachers who are less likely than their more 
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senior peers to meet all of these compliance-based expectations in a given quarter. For one, 
beginning teachers may still be learning various administrative duties and may not be able to 
execute them as well as teachers who have been working for decades. Second, younger teachers 
are more likely to have young children and thus more likely to have to miss work than their 
senior counterparts. Thus this combined criterion disadvantages younger teachers.  Another 
example of a combined criterion that is less advantageous to younger teachers is that of “active 
engagement of teacher in development and activities of the school. Community service work to 
benefit the school.” This advantages senior teachers who have more ties to the school community 
and more responsibility for the development of activities in their school than beginning teachers. 
As shown in Table 6.4, no senior teachers in one department at this school that is comprised of 
seven teachers receives a bonus pay coefficients of less than 1.0.  Each criteria outlined by the 
school in this table corresponds to a coefficient between 0.1 and 0.2. When a teacher is not given 
any points a dash is designated as zero.  
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Table 6.4. Stimulus Fund criteria and coefficient allocations for one department, category replacement school, June - September 2015 
Stimulus Fund Criterion Teacher 1  (44 years) 
Teacher 2  
(31 years) 
Teacher 3  
(10 years) 
Teacher 4  
(14 years) 
Teacher 5 





 (10 years) 
Total per 
criterion 
Complexity and intensity of work 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
Quality maintenance of 
documents and school records 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 - 0.8 
Education planning work 
(schedules, lesson plans) 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.2 
Professional development, active 
participation in department 
work 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
Quality of education and 
extracurricular activities, 
organization of school-wide 
activities and participation in 
public events 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
Work discipline and absence of 
administrative penalties. No 
absences.  
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 - 0.7 
Active engagement of teacher in 
development and activities of the 
school. Community service work 
to benefit the school.  
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 - - 0.8 
Participation in various 
competitions and the 
preparation and organization for 
competitions 
- 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Level of professional mastery 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 
Criteria points total per teacher 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 7.0 
 Source: Stimulus Fund data collected at the school  
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Several things are worth noting here. First, as stated, no teachers with substantive 
experience receive a bonus pay that amounts to a coefficient of less than one, making this bonus 
pay schema more advantageous to senior teachers. Second, the coefficient additions to senior 
members are deductions from teachers who have less work experience, evidence of the 
subtractive or punitive approach of bonus pay that disadvantages the younger teachers. Both 
teachers 6 and 7 were awarded no points for active engagement in development activities or 
community service work for the school. Additionally, teacher 7 was deducted points for “quality 
maintenance of documents and school records” and “work discipline, administrative penalties, 
and absences.” These deductions suggest that at least some portion of the Stimulus Fund is used 
to ensure discipline and compliance of the junior members of the staff and to reward the more 
senior teachers. Third, in this department, the coefficients span only zero to 0.2, making no one 
criterion more weighted than any other. In other departments of the school, some criteria are 
weighed more heavily than others (e.g. in the elementary education department of this school, 
the criterion for level of professional mastery is valued at a total of 2.4 points, with per-teacher 
point allocations ranging from 0.2 to 0.4). And finally, some of the criteria and associated points 
are distributed equally among all teachers, as is the case for the following two criteria: 
“complexity and intensity of work” and “professional development, active participation in 
department work.” Notably, these are the very criteria that might be best suited to assess the 
actual quality of teachers’ work as pertains to teaching quality and student learning, but instead 
the points for these criteria are distributed equally among all teachers.    
 
Subject-area Retention Distribution 
 Subject-area retention school is a prestigious gymnasium school located in the center of 
Bishkek. The school competes with other prestigious schools – both public and private – for the 
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most talented teachers. This school’s challenge is around retaining its best teachers and teachers 
with specific subject expertise and ensuring that they are satisfied within their work environment 
and take on large teaching loads to meet the needs of the school and the demands of the parents 
who pay large unofficial fees to the school.  
This school has only 16 teachers out of more than 100 with less than 10 years of work 
experience. Of the 85 teachers with more than 10 years of work experience, 14 are teachers with 
more than 35 years of teaching experience. However, unlike in the category replacement school 
in which senior teachers receive the highest bonus pay, in this school the pattern of Stimulus 
Fund distribution meets other school priorities. 
Of all teachers who have more than 10 years of experience, there is a fairly even split of 
38 senior teachers who receive a bonus pay coefficient of less than 1.0 and 47 who receive a 
coefficient that is higher than 1.0. Less than half of the most senior teachers at the school receive 
bonus pay coefficients higher than 1.0. Instead, this school utilized the Stimulus Fund to 
incentivize teachers who are the most difficult to recruit and most likely to leave the school to 
pursue employment elsewhere. This includes teachers of Russian, physics, mathematics, and to a 
lesser degree, elementary school teachers. In this school, the distribution of bonus pay points is 
not confined to departments, with each department having as many points as there are teachers 
(as was the case in the previous distribution example with 7 points for a department with seven 
teachers). Instead, the points in this school are distributed across departments based on which 
department’s teachers need to be most incentivized and rewarded the most.  
Evidence of subtractive bonus pay allocation from one department to the benefit of 
another can be seen between the Russian language department and the department of the 
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“aesthetic" arts” (which includes physical education, drafting, and music classes). Table 6.5 
illustrates the bonus pay coefficients allocation for each department.  
6.5. Stimulus Fund allocations for Russian language versus aesthetic arts teachers, subject-area 
retention school, June – September 2015 
Years of work experience Hours teaching Bonus pay coefficient 
Bonus payout  
(in Kyrgyz som) 
Russian language teachers 
   30 31 0.71 1,646 
30 28 1.06 1,607 
24 25 1.25 2,494 
35 16 1.39 1,125 
29 24 1.57 3,341 
26 26 1.66 2,972 
22 29 1.72 3,948 
Aesthetic arts teachers 
   50 30  (Extracurricular lead) 0.31 576 
55 29 0.53 1,363 
34 31 0.74 1,926 
17 30 0.75 1,962 
2 17 0.75 1,049 
26 24 0.76 2,027 
12 26 0.79 1,044 
24 12 0.79 1,044 
31 25 1.30 2,663 
Source: Stimulus Fund data collected at the school  
 
Most strikingly, all but one teacher of Russian language received a bonus pay coefficient higher 
than 1.0, whereas of the aesthetic arts teachers, only one received a bonus pay coefficient of 
more than 1.0. The highest bonus payout among Russian language teachers was an impressive 
3,948 som, whereas the highest payout among the aesthetic arts teachers was 2,663, even though 
the aesthetic arts teacher with the highest bonus pay has nine more years of teaching experience 
than the highest bonus pay earner in the Russian language department. Comparing the bonus pay 
coefficients between the Russian language department and the aesthetic arts department shows 
that neither age, years of teaching experience, nor the number of teaching hours affect the 
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allocation of bonus points distribution at this school. In sum, Russian language teachers deliver a 
total of 179 hours of instruction whereas teachers of the aesthetic arts teach 224 hours. 
Nevertheless, in total bonus payout, teachers of the aesthetic arts received 3,479 som less than 
teachers of Russian language, even though there are nine teachers of the aesthetic arts and only 
seven Russian language teachers. In terms of bonus pay coefficients, the total sum of coefficient 
for the seven Russian language teachers is 9.36, whereas teachers of the aesthetic arts were 
allocated a coefficient of 6.72 for the quarter. What this data shows is that this school distributes 
bonus pay based on the school’s priorities for retaining teachers in certain subjects over others. 
This strategy amounts to a Stimulus Fund that functions not to reward teachers based on 
performance but instead prioritizes the goals of the school to retain the teachers that are most 
critical for the continued success of the school. In addition to teachers of Russian language, other 
teachers that are given high bonus pay allocation are teachers of physics and mathematics as well 
as elementary school teachers. Kyrgyz language teachers and subject teachers in Kyrgyz-
language classes are the ones who receive smaller bonus pay coefficients, reflecting a lesser 
priority of the school to incentivize these teachers to stay.  
 
Teacher Micro-management/Compliance Distribution 
Teacher micro-management school is located on the outskirts of the city and serves 
largely children of migrant workers and families with low incomes. The majority of teachers at 
this school are new to their work as teachers. In contrast to the bonus pay distribution pattern that 
emerged in the category replacement schema, the incentive pay structure here does not reward 
teachers based on tenure. At this school, the Stimulus Fund points are distributed on the basis of 
compliance with stipulated criteria, which are heavily oriented towards discipline and 
documentation (i.e. responsibility of teachers and documentation work and monitoring and 
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evaluation of student achievement). Among teachers with 10 or less years of work experience at 
the school, the Stimulus Fund is used punitively more than it is used rewardingly. The number of 
beginning teachers with a Stimulus Fund coefficient of less than one is 34, while the number of 
beginning teachers with a coefficient of more than one is 20. The number of teachers with more 
than 10 years of teaching experience with a coefficient of more than one is also lower than the 
number of experienced teachers with a coefficient lower than one. This indicates that there is no 
age-stratified distribution of bonus pay at this school. Rather, this school distributes bonus 
punitively (or sometimes rewardingly) to ensure teacher compliance and adherence to the 
disciplinary goals set by the school administration.  
Who then gets the highest coefficients of the Stimulus Fund points at this school? The 
school administrators and teachers who head up the Stimulus Fund committees. The salary of 
administrators is listed as a percentage of the total bonus pay allocation of the school, including 
15 percent for the principal and 10 percent for each vice principal at the school. Additionally, the 
librarian receives 5 percent, the school psychologist 4 percent and the security guard, head 
janitor, and school secretary receive 3 percent each. Assigned percentages for administrative 
workers mean that the school’s administrative staff can expect to receive the same bonus payout 
each quarter and are not subject to the same performance criteria as teachers. In fact, they are not 
subject to any criteria at all. Because the principal and school administrators emphasize the 
importance of compliance at this school, this high bonus pay for administrators is both a 
manifestation of authority on the part of the school administrators and a way to impart to the 
teaching staff that they should be prioritizing fulfillment of their administrative duties. In 
assigning high bonus payouts to the administration, the school is illustrating the importance of 
administrative compliance as the key-organizing factor for the functioning of the school.  
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Authority-oriented Distribution 
The teacher micro-management/compliance distribution discussed above illustrates that 
when management of staff is the priority for salary distribution, persons in positions of power or 
authority are most likely to benefit from the bonus pay distribution schema. This is also the case 
with authority-oriented distribution of the Stimulus Fund as identified at another school, also 
located outside of the city center, not far from one of the major outdoor markets in the city that 
employs many migrant workers. This school has been under close scrutiny by education officials 
throughout the school year because of reported abuses of power of the school administrators who 
have been accused of soliciting payments from parents. The school principal was suspended 
from her duties at the end of 2015 due to an ongoing investigation. The context of this situation 
is relevant to an analysis of how the Stimulus Fund is distributed at this school.  
The teachers at authority-oriented school comprise a diverse age population, including 23 
teachers with 10 or less years of teaching experience and 30 teachers with more than 10 years of 
experience. The distribution of the Stimulus Fund shows a skew to rewarding senior teachers 
more than novice teachers. For the quarter for which data was collected, 11 senior teachers 
received bonus pay at a coefficient higher than 1.0, while only one young teacher received a 
bonus pay higher than 1.0. Further, 13 young teachers were awarded a coefficient of less than 
1.0, versus only three senior teachers with a bonus pay coefficient of less than 1.0.  
However, age-stratified distribution of bonus pay does not show the full picture of the 
allocation of Stimulus Funds at this school. To understand the nuanced patterns of bonus 
compensation at this school, it is necessary to look at the departmental level of how bonus pay 
coefficients are assigned. This school has the most differentiated bonus pay of all schools. Each 
department appears to be independent in its assignment of bonus pay coefficients and there does 
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not appear to be any pattern or synchronized procedure of bonus pay allocation across 
departments. This suggests independent or fractured decision-making across departments and no 
obligation to following a single protocol from the principal. The school has six departments 
including elementary school, science and mathematics, Kyrgyz language, English, aesthetic arts, 
and the humanities. The most notable difference in bonus pay allocation is between the English 
language department and the department of aesthetic arts. The aesthetic arts department has 11 
teachers who range in experience between 32 years and first year teaching. Yet all of the teachers 
in this department receive a coefficient of exactly 1.0 for their work, regardless of years of work 
experience or number of teaching hours. To the contrary, in the English department, there are 
five teachers of whom three are new teachers and two who are teachers with 19 and 27 years of 
teaching experience. In this department, the two experienced teachers receive unusually high 
bonus pay coefficients of 3.0 and 1.5, while the teacher with one year of work experience is 
allocated a bonus pay coefficient of 0.5. The two English language teachers who are new to the 
school are allocated a bonus pay coefficient of 0, amounting to no bonus pay and effectively 
transferring all bonus pay coefficients allocated to the department to the experienced teachers. 
This pattern of some teachers earning a very high bonus pay coefficient at the expense of other 
teachers who earn nothing was carried through in other departments as well.  
In the elementary school department, of 16 teachers, half were allocated a coefficient of 
1.0. Of the nine teachers with less than 10 years of work experience, six were assigned bonus pay 
coefficients of less than 1.0 (no senior teachers in this department received a coefficient of less 
than 1.0). This department had one teacher who was assigned a coefficient of 2.5, higher than 
anyone else in the department, and 2.5 times higher than the coefficients of most other teachers 
in the department. Similarly, in the science-mathematics department, two teachers out of 11 
	  	   152	  
received coefficients of 2.15, while the rest of the teachers in the department had coefficients 
ranging from 0.5 to 1.0, with no others receiving a coefficient higher than 1.0. And finally, in the 
Kyrgyz language department, one out of eight teachers was awarded a coefficient of 2.76, two 
teachers had a coefficient of 1.0 and the rest were given coefficients of less than 1.0.  
What the elementary school, science-mathematics, and Kyrgyz language departments 
have in common is that one or several individuals in these departments receive bonus pay 
coefficients that are significantly higher than the bonus coefficients of others and that come at 
the expense of the other teachers. Who are these teachers that received higher bonus pay? In each 
of these departments, they are either the head of the department or an administrator at the school 
who teaches a limited number of hours within the department. Those who receive the highest 
bonus pay coefficients in this school are the administrators or teachers designated to be 
responsible for recording teacher performance throughout the quarter and managing the bonus 
pay allocations for their department. In each of the three departments with inflated bonus pay 
coefficients for administrators, it is the case that these individuals have assigned themselves and 
their administrator colleagues coefficients that are far higher than those assigned to regular 
teachers. Further undermining the goal and spirit of the Stimulus Fund, the assignment of the 
extra points for administrators was done arbitrarily to elevate the cumulative points for the 
administrators, thus devaluing the objectivity of the criteria used to assess performance of the 
other teachers in the department. For example, the head of the Kyrgyz language department 
received a coefficient of 0.76 for the criteria of “Quality of disciplinary and non-curricular work” 
and 0.9 for the criteria of “condition of classroom,” and 0.6 for “work discipline.” To compare, 
the other teachers received either a coefficient of 0.1 or 0.2 for each of these categories. This 
begs the question of whether all the other teachers can be assumed to be significantly 
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underperforming. The more likely answer is that the head of the department is using her 
privileged position of power to assign arbitrarily elevated coefficients to reward her own work, 
while holding all the other teachers to a different rubric of coefficient distribution.  
 The example of Stimulus Fund distribution schemas across departments in this authority-
oriented school suggests that schools that select this approach use scattered approaches to 
distribute the bonus funds in ways that serve the needs and hierarchies of specific departments, 
even at the cost of undermining the goal of Stimulus Fund policy aimed to incentivize teachers 
and staff based on performance. That three out of six departments have some individuals 
receiving very high bonus coefficients at the expense of others suggests that this school has 
interpreted and appropriated the reform to serve its needs. Knowing that this school went through 
a leadership change shortly after this bonus pay schema was employed, this Stimulus Fund 
compensation schema appears to be indicative of the personnel dynamics and pressures the 
school faced at the beginning of the 2015/16 academic year. This inequitable pattern of 
distribution of the Stimulus Fund that disproportionally benefitted school administrators is 
illustrative of how schools can undermine reform by taking advantage of all available loopholes 
to serve the power dynamics within institutions.  
 
Non-differentiated (“Egalitarian”) Distribution 
 The Stimulus Fund distribution pattern at non-differentiated, or egalitarian school is yet 
another way in which schools opt to organize bonus pay to serve their goals. This school is 
another gymnasium school located in the center of Bishkek. This school gained gymnasium 
status fairly recently and is still gaining its reputation as a prestigious school. Owing to this, the 
school is roughly split between senior teachers (31) and junior teachers (37). The majority of 
teachers (46) receive a bonus pay coefficient of 1.0 regardless of age or teaching experience That 
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the majority of teachers receive the same coefficient suggests that the Stimulus Fund at this 
school is undifferentiated or intentionally distributed in an egalitarian manner.  
To determine the school’s logic of assigning 46 coefficients of 1.0 to teachers, it is useful 
to revisit Table 6.2, which illustrates that this school (School 2) has adopted nine out of ten 
government recommended criteria for its Stimulus Fund. This is the closest alignment of any 
school in this study to the government’s recommendations. Although nominally this conforms 
closely to the Stimulus Fund criteria recommendations, an analysis of how the school distributes 
bonus pay at the individual level suggests that it is done in a largely undifferentiated manner, 
thus undermining the overall goal of the Stimulus Fund to incentivize teachers to improve the 
quality of their work.  
 This school has six subject specialization tracks into which all the teaching staff are 
organized. This includes: the humanitarian-law track, economics, Kyrgyz language, elementary 
school, ecology, and the ethical-technological track. Two out of six of these subject departments 
follow an identical distribution pattern of the Stimulus Fund, which includes equal distribution of 
points for each teacher. Table 6.6 below illustrates the Stimulus Fund distribution for teachers in 
the economics track, which is one of the departments that allocate the bonus pay coefficient 
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Table 6.6. Stimulus Fund distribution for teachers in economics track, non-differentiated/“egalitarian” 


















1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Total 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 8.0 
Source: Stimulus Fund data collected at the school  
 
As Table 6.6 shows, this department (and in fact the entire school) effectively uses only 
five out of the nine criteria they have adopted from the government recommended Stimulus Fund 
criteria list. Even so, in this department and in the elementary school department, bonus points 
are allocated equally, with each criteria valued at a coefficient of 0.2 for a cumulative 1.0 bonus 
pay allocation per teacher. These two departments demonstrate that the school practices a largely 
egalitarian approach to bonus pay allocation, without regard to teacher experience, hours 
worked, or subject taught. This distribution reflects either an approach motivated by an 
egalitarian imperative of bonus pay distribution or departmental indifference in allocation of 
bonus points, resulting in a resignation and opting for ease of simply assigning the same bonus 
pay coefficients to each teacher. Either way, this approach of distributing bonus pay undermines 
the reform goal of using the Stimulus Fund to incentivize teachers to improve their work.  
 In the four departments at this school that do differentiate the bonus coefficients among 
teachers, there are some discernable patterns of allocation preference, with a slight skew of 
lowering bonus pay coefficients for teachers with 10 or less years of experience (10 young 
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teachers had a coefficient of less than 1.0 as compared to only two teachers with more than 10 
years of teaching experience). For both beginning and senior teachers, however, the majority 
were given a bonus pay allocation of exactly 1.0. One exception to this is the bonus pay 
coefficient allocation to administrators who also teach. Of the six administrators at the school 
who also take on teaching duties, five have a Stimulus Fund coefficient higher than 1.0 (the 
exception being the administrator in the economics department which assigns all department 
staff a bonus pay coefficient of 1.0). Regardless of the assigned number of teaching hours, 
administrators still receive higher bonus pay coefficients than teachers. This is a recurring 
observation that was also apparent in the teacher micro-management/compliance distribution 
schema and the authority-oriented distribution, suggesting that schools do utilize the Stimulus 
Fund to provide extra compensation to their administrators even if it is at the expense of 
teachers.   
 
Summary of Findings 
As the presentation of five Stimulus Fund distribution schemas shows, they are not each 
mutually exclusive and do appear in combined form in the schools. For example, authority-
oriented distribution is often combined with teacher micromanagement distribution, wherein the 
punitive measures of deducting bonus points for teacher incompliance is reallocated to heads of 
Stimulus Fund committees. Additionally, as the case examples have shown, different subject 
departments within the same school implement bonus pay differently, or as in the case of the 
subject-area retention school, which has a highly centralized approach to bonus pay allocations, 
points can be “borrowed” and distributed across departments, as the principal sees fit.  
As such, each of these patterns of bonus pay distribution uniquely undermines the goals of 
introducing the Stimulus Fund as part of the 2011 teacher salary reform. The category 
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replacement distribution pattern reflects a re-allocation of funds to senior teachers who lost 
compensation for categories; the subject-area retention distribution offers bonuses to teachers 
based on the subject they teach and not the merit of their work, advantaging (or disadvantaging) 
teachers based only on the subject they teach; the teacher micro-management/compliance 
distribution appears in schools in which administrators are more concerned with garnering 
teacher compliance than rewarding quality of teaching or learning success; the schools that divert 
Stimulus Funds disproportionately to administrators or teachers who head up the bonus pay 
committees are remunerating authority rather than rewarding performance; and finally, schools 
(or departments) that adopt the non-differentiated distribution scheme have decided that the time 
and effort of tracking each teacher’s individual performance for the purpose of distributing 
quarterly incentive pay is not worthwhile. This analysis reveals that each of the five Stimulus 
Fund distribution patterns identified in this study have appropriated at least some portion of 
funds allocated for bonus pay to achieve goals specific to the school. This comes at the cost of 
undermining reform goals. Cumulatively, these individualized school actions have contributed to 
the overall undermining of the 2011 reform.  
It must again be noted that some schools do also employ bonus pay distribution patterns 
that reflect the criteria suggested by MoES. However, for the most part, the criteria selected for 
assessing teachers’ work do not reflect teaching quality but rather other aspects of teachers’ 
work, including the fulfillment of administrative duties and professionalism. 
 
Converting Bonus Points to Pay 
Finally, it is valuable to understand how bonus pay allocations are converted from points 
to money paid out to teachers. Bonus pay is disbursed on a quarterly basis and is calculated using 
a formula that takes into account the exact earnings of each teacher for three months. To examine 
	  	   158	  
how bonus pay is calculated, I look at the calculations for one school. Table 6.7 illustrates how 
district education offices, under the guidance of MoES, arrive at the exact bonus payout for each 
teacher.  
Table 6.7. Calculation of Stimulus Fund for one department, School 5, June - September 2015 
 
Total salary over 3 
months 
School-wide coefficient 




payment (in som) 27 
Teacher 1  
(44 years) 28,438 0.085 1.0 2,421 
Teacher 2  
(31 years) 27,151 0.085 1.1 2,542 
Teacher 3  
(10 years) 23,341 0.085 1 1,987 
Teacher 4  
(14 years) 28,067 0.085 1.2 2,867 
Teacher 5 
 (11 years) 21,668 0.085 1.1 2,029 
Teacher 6  
(3 years) 22,629 0.085 0.9 1,734 
Teacher 7 
 (10 years) 16,924 0.085 0.7 1,009 
 Source: Stimulus Fund data collected at School 5 
 
 Table 6.7 shows the components of arriving at bonus pay conversion from points to 
payment (in Kyrgyz som). The bonus pay is different from teacher to teacher and depends on 
two variables: the overall salary of the teacher over the course of three months and the teacher’s 
work rate coefficient, which is the total points earned by a teacher during the quarter. Each 
school is also assigned a single school-wide “coefficient of additional wages,” which is 
calculated by the Bishkek Education Department as the quotient of the total funds allotted to the 
school for the ‘Stimulus Fund component’ of the salary and total funds allocated for 
compensation of the ‘Guaranteed component’, which is the main component of wages of school 
staff for their total hours worked. To arrive at the Stimulus Fund payment for each teacher, the 
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average salary of the teacher for the quarterly period of three months is multiplied by the school-
wide coefficient of additional wages and the work rate coefficient. 
 Comparing teachers 1 and 2 in Table 6.7 shows that a teacher who earns a lower salary 
than her colleague can earn a higher bonus payment just by accumulating an extra 0.1 work rate 
coefficient. In examining the situation of teacher 7, one can see how the combination of a lower 
wage and a punitive work rate coefficient sets a teacher back in bonus pay earnings by nearly 
three times that of a teacher who has a higher salary and a higher work rate coefficient than other 
colleagues.  
Since this school distributes bonus pay based on the category replacement schema with 
elements of teacher micro-management/compliance distribution, this school is an example of 
how the Stimulus Fund is used to reward teachers along age-stratified norms and to penalize 
teachers for administrative errors along norms of compliance. As the head teacher of one 
department at this school explains, points are added for tasks that are well executed and deducted 
when necessary as a punitive measure, 
We subtract points for what was not done. We take points off right away. Here you can 
see that I’ve made a note of it. In January, we had a roundtable, and I’ve noted here who 
participated, made a presentation, or made some other contribution… Kalabasheva read a 
report at the roundtable while Morusev28 missed lessons, and I took away 0.1 point. 
That's how the system works. (Teacher Interview 19, November 2015). 
 
Reinventing the Wheel: The Hidden Cost of Pivoting Away from the Status Quo 
Among the most significant findings in this analysis is that the intended recipients of the 
Stimulus Fund – new recruits to the teaching profession who were enticed to join a workforce 
that enables individuals to receive bonus pay for quality work – are in practice the least likely 
recipients of bonus pay because schools disproportionally use the Stimulus Fund to meet other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Names have been changed to protect the identity of individuals. 
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priorities, be they to enforce work discipline and ensure the fulfillment of administrative duties 
by teachers or to assuage the discontent of senior teachers who were disappointed over the 
elimination of categories.  The Stimulus Fund, which was intended to introduce constructive 
competition among teachers, instead became the locus of control that enabled schools to adapt 
the reform to conform to the needs of the school and maintain the norms, social hierarchies, and 
power dynamics within schools.  Largely, these norms favor experienced teachers and 
administrators. As such, the Stimulus Fund became a catalyst and the modality for certain 
teachers and administrators at the helm of the power vertical in their school to modify and revert 
significant components of the 2011 teacher salary reform to the previous salary structure, 
including retuning to age-stratified compensation, compensation for compliance, and authority-
oriented compensation. 
As countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic seek to identify solutions to local challenges 
that have been tried globally, the implementation of ‘best practices’ such as incentive pay are not 
necessarily a fit within local contexts. Reforms in remuneration practices within the public sector 
are especially precarious in implementation because they have a wide-spanning impact and are 
remarkably challenging to modify given the significant resources necessary for even small 
adjustments.  Because salaries impact the livelihoods of people, reforms in this sphere are also 
deeply impactful and susceptible to scrutiny, resistance, and discontent. This is the case if the 
reform advantages – or even appears to advantage – one group at the expense of another, as was 
the case with the teacher salary reform of 2011 that aimed to attract young teachers into the 
profession and aggrieved senior teachers.  
In this chapter, I have examined the implementation of the Stimulus Fund and the extent 
to which schools in Bishkek use the Stimulus Fund to reward high-performing teachers and 
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attract new teachers to the profession. The evidence shows that the goal of the Stimulus Fund to 
motivate teachers to improve the quality of their work and compete with colleagues for part of 
their salary does not match the values and expectations of educators on equitable remuneration 
practices. Instead, the Stimulus Fund was redirected at the school level to meet the goals and 
help ameliorate the unique challenges posed by the reform at each school.  
Next, I turn my attention to a statistical analysis to determine whether senior teachers’ 
perception that they were disadvantaged by the reform can be empirically backed or whether it is 
indeed only a perception.   
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CHAPTER 7 
DEMOGRAPHICS, SALARY DETERMINANTS, AND AGE-STRATIFIED 
COMPARISON OF TEACHER PAY FOLLOWING THE 2011 REFORM 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I present quantitative data and analysis that informs the question of how 
the teacher salary is determined and whether some teachers were advantaged by the reform while 
others were not. Specifically, I examine the variables that were made salient in the interview 
portion of the study, including the experience of teachers, the subjects they teach, and the type of 
school they teach in, among other factors. This is accomplished by analyzing the data reported in 
the tarifikatzia (school salary list) at the school level for the 10 schools in the study. Data from 
the tarifikatzia allows for comparative analysis of the impact of the reform at the school level 
and at the individual level of teachers and administrators.  
The goals of a quantitative treatment of the collected data are: first, to present the 
comprehensive demographic information about teachers and school administrators who are part 
of this study; second, to build a quantitative framework for examining the determining variables 
that affect the salaries of teachers; and finally, to compare teacher pay between age-stratified 
teacher cohorts, focusing on beginning teachers and senior teachers to determine whether senior 
teachers’ view that they were the losers of the 2011 reform is supported quantitatively or better 
explained as perception.  
 
Demographics of the Pedagogical Cadre Before and After the 2011 Reform 
Among the goals of the 2011 reform was to increase the number of teachers in the 
workforce and diversify the age population of teachers. Table 7.1 shows the increase in the 
number of teachers in Kyrgyzstan as well as in Bishkek before and after the 2011 reform.    
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Table 7.1. Teachers in general education schools, by length of service and percentage change from previous 
year, 2009/10 – 2013/14 




11-15 years More than 15 
years 
Total 
2009/10      
Kyrgyzstan 13,467 12,200 9,140 36,365 71,172 
Bishkek 1,128 1,015 1,141 3,209 6,493 
2010/11      
Kyrgyzstan 12,381 (-8%) 11,103 (-9%) 8,454 (-8%) 37,124 (2%) 69,062 (-3%) 
Bishkek 1,051 (-7%) 921 (-9%) 1,028 (-10%) 3,481 (8%) 6,481 (0%) 
2011/12      
Kyrgyzstan 15,611 (26%) 12,409 (12%) 9,025 (7%) 38,457 (4%) 75,502 (9%) 
Bishkek 1,661 (58%) 1,090 (6%) 1,091 (6%) 3,591 (3%) 7,433 (15%) 
2012/13      
Kyrgyzstan 15,459 (-1%) 12,246 (-1%) 9,501 (5%) 38,450 (0%) 75,656 (0%) 
Bishkek 1,577 (-5%) 1,087 (0%) 1,042 (-4%) 3,757 (5%) 7,463 (0%) 
2013/14      
Kyrgyzstan 14,676 (-5%) 11,974 (-2%) 9,473 (0%) 38,284 (0%) 74,407 (-2%) 
Bishkek 1,488 (-6%) 1,055 (-3%) 1,010 (-3%) 3,684 (-2%) 7,237 (-3%) 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014 
 
From 2009/10 to 2010/11, when teacher salaries were at an all-time low of 55 percent of 
the national average (see Chapter 4), the country saw a decrease in the number of teachers from 
71,172 to 69,062. In the year that the teacher salary reform was announced, over 6,400 more 
teachers joined the ranks countrywide (an increase of more than nine percent). The percentage 
increase of teachers in Bishkek in the same period of 2009/10 to 2010/11 was even higher, at 15 
percent (totaling 952 teachers). Of new teachers countrywide, there was a net gain of 3,230 
beginning teachers. In Bishkek, the net gain of new teachers was 610, or 64 percent of the net 
gain of all teachers. This suggests that the reform saw initial success in attracting more teachers, 
notably beginning teachers. 
However, the net gains made after the introduction of the reform did not hold up. In the 
years following the introduction of the reform, the number of teachers in the country and in 
Bishkek either held steady or declined. Teacher vacancies continue to be a challenge for schools 
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across Bishkek (see Chapter 5) and the issue of equitable teacher pay has become a contentious 
subject owing to the changes in salary structure introduced in 2011. To determine if this was in 
fact the case, I will examine what factors determine the salary in the post-2011 reform era. 
 
What Factors Determine the Salary of Teachers? 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the schools examined in this study consist of 10 schools across 
Bishkek. The schools were selected to reflect a diverse range of school types based on the 
categories used by MoES to classify basic education institutions. Given the significance of each 
school classification, I compare schools to discern any observable trends around teachers 
salaries. A multivariate regression analysis is also employed to statistically determine which 
factors impact the salary outcomes for teachers.  
 The quantitative analysis is informed by the qualitative data collection. In the course of 
interviews with teachers and administrators, several factors were identified as most likely to 
impact salaries. Principals across schools discussed shortages of teachers in specific subjects, 
namely subject areas that could be transferred to other work sectors outside of teaching. This 
includes Russian, mathematics, and the physical sciences. Officially reported teacher vacancies 
in Bishkek do show that these subjects pose hiring challenges (see Chapter 5). My hypothesis is 
that the subject taught will affect the earnings of teachers. 
 Interviews with teachers across age cohorts also directed me to a second hypothesis about 
factors that impact teacher pay. Senior teachers, beginning teachers, as well as teachers with an 
intermediate level of experience all expressed views that years of work experience has a 
significant impact on salary, both before and after the 2011 reform. Experience is the second 
factor that I will consider as a determinant of teacher salary. 
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  Before endeavoring to look at these variables as determinants of teacher pay, it is 
necessary to revisit the composition of teacher pay that was discussed in Chapter 4. It is also 
helpful to situate teacher pay relative to the compensation of school administrators because it 
illuminates how the organization of teacher pay is determined (mostly by teaching hours and 
non-teaching hours) versus administrator pay (determined largely through a fixed annualized 
salary). 
Table 7.2 shows the overall the average salaries earned by principals, vice principals, 
teachers, and other administrators in the dataset comprised of 10 Bishkek schools. The lowest 
average salaries are earned by part-time administrative staff members who are responsible for 
extracurricular work and planning duties and the highest salaries are earned by principals and 
vice principals. On average, teachers earn about 1,700 som less than principals. Teachers work 
an average of 41 hours per week, 22 of which are teaching hours.
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Table 7.2. Composition of staff and average work hours and salary, 10 Bishkek schools 










































549 17 22 6,600 6 1,143 41 1,604 5,553 14,900 
Principals 10 28 5 1,606 2 229 30 2,500 11,276 15,611 
Vice Principals 40 23 11 3,164 4 815 39 1,888 9,676 15,543 
Administrators 












77 17 7 2,222 3 758 32 1,262 8,308 12,550 
All employees  712 16 18 5,392 6 1,342 37 1,439 5,530 13,703 
Source: Tarifikatzia documents collected at Bishkek district education offices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Other salary components include compensation for homeroom duties, preparation of lessons, checking student work, allowances for specialized school status, 
and Bishkek mayor’s office bonus of 1,000 som for each staff member. For principals, vice principals, and all other administrators excluding extracurricular 
coordinators, this salary component also includes an annualized standard salary. 
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The average years of work experience of teachers, number of teaching hours, hours of non-
teaching work, and total hours of work per week undertaken by teachers are an important 
baseline to establish before endeavoring to determine which variables affect teacher salaries. 
Knowing that teachers have an average of 17 years of teaching experience and earn on average 
6,600 som for teaching duties (and 14,900 som total salary) per month, it is now appropriate to 
examine whether some subject-area teachers earn more or less than this average, and how 
salaries of teachers of different years of teaching experience compare to the average monthly 
salary.   
 
Earnings by Subject 
On the highest end of earners by subject are Kyrgyz language teachers, who are 
compensated at a rate of 15 percent extra for each teaching hour. In this dataset, the average 
additional monthly income of Kyrgyz language teachers is 1,281 som. As Table 7.3 shows, 
Kyrgyz language teachers are the highest subject earners, even though they are among the 
youngest teachers with only 15 years of teaching on average.  This can be compared to teachers 
of Russian language who have on average 21 years of experience but earn 1,086 som less than 
Kyrgyz language teachers, even though teachers of both subjects have the highest average 
teaching hours at 25 hours per week.  
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Source: Tarifikatzia documents collected at Bishkek district education offices 
  




































    Biology/ Chemistry/ 
Physics 44 20 22 6,197 7 1,307 40 1,676 14,305 
Elementary  137 18 21 6,824 8 1,294 43 1,603 15,836 
English 45 11 22 6,458 5 853 42 1,209 14,259 
History/ Geography 43 16 20 5,519 6 1,188 35 1,479 12,505 
Kyrgyz  73 15 25 7,447 5 913 45 1,827 17,010 
Mathematics 42 16 23 6,603 8 1,610 45 1,781 15,284 
Russian 62 21 25 7,206 6 979 45 2,016 15,924 
All other subjects 103 16 21 6,022 5 1,050 35 1,321 12,923 
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On the lowest end of subject earners are teachers of history and geography as well as 
teachers of ‘other’ subjects. Both of these groups of teachers have the lowest average teaching 
hours (20 and 21 respectively) and take on more non-teaching duties than teachers who are 
assigned more teaching hours, which contributes to a lower overall salary than earned by 
teachers who have more teaching hours.  
This analysis suggests that there are some subject-specific hierarchies of teachers, with 
the best-compensated subjects being Kyrgyz and Russian. However, teachers of both subjects 
also take on the largest number of teaching hours, which may be a more predictive determining 
variable than the subject itself.   
 
Earnings Based on Work Experience 
Years of work experience is another possible determinant of teacher salary, for two 
reasons. First, after the first five years of service and up to 20 years of service, teachers receive a 
10 percent increase at the juncture of 5, 10, and 20 years of tenure, capped at 30 percent for 20 or 
more years of service. Second, as examined in the next chapter, in the course of decades of work 
experience teachers build social capital at their school that enables them to identify and utilize 
the conditions conducive to earning the highest salaries.  
How much higher are the salaries of the most senior teachers as compared to novice 
teachers? Table 7.4 shows the average monthly salary of the most senior teachers at each school 
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Table 7.4. Average salary of beginning teachers, senior teachers, and teacher 
vacancies per school, 2015/16 
School 
Less than 5 
years of 
teaching 
40+ years of 
teaching 
Junior teachers' 
pay as percentage 





1 9,242 13,92630 66% 6 
2 10,513 16,273 65% None reported 
3 7,036 16,370 43% 5 
4 7,140 12,853 56% 10 
5 13,661 15,913 86% 6 
6 10,549 14,667 72% 12 
7 9,128 10,200 89% 18 
8 8,888 13,51331 66% 2 
9 9,917 11,61632 85% 4 
10 10,345 13,806 75% 9 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data collected from tarifikatzia tables 
 
In every school, the salary of senior teachers is higher than the salary of beginning 
teachers.  In some instances, such as in Schools 3 and 4, senior teachers make nearly twice as 
much as their junior counterparts. Schools where junior and senior teachers come closest in 
earnings are school 5, 7, and 9.  
To understand the discrepant factors between schools that come close to parity in 
earnings between beginner and veteran teachers and schools in which older teachers earn on 
average a salary that is nearly double that of their junior counterparts, I examine two schools that 
represent either extreme: School 7 and School 3.  
At School 3, beginning teachers make up 47 percent of the teacher workforce (see Table 
7.5, and Tables 5.1 and 5.2) but earn on average only 43 percent of what the most senior teacher 
earns. This school, which is located outside of the city center and has a reputation of being a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This school has no teachers in the 40+ years of teaching experience category; this figure reflects the 30-39 year 
category. 
31 See above. 
32 See above. 
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school for students who are expelled from elsewhere,33 struggles yearly with retaining new 
teachers. New teachers at the school leave this school for other schools or other work 
opportunities after one or two years of service at the school (Administrator Interview 33, 
November 2015). For this reason, the principal intentionally assigns beginning teachers a small 
number of teaching hours so that if a novice teacher leaves abruptly, her exit will not disrupt the 
school schedule because the hours will be redistributed to other teachers. As one of the senior 
teachers at the school shared, the number of hours senior teachers end up with at the end of the 
school year can be significantly higher at the end of the school year than at the beginning 
(Teacher Interview 36, November 2015). 
Table 7.5. Composition of teachers, School 3, 2015/16 
 











  40+ years 1 6% 30 16,370 
30-39 years 2 12% 27 12,887 
20-29 years 0 - - - 
10-19 years 4 24% 27 13,927 
5-9 years 2 12% 24 12,012 
Less than 5 8 47% 17 7,036 
Total 17 100% 22 10,480 
Source: data collected from tarifikatzia tables 
 
School 7, which has the highest ratio of earnings of the most junior to the most senior 
teaches is also the school that posted the most teacher vacancies (18) at the beginning of the 
2015/16 school year (see Table 7.4).  This school is located on the outskirts of the city and 
largely serves students who live in the school vicinity. Most teachers have been employed at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Owing either to student performance or behavioral issues or because the student’s family cannot pay mandatory 
informal fees to the more reputable schools in Bishkek.	  	  
34 Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
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school for 10 years or more (See Table 7.6), but given the overcrowding of the school, there are 
not enough teachers to cover all the subjects in the schedule.  
7.6. Composition of teachers, School 7, 2015/16 
 











  40+ years 5 13% 18 10,200 
30-39 years 2 5% 19 11,651 
20-29 years 17 40% 26 14,312 
10-19 years 4 10% 26 15,457 
5-9 years 4 10% 24 12,370 
Less than 5 8 23% 18 9,128 
Total 40 100% 2 12,548 
Source: data collected from tarifikatzia tables 
 
Of the vacancies reported at the school, most are for a small number of hours, averaging 
at six hours for each subject. It is likely that each of these vacancies is filled by current teachers 
who take on those hours, regardless of whether those teachers are in the younger or older age 
cohort. Three glaring exceptions of vacancies are in the following three subjects: Russian 
language, physics, and physical education. For the first, the school has four teachers of Russian 
and three out of four teach the maximum permitted number of hours. The fourth teaches only 18 
hours and is a teacher with 45 years of work experience, so this teacher may not be willing to 
carry a full teaching load of 31 hours. Even if she were, the 16 hours of vacant teaching time for 
Russian would exceed the permissible teaching limit for this teacher. The situation is even direr 
for physics and physical education at this school. There is one physics teacher who is already at 
capacity with 31 teaching hours and unable to lawfully fill the additional eight-hour teaching 
vacancy at the school. Likewise, the two physical education teachers at the school each also 
teach the maximum permissible hours, and the 10 additional hours of physical education are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.	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met. It is likely that this school has a significantly higher number of vacancies than other schools 
owing to its remote location in the outskirts of Bishkek. As the principal explained in an 
interview, most teachers at the school are educators who live in the area and the school has 
difficulties attracting and retaining new teachers because of its relative remoteness (Principal 
Interview 50, December 2015). While this school has the highest proportion of salary pay of 
beginning teachers to senior teachers (89 percent), the overall number of teachers with 
experience of less than five years that the school has been able to attract is low, comprising only 
nine teachers.  
At this school, the highest salary is concentrated in teacher cohorts of 10-19 and 20-29 
years of service (see Table 7.6) and the lowest salaries are earned by the most junior and most 
senior staff. This is exceptional among the 10 schools, though it does help to explain the 
perception of senior teachers at this school that younger teachers earn more than senior teachers. 
It is in fact the case that the most senior teachers in many schools earn less than teachers with 
less tenure.36 However, it is not the case in any school that the most junior teachers earn more 
than the most senior teachers. Analysis of 10 schools in Bishkek shows that teachers with 10 or 
more years of work experience have higher average earnings in every school than their more 
junior colleagues, not only because of additional wages for experience, but also because they are 
assigned more teaching hours. I will now turn to examining the extent to which other variables, 
including the number of teaching hours are the determining factors of teacher salaries.  
 
Earnings Based on Teaching Hours, Work Hours, and Other Factors 
In the course of interviews with teachers and school administrators, it became apparent 
that teachers compete to take on as many teaching hours as possible. I now turn to an analysis to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is owing to many senior teachers electing to teach fewer classes due to age, preference, and the factor that 
they have additional income from pension payments. 
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determine what other variables besides subject teaching and years of work experience determine 
teacher salary, and ask the question of whether teaching hours is the main determining factor of 
teacher salaries.  
In addition to subject teaching and years of work experience, other variables for 
consideration of determinants of teacher pay can be identified in the tarifikatzia documents, 
which enumerate every component of teacher pay and document the demographic data about 
each teacher. Table 7.7 lists all the variables from tarifikatzia documents that were considered 
for this analysis. 
Table 7.7. Tarifikatzia data considered for statistical analysis, 10 Bishkek schools 
Variable Range 
School 1 - 10 
School location Center or outskirts of Bishkek 
School language of instruction Russian/Kyrgyz/Mixed 
School type Regular/Specialized/Special needs 
Person ID Classification for each entry 
Staff member Teacher/Administrator/Principal 
Subject 
Elementary School, Kyrgyz, Russian, English, 
Biology/Chemistry/Physics, Mathematics, Other 
Years of work experience 0 - 55  
Hourly wage  28 - 90 som 
Hours of teaching 0 - 31 
Salary for teaching 0 - 11,340 som 
Hours of preparation work 0 - 5 
Salary for preparation work 0 - 1,644 som 
Hours of student notebook checking work 0 - 8 
Salary for student notebook checking work 0 - 2,722 som 
Hours of non-teaching work 0 - 40 
Salary for non-teaching work 0 - 10,800 som 
Total hours of work per week 0 - 90 
Total salary for 'guaranteed' salary component 0 - 29,106 som 
% extra for teaching experience 0 - 30  
Som for teaching experience 0 - 5,103 som 
Extra pay for teaching Kyrgyz language 0 - 1,567 som 
Extra pay for special status school 0 - 5,046 
Total salary 1,080 - 30,972 som 
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The statistical models to discern salary determinants includes data on teachers. Principals 
and school administrators, regardless of whether or not they teach any classes were omitted from 
the analysis of teacher salary outcomes. Although some administrators and principals do teach 
substantial hours of class subjects (up to 25 hours for administrators and 12 hours for principals), 
for the purpose of this analysis, data on schoolteachers was separated from administrators and 
principals to arrive at the most informative understanding of the salary composition and 
components that affect teacher pay.  
Based on the components in the tarifikatzia that comprise the salary (see Chapter 4 for 
detailed description), the following variables were selected as independent variables for the 
model:  
1. Years of work experience 
2. Hours of teaching 
3. Total hours of work 
4. Subject teaching 
5. School type 
6. Language of instruction at school 
 
The selection of these variables is supported by the qualitative data collected in the course of this 
study, in which various school stakeholders discussed these variables as influencers of teacher 
salaries. These variables are also chosen while others in Table 7.7 are omitted because there is 
strong collinearity across variables. The following three variables are collinear with other 
variables that are omitted: 
1. School type: collinearity with location of the school. All of the ‘specialized schools’ are 
located in city center and most (though not all) ‘regular’ schools are in the outskirts of the 
city. There is also collinearity with ‘Extra pay for special status school’. 
2.  Years of work experience: collinearity with ‘percent of extra earnings for teaching 
experience’. Since years of work experience determines the percentage added to teacher 
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salaries, both variables indicate the same component of teacher pay. This variable is also 
collinear with ‘extra pay for teaching experience’ since both are variables that measure 
the same factor.   
3. Subject: collinearity with preparatory work and hours and salary of student notebook 
checking. Not all subject teachers are assigned preparatory and notebook checking hours. 
Additionally, the subject variable is also collinear with ‘Extra pay for teaching Kyrgyz 
language’ because teachers of Kyrgyz get 15 percent extra for every teaching hour of 
Kyrgyz language class.  
In addition to the exclusion of several variables due to collinearity, a number of other variables 
were excluded based on the range of total payment that was generated by a given component. 
This includes the components of hours and salary for ‘preparatory work’ and hours and salary for 
‘student notebook checking’. The maximum salary earned for each task is not substantial enough 
to have been the determinant factor for the salary of teachers.  
 Once the variables most likely to affect teacher salary were determined, my first step was 
to do a correlation analysis using STATA software to determine which two variables are linearly 
related.  Table 7.8 shows the findings of the Pearson correlation analysis. Correlations that are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level are denoted.   
 
Table 7.8. Correlation, teacher salary  
years of work experience  0.20 
hours of teaching   0.90* 
total hours of work   0.55* 
subject teaching -0.10 
school type  0.12 
language of instruction at school  0.02 
n = 540 
  Statistical Significance: *p < 0.001 
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This correlation shows a strong positive relationship between total teacher salary and the 
number of teaching hours as well total teacher salary and the total hours of work. However, 
these two variables are collinear because the total hours of work also encompasses the hours of 
teaching. Notably, the correlation between teaching hours and total salary is stronger than the 
one between total hours of work and teaching. While this seems paradoxical (since the more 
one works overall the more it would seem one would be paid), understanding the nuances of the 
teacher compensation system in Kyrgyzstan helps to understand why that is not necessarily the 
case. Teachers who take on a high teaching load receive additional supplements, including for 
preparatory work and student notebook checking. Those who are teachers of Kyrgyz language 
receive an additional 15 percent for each hour of teaching. Teachers at specialized schools also 
receive between 15 and 25 additional percent for each hour of teaching. Finally, teachers who 
have five or more years of teaching experience also receive extra-prorated percentages of salary 
for each hour of teaching. This can be contrasted with teachers who take on other work at 
school beyond teaching, such as homeroom duties or running extracurricular activities. For 
these non-pedagogical bureaucratic tasks teachers are paid at a compensation coefficient of 0.5, 
which simply means that they earn half of an hour’s full salary value. Furthermore, teachers do 
not get additional salary percentages for any non-teaching work, which also drives down the 
overall value of non-teaching work. Yet for those teachers who do take on a large number of 
non-teaching duties, the effect on their salaries is also net positive and is statistically significant. 
This finding suggests that the factor of teachers taking on more work hours, be they teaching or 
other work should be further investigated in a multivariate regression analysis as possibly being 
the strongest determinants of a salary outcome. 
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 Having determined that the strongest linear relationship is between ‘hours of teaching’ 
and ‘total salary’ a multivariate regression is run to control for the other variables and to 
understand the degree to which ‘hours of teaching’ and ‘total hours of work’ determine salary. 
While the correlation coefficient was used to determine the strength of a linear relationship 
between two variables, applying a multivariate analysis informs the mathematical relationship 
between variables. The advantage of the multivariate regression analysis is that it allows for 
control for confounding factors, or variables in the dataset that are correlated both with hours of 
teaching and salary. Thus the multivariate analysis offers a better prediction of the causal effect 
of hours teaching and hours worked on total salary. 
 In the correlation analysis, I identified that two variables are related to the total salary of 
teachers. In conceptualizing the model for the multivariate regression analysis, it is appropriate 
to consider two models, one each for each of the two variables with correlation to the 
independent variable. The first model includes the variable ‘hours of teaching’ and the second 
include the variable ‘total hours of work’ to determine which is the best fit and which offers the 
most explanatory value. For each model, the same five independent variables are selected as in 
the correlation: years of teaching experience, hours of teaching or total hours of work, subject, 
school type, and language of instruction at school. Of these variables, the following three were 
re-coded into dummy variables: subject, school type, and language of instruction. For the subject 
variable, ‘mathematics’ is the reference group. For school type, ‘regular’ is the reference group, 
and for language, ‘Kyrgyz’s is the reference group.  
Model 1: 
Y = β0 + β1*X1 + β2*X2 + β3*X3 + β4*X4 + β5*X5 +ε 
Y is the independent variable, Total Salary. 
β0 is the intercept for regression. 
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β1 to β5 are the coefficient for X1 to X5 and the explanatory variables in this regression, with β2 as 
the ‘hours of teaching’ variable. 
ε is the residual standard error.  
 
Table 7.9 includes the results of this multivariate linear regression. 
 
Model 1 shows that the following variables are significant at the 0.01 level: experience, 
hours of teaching, working at a specialized school or a school for students with special needs, or 
working at a school where the language of instruction is either mixed (Russian and Kyrgyz) or 
Russian. This model explains 65.6 percent of the variance of the total salary of teachers. The 
coefficient of determination (R2) suggests that the variables that were determined for exclusion 
from this regression model (e.g. compensation for preparatory work and student notebook 
checking work) would not have added substantially to the explanatory value of this model. 
There are two other notable observations in this model: first, the coefficients for school type 







error t stat  p value 95% confidence interval 
experience 73.52* 11.77 6.24 0.00 50.39 96.64 
hours of teaching 499.81* 26.06 19.18 0.00 448.62 551.01 
subject: science -645.47 761.34 -0.85 0.40 -2,141.11 850.17 
subject: Kyrgyz 199.68 467.86 0.43 0.67 -719.43 1,118.79 
subject: 
geography/history 332.95 832.10 0.40 0.69 -1,301.70 1,967.61 
subject: English 264.75 756.82 0.35 0.73 -1,222.01 1,751.51 
subject: 
elementary school -588.75 678.69 -0.87 0.39 -1,922.03 744.53 
subject: Russian 690.01 760.27 0.91 0.37 -803.53 2,183.56 
subject: other -532.29 646.26 -0.82 0.41 -1,801.87 737.29 
school type: 
specialized 5764.71* 379.62 15.19 0.00 5,018.94 6,510.47 
school type: 
special education 4539.15* 574.33 7.90 0.00 3,410.88 5,667.43 
language: mixed -2107.39* 464.43 -4.54 0.00 -3,019.76 -1,195.03 
language: Russian -6989.31* 521.45 13.40 0.00 -8,013.69 -5,964.92 
constant 3,750.82 873.95 4.29 0.00 2,033.95 5,467.69 
n = 539 
      R2 = 0.6562 
      Statistical Significance: *p < 0.001 
For the subject variable, mathematics is the reference group; for school type, ‘regular’ is the reference group; 
and for language, ‘Kyrgyz’s is the reference group. 
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and language of instruction are high; and second, teaching in a mixed language school or 
Russian language school has a negative relationship with salary.  On the first, it is the case that 
teachers working in specialized schools and in the special education school do earn extra. That 
the coefficients presented in this model are much higher than the descriptive data indicates, 
suggests that this model may not be the best model to determine the independent variables that 
contribute to total teacher pay. The second aspect of the model is also not supported by the 
qualitative findings of this study (or the correlation analysis), which is that language of 
instruction of the school has such a substantial impact on teacher salaries. Next, I will see if 
another model, Model 2, can offer a more apt explanation of the variables that impact teacher 
salaries.  
 In Model 2, I substitute the X2 variable with ‘total hours of work’ for the ‘hours of 
teaching’ that was applied in Model 1. As such, the equation for the model remains the same 
but with a different X2 variable. 






standard error t stat p value 
95% confidence 
interval 
experience 74.29* 6.73 11.04 0.00 61.07 87.51 
total hours of work 300.42* 8.78 34.23 0.00 283.18 317.67 
subject: science -343.22 426.40 -0.80 0.42 -1,180.88 494.43 
subject: Kyrgyz 56.49 254.47 0.22 0.82 -443.41 556.39 
subject: geography/history -159.73 502.20 -0.32 0.75 -1,146.29 826.83 
subject: English -517.44 402.89 -1.28 0.20 -1,308.92 274.04 
subject: elementary school -612.95 394.97 -1.55 0.12 -1,388.87 162.96 
subject: Russian -171.48 381.44 -0.45 0.65 -920.83 577.86 
subject: other -806.71 373.57 -2.16 0.03 -1,540.58 -72.84 
school type: specialized 802.52* 239.99 3.34 0.00 331.05 1,273.99 
school type: special education 2278.38* 437.96 5.20 0.00 1,418.02 3,138.74 
language: mixed -188.28 247.17 -0.76 0.45 -673.84 297.29 
language: Russian -47.36 338.66 -0.14 0.89 -712.66 617.94 
constant 1,493.07 532.08 2.81 0.01 447.81 2,538.33 
n = 539 
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Model 2: 
Y = β0 + β1*X1 + β2*X2 + β3*X3 + β4*X4 + β5*X5 +ε 
Y is the independent variable, Total Salary. 
β0 is the intercept for regression. 
β1 to β5 are the coefficient for X1 to X5 and the explanatory variables in this regression, with β2 as 
‘total hours of work’ variable. 
ε is the residual standard error.  
 
Model 2 shows the following variables are significant at the 0.01 level: experience, total 
hours of work, working at a specialized school or a school for students with special needs. This 
model explains 88.1 percent of the variance of the total salary of teachers. This coefficient of 
determination (R2) is high and suggests that the variables that were determined for exclusion 
from this regression model (e.g. compensation for preparatory work and student notebook 
checking work) would not have added substantially to the explanatory value of this model. This 
model does not show language of instruction as significant at the 0.01 level.  
The explanatory variables in this model support the qualitative findings of this study, 
namely policy document analysis and interview-based research. Experience impacts total salary 
insofar as teachers with five years or more of teaching experience earn extra money for 
experience and 219 teachers (40 percent of the sample population) are teachers with 20 or more 
years of teaching tenure, affording them the maximum payout for experience at 30 percent extra 
per teaching hour. Total hours of work impacts the total salary of teachers and the substitution in 
this model of the variable ‘total hours of work’ for the ‘hours of teaching’ variable in Model 1 
R2 = 0.8812 
Statistical Significance: *p < 0.001 
For the subject variable, mathematics is the reference group; for school type, ‘regular’ is the reference 
group; and for language, ‘Kyrgyz’s is the reference group. 
	  	   182	  
has resulted in a higher coefficient of determination and thus a more reliable model for 
understanding the variables that contribute to the total salary.  
Given that specialized schools and schools for students with special needs pay an extra 
percentage to teachers (15 or 25 percent depending on the school) for their work, it is expected 
that employment at a specialized school rather than at a regular school would have a statistically 
significant impact on the salary of teachers. Also interesting in this model is the difference in 
coefficient estimates between specialized schools and the special education school, with the 
latter coefficient being more than double that of the former. The nuances of remuneration explain 
this difference: in the school serving students with special needs, all teachers are compensated 
with 25 percent extra for each teaching hour. At the specialized schools for advanced academic 
studies, only the academic subject teachers (all but elementary school teachers and teachers of 
‘other’ subjects) receive 15 percent extra pay per hour. Overall, the salaries of teachers at schools 
for students with special needs are on average more affected by the variable of ‘type of school’ 
than other specialized schools. And finally, the elimination of statistical significance of language 
of instruction also conforms with the qualitative research conducted in this study. While teaches 
of Kyrgyz language do get percentage increases in pay, this model shows that neither the 
language of the school nor teaching of a given subject, language or otherwise, is a variable of 
statistical significance in this model. In summary, this is the model that has the most explanatory 
power and proves to be most congruent with the experiences of teachers in Bishkek as conveyed 
in interviews.  
Knowing which variables are statistically significant in determining teacher salaries 
(work experience, total work hours, and type of school), it is possible to answer the question of 
who benefitted and who was disadvantaged by the reform. Among the most ubiquitous 
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perceptions of senior teachers made evident in the course of this study is their conviction that 
they suffered salary loses as a consequence of this reform. It is to this question that I will now 
turn. 
 
Age-stratified Comparison of Teacher Pay Following the 2011 Reform 
To compare the salary of senior and non-senior teachers, two t-tests were run (also using 
STATA software) to determine which group receives a higher average salary and by how much. 
The first t-test was run to compare the salary averages of beginning teachers (teachers with less 
than five years of teaching experience) with non-beginner teachers (teachers with five or more 
years of work experience). This analysis found that teachers with five or more years of work 
experience earn on average 16,500 Kyrgyz som per month, whereas beginning teachers earn on 
average 11,655 Kyrgyz som per month (n=540; beginning teachers = 160; non-beginning 
teachers = 380; t = 9.8895, p = 0).  The monthly average difference of 4,844 som (or 41 percent) 
earned by teachers with five or more years of work experience and teachers new to the 
profession is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This amount is a substantial difference with 
financial implications for the lives of teachers, benefitting experienced teachers. That novice 
teachers make only approximately 71 percent of the salary of their more senior counterparts 
suggests that the reform did not on average disadvantage teachers with experience. Nevertheless, 
the perception that experienced teachers were the losers of the reform became crystalized among 
senior teachers and has continued to endure years after the reform was first introduced.  	  
The second t-test aims to determine whether and how much more the most senior 
teachers (those with more than 20 years of teaching experience) earn than the teachers with 20 or 
less years of teaching experience. The cutoff of 20 years or less is selected because 20 years of 
service marks the final increase in the career of a teacher when she is awarded an additional 
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percentage of pay per teaching hour. Teachers with 20 or more years of teaching experience 
receive an additional 30 percent on top of their hourly teaching rate for each hour of class they 
teach.  
In the sample of 540 teachers, 200 teachers are teachers with more than 20 years of 
teaching experience and 340 are teachers with 20 or less years of teaching experience. On 
average, teachers with more than 20 years of teaching experience earn 17,110 Kyrgyz som, 
whereas teachers with 20 or less years of teaching experience earn 13,861 Kyrgyz som per 
month (t = -6.7173, p = 0).  The monthly average difference of 3,249 Kyrgyz som earned by 
veteran teachers versus all other teachers, significant at the 0.01 level, is evidence that the 
testimonials of the most senior teachers that they were the most disadvantaged due to the 2011 
teacher salary reform is a matter of perception rather than fact. This perception was pervasive 
among teachers and affected the implementation of the reform.  
 
Conclusion 
With the quantitative analysis showing that experienced teachers were the pecuniary 
winners and not the losers of the 2011 teacher salary reform, it is reasonable to conclude that 
their sense of loss pertained to status and position in school and society. Since experienced 
teaches were “leveled” with beginner teachers in hourly earnings, the ceiling of hours they could 
take on, and because of the elimination of categories, experienced teachers perceived that these 
losses would also impact their salaries. While a loss of salary did not happen, the perception of 
the reform as having negative salary consequences to experienced teachers was very real. What 
were the unintended consequences of this perception? 
Despite good intentions to improve the salary system and align Kyrgyzstan’s teacher 
remuneration structure with that of OECD countries, what this reform did not account for is that 
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it directly contradicted the longstanding age-stratified norms of compensation in Kyrgyzstan. 
Although the quantitative analysis undertaken in this chapter shows that senior teachers were not 
losers in this reform, the unintended consequence of introducing a reform policy in a manner that 
inculcates such a perception are perhaps as consequential as if the accounting of the perceived 
loses were actually true.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Conclusion 
Only this year the government has recognized that the reform of 2011 proved not to be 
much of a reform.   
  (Policymaker Interview 78, February 2016) 
 
The 2011 salary reform included several major components aimed to restructure the 
Soviet teacher remuneration system. Foremost was the elimination of the Soviet stavka schema, 
to be replaced with a weekly workload structure that caps the number of teaching hours and 
standardizes workloads for all teachers. Second was the introduction of a compensation rubric 
based on the educational qualifications of teachers. Next was the elimination of the attestation 
process and categories-based compensation of teachers. And finally, a new type of bonus pay, 
the Stimulus Fund, was introduced to financially incentivize teachers to improve the quality of 
their work by competing with colleagues on performance-based criteria.  
Each of these salary components was aimed to remedy the challenges facing the teaching 
profession, including a need for improved quality of work of teachers and attracting quality new 
recruits into the profession. First, by capping the number of hours that teachers spend teaching in 
a given week and unburdening teachers from excessive teaching loads, the quality of teaching 
was expected to improve. Standardized and capped teaching hours was also a measure to instill a 
uniform and more equitable distribution of work hours, aimed to resolve the issue of senior 
teachers being allocated significantly more teaching hours than their junior peers. Second, 
replacing hourly wage rates based on a semi-automated promotion system of teacher categories 
with education credentials criteria was a policy move to attract more young and qualified 
teachers into the profession. Finally, the introduction of the Stimulus Fund was intended to 
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motivate all teachers to increase their competency and continually improve the quality of their 
work. 
Despite a concerted effort to move the salary system away from the archaic stavka system 
and align Kyrgyzstan’s teacher remuneration structure with that of teacher salary schemas more 
common around the world, what was evidently not accounted for by policymakers is that this 
reform would contradict the age-stratified norms of compensation in Kyrgyz schools. Each 
reform component was viewed by senior teachers as a mechanism to decrease their salary and 
undermine their status and social standing. Placing a ceiling on the number of teaching hours that 
teachers could take on was deemed a subtractive measure to decrease the teaching hours and 
earning potential of the most experienced teachers. Shifting the compensation structure to reflect 
educational qualifications rather than experience and categories earned during a teacher’s 
professional life course was seen as an overt policy to reduce the wages of senior teachers. And 
finally, the introduction of bonus pay to encourage all teachers regardless of age and tenure to 
compete for extra money was deemed by senior teachers as a tactic to undermine their 
experience and competence.  Competing for merit-based pay with beginning teachers was seen 
as an insult by experienced teachers who had dedicated their professional lives to their work. 
Shortly after the introduction of the reform, senior teachers became the most vociferous 
opponents of the reform and the main proponents of reverting the salary structure back to the old 
stavka system.  Overall, the key goal of the reform to attract more young teachers to the 
profession was not accomplished in Bishkek. The number of beginning teachers on staff rose by 
a whopping 58 percent in the year that the reform was announced, but that number steadied and 
declined in the two years following. 
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Again, the 2011 salary reform was conceived with good intentions to improve the salary 
system and address the many challenges faced by the education sector, ranging from retention to 
performance.  What the reform did not account for, however, is that it directly contradicts the 
longstanding norms of compensation in Kyrgyzstan, which follow a Soviet stavka system that 
bases remuneration on input, ability, and dedication.  
At junctures in which individuals perceive negative consequences in pivoting away from 
the status quo, individuals can utilize agency to affect change. Individual agents can also develop 
the capacity for collective agency, enabling groups to enact change. According to Day, Kington, 
Stobart, and Sammons (2006), the process of mobilizing for change (or in this case, mobilizing 
in resistance to change) takes place in the space between the structure of society, including 
power relations across groups, and the agency of individuals and groups that coalesce for action 
(Day et al., 2006).  In the context of Kyrgyzstan, individuals can be keenly impactful on the 
enactment and reception of new polices. If new policies are judged to be incongruent within 
school contexts, as was the case of the 2011 reform, teachers and school administrators mobilize 
to modify that policy. As the case of Kyrgyzstan shows, while the structure of the stavka system 
may be outdated, the logic inherent in its reception as a fair system of salary distribution 
continues to hold steadfast in the country and in the region. If envisaged policies do not align 
with local values, enacted policies will not meet the goals set out by the policymakers.  
As Larry Cuban observed (1998), education reforms are ultimately implemented by 
schools and they will be localized and modified if there is discord between the policy and 
whatever the school community regards as “moral and service values inherent to teaching” 
(Cuban 1998, p. 459). The intentions and logic of implementation of reform at the policy level 
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must match at the school level for smooth implementation. Because this is rarely the case, there 
is a disjuncture between the goals at the policy level and the implementation at the school level. 
 This study shows that in age-stratified settings, spanning both the teaching profession as 
well as traditional societies like Kyrgyzstan, if individuals perceive a threat to their earnings or 
are primed to compete with colleagues for salary, they will employ mechanisms to attain the 
highest salary. However, if this occurs due to a change of rules in salary attainment, teachers will 
seek to resist this change. They will identify modes of rule breaking of the policy components 
that they deem to be counter-normative. Rule breaking mechanisms include leveraging social ties 
with allies in and out of school to ignore the reform, undermine, and undo it.  
Ultimately, the 2011 salary reform failed to bring about a change in the work structure of 
the teaching sector in Kyrgyzstan. Four years after the reform was introduced, teachers do not 
teach fewer hours and they are not motivated by the Stimulus Fund to improve the quality of 
their work. To the contrary, as illustrated in Chapter 7, teachers now work upwards of up to 90 
hours (teaching as well as other tasks, see Table 7.6 in Chapter 7), which is far more than they 
worked before the reform. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Stimulus Fund is used to meet the 
goals of schools rather than to incentivize teachers to improve the quality of their work. 
Furthermore, the reform has not succeeded in maintaining a pace of recruiting new teachers to 
the profession that matches the pace from the first year that it was announced.  
The quote introducing the chapter shows that policymakers in the education sector have 
come to acknowledge that this reform was not successful. As stated by the official at the 
Ministry of Education and Science, the reform merely amounted to an “increased salary…[but 
overall] the reform of 2011 proved not to be much of a reform (Policymaker Interview 78, 
February 2016). At the end of 2015, the Ministry of Education and Science announced that 
	  	   190	  
categories would be reinstated again and that a new attestation process would begin in 2016. 
Although at the time of writing, this has not been initiated, it is widely believed that the 
revamped category structure and attestation process will be similar to its Soviet antecedent.  
The tone of passive acceptance of the failure of reform from policymakers as well as 
teachers and principals is insightful to understand how reforms are assessed post-
implementation. Rather than evaluating the reform based on its scope of accomplishment, it 
would seem that even sweeping reforms such as the 2011 one are re-characterized as 
incrementally successful; in this case the mere increase of the salary is some progress. That the 
reform unleashed significant disapproval by teachers and had a number of unintended 
consequences is not acknowledged. Nor does there appear to be acknowledgement of the 
distortion of faith in transcending the status quo. What is likely to endure as a lasting impact is 
the reaffirmation of Soviet-era norms around hierarchical and age-stratified compensation 
practices. 
How can minimal reform success be deemed acceptable and the sociological 
consequences of the reform ignored? Part of the answer lies in the post-Soviet history of policy 
implementation in Kyrgyzstan. The influx of foreign aid and donor projects over the last 25 years 
has sown in the country’s bureaucrats the reluctance to take reforms at face value. It is common 
for legislation to be adopted in draft form and later revised through amendments. Policy ideas, 
either homegrown or “borrowed” are seldom piloted due to limited resources of time and money. 
The precedent of top-down policy implementation from the Soviet era and a similar post-Soviet 
trajectory also drives the policy process. Consequences to schools and individuals are secondary 
considerations to the primacy of the rush and resolve of implementation, even if this proves to 
have adverse consequences later. Additionally, in some instances, legislation is passed merely to 
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satisfy the conditions of foreign aid contracts. While the 2011 reform was not specifically 
sponsored by a donor agency, three proposed compensation schemas were presented by bilateral 
and multilateral partners of MoES, with the implicit pressure to adopt one of them.   
Given that Kyrgyzstan has an erratic practice of rapid legislative implementation 
followed by incremental amending of the law (see Table 4.4 for a listing of changes to the 
number of permissible teaching hours following the passage of the 2011 reform), teachers and 
school administrators have internalized that there is a space for agitating for change to any 
reform. This results in a dynamic of schools identifying the capacity for affecting change and 
capitalizing on it through the myriad of mechanisms identified in this study. The precedent of 
fast-enacted-then-redacted legislation provides a plausible explanation of why teachers and 
principals are apprehensive about full implementation of reforms and why they endeavor to 
ignore, undermine, and undo them. Because laws around education policy can change quickly, 
schools look for loopholes for selective adherence to the reform. This in turn becomes the 
feedback loop for policymakers to modify the reform.  
In the case of the 2011 salary reform, the perception of senior teachers that they were the 
losers of the reform triggered a strong reaction from schools to undo it. The 2011 reform 
reverberated deeply at the school level because it changed the compensation structure and left an 
inaccurate but deeply rooted impression that experienced teachers were slighted by the 
government. Yet it is important to distill the root of senior teachers’ reform objection: inasmuch 
as salary threat was a factor for discontent, it was also the loss of status and position in the social 
hierarchy and age-reverential work environment that was the impetus for rejecting the reform. As 
shown in Chapter 7, senior teachers were in fact the pecuniary winners of the reform, but the 
perception that they would lose salary was tied to the loss of categories and the limit to the 
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number of teaching hours they could take on. Senior teachers fought to undo the reform to 
reclaim their status and position in Kyrgyzstan’s age-stratified teaching profession. Senior 
teachers and their allies pushed against the reform in a myriad of ways identified in this study 
because in amassing social capital at the school level, they become familiar with what is 
permissible and what oversteps the bounds of rule breaking. The toggle between reform 
implementation and reform resistance is the result of alliances at the school level that ultimately 
provide feedback to policymakers to reshape the reform in the image of schools’ vision for it – in 
this case, the vision that it should be undone.  
There are three conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis of the failed 2011 salary 
reform. First, longstanding norms and social hierarchies within the teaching workforce matter. 
Even in highly centralized systems such as the Kyrgyz Republic where there is a long running 
tradition of compliance, reforms are still subjected to the scrutiny of values-based norms. If 
reforms contradict established norms, they will be rejected, or at least efforts will be made to do 
so.  As such, it is critical to anticipate and consider who will win and who will lose in a given 
reform and just as important to anticipate which constituents may perceive themselves to be the 
winners and the losers. In Bishkek, the cohort of older teachers were the group that perceived 
themselves the losers and it was this group of teachers that worked to undo the reform.  
Second, salary reforms can challenge longstanding views on the logic of equitable 
compensation. If the reform bucks the norms around age-stratified remuneration practices and is 
implemented in a manner that contradicts deeply rooted beliefs around deference to seniority, the 
reform is doomed to be disavowed. If the reform also contradicts other workplace norms such as 
introducing competition between teachers for small bonus amounts, as was the case of the 2011 
reform, it is likely that teachers will consider the risks and rewards around rule breaking and opt 
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to undermine the reform.  Whether or not teachers employ agency to pursue desired goals of 
undoing unfavorable reforms depends upon how willing they are to engage in risk-taking 
behavior. 
Kyrgyzstan’s challenges around teacher recruitment and retention are similar to those of 
other countries in the post-Soviet region and Kyrgyzstan offers a rich example of the tensions 
between the structure and logic of the old systems and new ideas. While new policies are framed 
as solutions to local problems, they are often not normatively congruent with the local context. 
Incongruent policies clash with local practices and become dysfunctional. They are resisted by 
those affected who stand to benefit more from old practices, particularly if they believe that they 
will be disadvantaged by change.  
A third conclusion addresses global education policy and transnational policy borrowing. 
The transfer of global teacher policy such as introducing a workload remuneration system and 
incentive-based compensation from one context (i.e. OECD countries) to another (the post-
Soviet region) implies an active “local translation,” re-contextualization, or local adaptation 
process as a result of which the initial purpose of the global reform may have been replaced with 
local agendas. As the examination of the 2011 salary reform in Kyrgyzstan shows, the 
introduction of the Stimulus Fund was implemented at the school level in five ways that each 
defeated the purpose of an incentive-based pay structure. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, schools’ 
individual agendas came to undo the entirety of the 2011 salary reform. 
Every educational system is a bounded system with a specific set of cause-effect 
relationships, its own logic, and regulatory mechanisms that ensure the system is perpetuated. 
The introduction of new policies that contradict any of the established order in this bounded 
system, especially if the logic of design or end goal is incongruent with existing practice, will not 
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be successful. In this case, localization and resistance are inevitable.  In studying the introduction 
of foreign reforms into local contexts, it is prudent to acknowledge fundamental differences as 
well as similarities between educational systems. Finally, in light of the busy global trade of 
educational reform packages that reach education systems in all regions of the world, it is 
important to be sensitized to the need for more culturally aware analysis. 
 The governments in developing countries are wiling to receive loans or grants to 
“borrow” reforms, most recently of managerial reforms in teacher education (Verger & 
Altinyelken, 2013), but more often than not they simply add them on top of already existing local 
reform initiatives for the duration of the loan or grant. While MoES did look for a viable solution 
to the challenges in the education sector, the reform attempted did not conform with local norms. 
The 2011 salary reform in Kyrgyzstan is a good example of how a top-down reform is subverted 
and changed by those who are the bearers of the status quo.  
This study has focused on analyzing the agency of a group of actors, namely senior 
teachers and their allies, whose interests are to maintain traditional, age-stratified norms and 
counter norms associated with capitalism and neo-liberalism. While Kyrgyz society is changing 
along economic class lines, teachers have persisted in maintaining age-stratified norms and 
organizing their work lives and salary structure to mirror their convictions around age 
hierarchies. It is in this intersection of enduring age-stratification and more nascent economic 
stratification that the 2011 reform has played out. It is also the scholarly space in which I have 
chosen to ground this study and to contribute by exploring a seldom studied but highly relevant 
classification stratum of age. 
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Contribution to Scholarship and Agenda for Further Research 
This study contributes to a deeper understanding of how alliances and allegiances play 
out in age-stratified school environments. I follow the trail of how social capital is utilized in 
schools in Bishkek to maximize earning potential in an era where net salary is the sole 
determinant for survival. I investigate how teachers and principals employ agency to pivot 
reforms to meet individual and school goals even with the potential risks of rule breaking that 
come with contradicting the reform. I also work to understand the long-lasting impact of 
perceptions, arguing that even when they are not backed with empirical evidence, perceptions 
can nevertheless have significant repercussions. Each of these endeavors is my contribution to 
the investigation of social capital, human agency, and power. 
 In addition to building on fundamental theories in sociology and the sociology of 
education, this research also furthers the study of transnational policy borrowing by examining 
how context impacts counter-normative reform implementation.  In understanding the 
mechanisms of reform modification vis-à-vis the Stimulus Fund across five schools, it is evident 
that a single reform component is localized at the school level in a manner that is illustrative of a 
universal phenomenon: individualization and localization of reforms.   
This dissertation answers the research questions posed in the study but also adds more 
questions to the research agenda. Most needed is research on another set of stakeholders in the 
education process in the context of post-Soviet education: parents and other community members 
with interests in policies that shape school affairs. Understanding how parents and families 
experience a range of phenomena unfolding in the education sector would inform both 
scholarship and practice on the far-reaching impacts of education reforms. One finding made 
evident but beyond the scope of this research topic is the normalization and escalating situation 
	  	   196	  
of informal fee collection in public schools across Bishkek. Teachers and school administrators 
speak about the importance of fee collection as a lifeline for the sustenance of the schools and 
teachers. However, solicitation of fees from parents creates even larger inequality rifts of 
educational access in a society already deeply stratified by economic status.  
While this scholarship contributes to research on the urban landscape of reform 
implementation (and interpretation), the same questions asked of teachers and administrators in 
Bishkek could be asked of their rural counterparts so as to compare whether the impact of age-
stratified norms is more or less endemic in rural regions. The study could also be expanded 
beyond Kyrgyzstan to compare how salary reform policies are implemented in other societies in 
the post-Soviet region and beyond. Additionally, a comparative study of the evolution and 
divergence of the Soviet stavka system 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union would 
offer a compelling analysis to explore how systems modify longstanding practices to fit present-
day bureaucratic challenges in the education sector and the extent to which the logic of the 
Soviet era endures in the public sector today.  
Methodologically, the topics undertaken in this study can be further examined in a range 
of frameworks. A social network analysis could be employed to map the most influential 
relationships within schools to determine the extent to which the strength of social networks 
impacts teacher salaries. The relationship between school actors and policymakers as well as the 
education sector and the international donor community could be analyzed via the principal-
agent approach to understand the nuanced and ambiguous dynamics that bind individuals, 
schools, and policies. 
Finally, this research suggests that teachers in Bishkek are the front line mediators, or the 
“street bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1979) who manage not only the educational processes of day to day 
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school operations and the implementation of school reforms, but also navigate the intersection of 
existing and emerging norms and values confronting the country as it continues in its 
transformation from a (post-)Soviet society to a 21st century Kyrgyzstan. Unbeknownst to many 
of them, teachers balance the status and symbolic expectations of their profession with the 
economic realities of their professional lives in the new market driven economy. This delicate 
balance between status maintenance and survivalist entrepreneurialism will have long-term 
repercussions on public perception of the education sector and government overall, and will 
drive the direction of the education sector for years to come. In this dissertation, I have begun to 
uncover this role of the pedagogical cadre and believe that its merits further inquiry both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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APPENDIX A 
Guiding interview questions for semi-structured interviews with principals, 
vice principals, and curriculum development staff  
 
INTRODUCTION: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on the role that the 2011 
reform had on your school.  My name is Raisa Belyavina, I am a doctoral student from New 
York and I am the principal investigator on this project.  This interview should last no longer 
than one hour. I will ask questions related to your school, including the teacher composition of 
your school, the key staffing challenges at your school, and the role the 2011 teacher salary 
reform has played on teacher dynamics within the school. Please remember that your 
participation in this study and in this interview is voluntary and if there is any question you 
would rather not answer, please let me know and we will skip the question. Are there any 
questions before we begin?  
 
In order to capture everything that we discuss, is it alright with you if I record our conversation? 
All the information you provide will be kept confidential. 
 
INDIVIDIUAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• What is your current position?   
• How long have you held this position? 
• What, if any, was your previous position in this school, in the education field, or in another 
sector? 
SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
• Please describe the school workplace environment. 
• What is the school like as a work environment for teachers?  
• How integrated are different peer groups of teachers?  
• Overall, how do you allocate class assignments to teachers: by teacher years of experience, 
level of education, as fits the schedule, etc.? 
REFORM IMPACTS  
• How have various salary reforms and other reform policies impacted the school over the 
years? 
• Please tell me about how the 2011 teacher salary reform impacted the work of teachers and 
administrators at your school. 
• What were teachers’ hopes for the reform? Was the reform satisfactory or disappointing in 
any way? 
• How did teachers react to the reform?  
• What were the consequences of the 2011 salary reform? 
• How did you (the school) deal with the consequences of the reform? Do you think the school 
adopted well to the reform?  
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• How does your school allocate the Stimulus Fund? Who is on the Stimulus Fund 
committees? 
CONCLUSION: That concludes the questions I have for our interview. Is there any additional 
information you would like to provide in relation to this research? Is there anything that you 
would like to ask me about this research? Thank you for your time today. 	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Guiding interview questions for semi-structured interviews with teachers 
 
INTRODUCTION: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on the role that the 2011 
reform had on your school.  My name is Raisa Belyavina, I am a doctoral student from New 
York and I am the principal investigator on this project.  This interview should last no longer 
than one hour. I will ask questions related to your school, including the teacher composition of 
your school, the key staffing challenges at your school, and the role the 2011 teacher salary 
reform has played on teacher dynamics within the school. Please remember that your 
participation in this study and in this interview is voluntary and if there is any question you 
would rather not answer, please let me know and we will skip the question. Are there any 
questions before we begin?  
 
In order to capture everything that we discuss, is it alright with you if I record our conversation? 
All the information you provide will be kept confidential.  
 
INDIVIDIUAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• What is your current position?  
• What subject(s) do you teach?  
• How long have you held this position? 
• When did you complete your education and in what subject? 
• Have you previously and do you currently hold teaching positions in other schools or work in 
other roles in the education field? Have you and do you work in other sectors as well? 
SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
• Please describe the school workplace environment. 
• What is the school like as a work environment for teachers? Would you say that it is a 
collaborative work environment or are teachers mostly autonomous? 
• What is the breakdown of teachers by age and work experience? Would you say that the 
school has more young teachers, old teachers, or teachers in-between? 
• How integrated are different peer groups of teachers? Do you find that there are opportunities 
for senior teachers to work with beginning teachers, either in a mentoring capacity or in other 
roles? 
• Who decides who teaches which classes and how many classes they teach? 
 
REFORM IMPACTS 
• How have various salary reforms and other reform policies impacted the school over the 
years? 
• Please tell me about how the 2011 teacher salary reform impacted the work of teachers and 
administrators at your school. 
• What were teachers’ hopes for the reform? Was the reform satisfactory or disappointing in 
any way? 
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• How did teachers react to the reform? How did administrators react to the reform? 
• What were the consequences of the 2011 salary reform? 
• How did the principal and the school deal with the consequences of the reform? Do you think 
the school adopted well to the reform?  
• How did the school support veteran teachers when categories were eliminated because of the 
2011 reform? 
• What mechanisms did veteran teachers employ to support themselves through these changes? 
• How does your school allocate the Stimulus Fund? Who is on the Stimulus Fund 
committees? 
TEACHERS AS REFORM CHANGE AGENTS  
• Which teachers are the most active members of the school community? 
• What would you say is their role in the school? For example, do you think their role is 
primarily helping to support beginning teachers, helping their peers acclimate to policy 
change, or supporting administration in ensuring that other teachers are compliant with 
school policies and regulations? 
• What role do teachers play in engaging parents in the school community?  
 
CONCLUSION: That concludes the questions I have for our interview. Is there any additional 
information you would like to provide in relation to this research? Is there anything that you 
would like to ask me about this research? Thank you for your time today. 
 
  
	  	   209	  
Guiding interview questions for semi-structured interviews with education 
officials and/or policymakers  
 
INTRODUCTION: Thank you for agreeing to meet with me to discuss the role that the 2011 
reform had on schools in Bishkek and the lives of teachers.  My name is Raisa Belyavina, I am a 
doctoral student from New York and I am the principal investigator on this project.  This 
interview should last no longer than one hour. I will ask questions related to the implementation 
of the 2011 teacher salary reform, including the ways in which schools and teachers responded to 
the reform. I thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule to meet with me today.  
 
In order to capture everything that we discuss, is it alright with you if I record our conversation? 
All the information you provide will be kept confidential.  
 
INDIVIDIUAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• What is your current position?   
• How long have you held this position? 
• What, if any, was your previous position in this institution, in the education field, or in 
another sector? 
REFORM IMPACTS 
My research focuses on the ways in which the teaching profession is affected by reforms and 
changes in society.  
• How have various salary reforms and other structural reform policies impacted schools over 
the years? 
• How have reforms impacted the lives of teachers, both their professional lives and their lives 
outside of school? 
• What was the goal of the 2011 teacher salary reform? 
• Please tell me about how the 2011 teacher salary reform impacted schools and teachers. 
• What were teachers’ hopes for the reforms? Would you say that the reform was satisfactory 
or disappointing to the teachers? 
• How was the reform received by teachers? How did schools and how did policymakers 
address the concerns of senior teachers who were upset about the elimination of teacher 
categories? 
• What teachers were adversely affected by the reforms? Which teachers benefitted from the 
reform? 
• What mechanisms did schools use to implement the reform at the school level?  
• How do schools allocate the Stimulus Fund?  
• Have any teachers or school administrators come to you directly to discuss the reforms?  
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CONCLUSION: That concludes the questions I have for our interview. Is there any additional 
information you would like to provide in relation to this research? Is there anything that you 
would like to ask me about this research? Thank you for your time today. 
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APPENDIX B 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
525 West 120th Street 
New York NY 10027 
212 678 3000 
www.tc.edu  
PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS 
Principal Investigator: Raisa Belyavina  
Research Title: Teachers as reform change agents: How senior teachers in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan employ 
agency and leverage social capital to undo reforms 
• I have read and discussed the Research Description with the researcher. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.	   
• My participation in research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation 
at any time without jeopardy to future medical care, employment, student status or other 
entitlements.  
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his/her professional discretion.	   
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes 
available which may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the investigator will 
provide this information to me.	   
• Any information derived from the research project that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by 
law.	   
• If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can contact the 
investigator, who will answer my questions. The investigator's phone number is +1-xxx-xxx-xxxx. 
• If at any time I have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or questions 
about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Teachers College, Columbia 
University Institutional Review Board /IRB. The phone number for the IRB is (212) 678-4105. Or, I 
can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, 
NY, 10027, Box 151, United States of America.	   
• I should receive a copy of the Research Description and this Participant's Rights document.	   
• Audio taping is part of this research (please check the appropriate line below),  
I ( ) consent to be audio-taped.  
I ( ) do NOT consent to being audio-taped.  
The written and/or audio taped materials will be viewed only by the principal investigator and 
members of the research team.	   
• Written and/or audio taped materials (please check the appropriate line below)  
( ) may be viewed in an educational setting outside the research	   
( ) may NOT be viewed in an educational setting outside the research. 
• My signature means that I agree to participate in this study.	   
Participant's signature: ________________________________ Date:____/____/____ 
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Teachers College, Columbia University 
525 West 120th Street 
New York NY 10027 




DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: You are invited to participate in a research study on the impact that 
reforms have on schools and on teachers. The purpose is to gain a strong understanding of the positive 
and negative ways in which a restructuring of salary schemes can affect the school culture and the 
professional well being of teachers. The study aims to contribute to the study of how countries can best 
attract and retain the most talented and qualified teachers.  You will be asked to provide some 
professional background information about yourself and to reflect on the impact of the 2011 salary reform 
on your school. The interview should last no longer than one hour.  In order to accurately document the 
information gathered from the interview, you will be asked to give consent for the audio recording of the 
interview. The interview will only be recorded with your written permission. Only the primary researcher 
will have access to the research notes and any available recordings. All participants will remain 
anonymous in all published findings and reports.  This research will be conducted by Raisa Belyavina, the 
principal and only investigator of this study. The research will be conducted at a mutually-determined 
location either inside or outside of the school.   
RISKS AND BENEFITS: You will be asked to share information about your experience and your school’s 
experience adapting to the 2011 reform, which may be sensitive or critical. The research has the same 
amount of risk individuals have in discussing this topic with colleagues.  The anticipated benefits of this 
study are the strengthening of understanding of the impacts of reforms on schools and teachers.  
PAYMENTS: There will be no payment for your participation in the research. 
DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: All participants will receive pseudonyms to protect 
anonymity.  Data will be stored confidentially and used only for professional purposes.  All electronic data, 
when possible, will be stored in password-protected files and on password-protected equipment. Physical 
files will be stored with the principal investigator in a locked case.   
TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will take approximately one hour. 
HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED: The results of the study will be used in a dissertation to be authored 
and presented to a five-person university committee by the principal investigator.  Data may also be 
presented at conferences, published in journals, and used for other educational purposes. The data may 
also be used to present policy recommendations on technical assistance projects in education for 
relevant organization and government officials. 
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APPENDIX C 
Indicator Data, Kyrgyz Republic 
Table 1. Economic indicators  
Indicator Year Source of Data 
GDP per capita/Purchasing 
power parity (PPP) 
$2,193 
USD 
2005 World Bank 
Poverty rate at $2.50 USD per 
day (%) 
31.5 2007/2008 World Bank 
Poverty at nationally 
designated rate (%) 
33.7 2007/2008 World Bank 
Number of social assistance 
beneficiaries (thousands) 
610 2008/2009 World Bank 
Maximum share of population 
who are social assistance 
beneficiaries (%) 
11.7 2008/2009 World Bank 
LRIS direct and indirect 
beneficiaries (thousands) 
387 2008/2009 World Bank 
Share of population (%) 7.5 2008/2009 World Bank 
Share of LRIS Benefits Going 
to the Poorest Quintile (%) 
Approximat
ely 50 
N/A World Bank 
Share of the Poorest Quintile 
Covered by LRIS 
22 2007 World Bank 
Inequality (Gini) 0.348 2008 World Bank 
Employment in agriculture (% 
of total employment) 
36.3 2008 World Bank 
Size of unobserved economy 
(% of GDP) 
38.8 2008 Schneider, Buehn, and 
Montenegro (2010) 
Reduction in poverty 
headcount  through LRIS 
benefits (As a percentage of 
pretransfer index) 
4.0 N/A World Bank 
Reduction in poverty gap 
through LRIS benefits (As a 
12.4 N/A World Bank 
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percentage of pre-transfer 
index) 
Reduction in Gini index 
through LRIS benefits (As a 
percentage of pre-transfer 
index) 
1.4 N/A World Bank 
Reduction in poverty 
headcount through all social 
assistance benefits (As a 
percentage of pre-transfer 
index) 
4.2 N/A World Bank 
Reduction in poverty gap 
through all social assistance 
benefits (As a percentage of 
pre-transfer index) 
13.1 N/A World Bank 
Reduction in Gini index 
through all social assistance 
benefits (As a percentage of 
pre-transfer index) 
3.2 N/A World Bank 
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog /world-development-indicators, and ECAPOV 
(database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://povertydata.worldbank.org 
/poverty/region/ECA  
 
Table 2. Demographic data  
Indicator Year Source  
Population 5,800,000  2007/2008 World Bank 
Number of social 
assistance beneficiaries 
(thousands) 
610,000 2008/2009 World Bank 
LRIS direct and indirect 
Beneficiaries (thousands) 
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Table 3. Poverty rates, select years 
Indicator Year Source 
Poverty rate at $2.15 USD per 
day (%) 
49.1 1998 World Bank 
Poverty rate at $4.30 USD per 
day (%) 
84.1 1998 World Bank 
Poverty rate at $2.50 USD per 
day (%) 
31.5 2007/2008 World Bank 
Poverty rate (USD rate not 
specified) 
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APPENDIX D 
Tarifikatzia Example 1 
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APPENDIX E 
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Stimulus Fund Coefficients Table Example 2 
 
 	  
 
